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TO DAVID ROSNER
DICTA takes this opportunity to express its appreciation
to David Rosner for a job well and cheerfully done. Dave is
taking an extended and well-earned vacation from the practice
of law and has resigned as the extremely successful and effective
"Supervisor General" of DICTA.
A few years ago DICTA was plowing a heavy field-its
power was feeble, its resources meager, its support negligible
and its effectiveness almost nil. The Colorado and Denver Bar
Associations and Denver University decided to do something about
it. They appointed Dave Rosner as "Czar" of DICTA. Dave
walked in, and in characteristic fashion, sparks began to fly. In
a very short time Dave revitalized DICTA. It is financially
sound. Under his guidance it has developed into a substantial
legal publication, which, we hope, will continue to be a credit
to the profession and to lawyers everywhere.
While we ire at it, we can't resist another salute or two on
behalf of the Colorado legal profession and all the organizations
through which it serves-schools, bar associations and courts.
Dave Rosner is one among many and one of the many. He
walks resolutely and alone, but always down the very center
of the stream of humanity and toward the same goal, never
swerving, never faltering, with a kind word and a good deed for
everyone whose shoulder he brushes. During the many years
at the bar, he has made the law a better profession, he has
made his friends capable of better friendships, and he has made
his legal adversaries stronger and more respected.
Our fondest wishes to Dave that his activities will continue
to bring him as great and enduring satisfactions and rewards as
have come to him through his years of faithful and loyal devotion to the law. Good luck, Dave, and come back soon.
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By
JOHN I. ZARIT, M.D.
President, Colorado State Medical Society

and
DOUGLAS MCHENDRIE

President, Colorado Bar Association

Recent years have seen a constant increase in personal injury
litigation, growth in the field of workmen's compensation, and increasing resort to medical opinion for scientific evaluation of facts
in other types of criminal and civil proceedings. This has meant an
expansion of the areas in which the professional activities of doctors
and lawyers merge. While the relations between our two professions in Colorado have remained generally excellent, there have
been occasions when lack of appreciation by a member of the one
profession of the problems, methods and objectives of the other has
resulted in friction, to the detriment of the patients and clients
served by both.
The Colorado State Medical Society and The Colorado Bar Association are dedicated to eliminating these instances, through continuing cooperation and mutual understanding. To this end we
commend to our members the Interprofessional Code jointly adopted by the two organizations in 1958, and urge adherence to its precepts. No better general guide to the doctor-lawyer professional relationship could be found than the basic principles of this Code,
which are an acknowledgment of the essential worth and dignity of
the services of the two professions and a recognition that each profession can serve best through an enlightened and tolerant understanding of the other.
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WHIPLASH INJURIES*
By

ALBERT

E.

ZARLENGO

Albert E. Zarlengo received his A.B.

degree from Regis College in 1930.
He received his LL.B. degree from
the University of Denver College of
Law in 1933, and was a full-time
member of the latter school's faculty from 1936 to 1941. He is a
partner in the Denver firm of McComb, Zarlengo & Mott, and is a
member of the American, Colorado, and Denver Bar Associations.
In the days of the horse and buggy there were no four and six
lane highways and grandpa traveled at a leisurely pace. Whips
were known only as a device to wake up old Dobbin and whiplash
injuries were unheard of. Then came an event which was an important milestone in history and which has materially changed our
way of life - the invention of the automobile. The old buggy with
its one horse power has given way to the car with 300 and more
horse power. Automobile manufacturers recognize this as a fast
age and each tries to out-do the other by creating a car with more
power and greater speed. Five million to six million and more new
cars are manufactured in the United States each year and multilaned highways are constructed to accommodate them. As these
cars speed over superhighways and crowded city streets they are
frequently required to make sudden stops, resulting in numerous
rear-end collisions. The National Safety Council has estimated that
such collisions account for fifteen per cent of all automobile accidents resulting in death, injury or property damage.
There is no doubt that people have suffered neck injuries from
the time man was created, but the term "whiplash injury" is of comparatively recent origin. The term was fathered by the medical
profession and rapidly grew in popularity after an article which
appeared in the Journal of the American Medical Association in
1953.1 Today every lawyer who handles negligence cases, whether
for plaintiffs or for the defense, encounters the term almost daily.
To understand better what is meant by whiplash injury, we
must have a general knowledge of the construction of the neck. The
neck consists of seven vertebrae and is known as the cervical spine.
These vertebrae are quite free and moveable and are so constituted
that the neck can tilt forward, backward or sideward and can rotate. Each vertebrae is separated from the next by an intervertebral
* Clear understanding of this article will be facilitated by reference to the illustrations on
pp. 300 to 303 infro.
1 Gay & Abbott, Common Whiplash Injuries of the Neck, 152 A.M.A.J. 1698 (1953).
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disc, which is a cushion and elastic affair. These discs provide the
mobility and flexibility necessary for the forward, backward and
sideward movements of the spine. The size of the vertebrae increases as we descend down the spinal column, the smallest and
most fragile bones being in the neck area.
The vertebrae have various protrusions on them and are maintained in position and in normal relationship to each other by-ligaments. There are very strong ligaments in the neck, one lying in
front of the cervical vertebrae and the other behind them. These
ligaments require a severe force to injure them. The one in front
is much thicker and is referred to as an anterior longitudinal ligament and the one in the rear as the posterior longitudinal ligament.
There are also numerous muscles in the neck and an intricate
system of nerves and nerve roots. Compression of the nerve roots
is one of the most common complications in whiplash. This causes
a condition known as "radiculitis," or radiating pain. Compression
of the spinal nerves in the area of the neck will usually cause pain
which radiates down the upper arms and may involve one or more
of the fingers. Nerve root compression may also evidence itself in
changes of reflex reactions. The nerve roots, as they come from the
spine and down the arm, form a very definite pattern in the hand,
which fact helps the doctor separate the malingerer from the person
with a real injury.
Although whiplash injuries may be suffered in many ways, they
are usually suffered in automobile accidents, particularly rear-end
collisions. Such an injury has been described as the:
"Damage sustained by the neck structures when
the body, in propulsion, stops suddenly or is suddenly
propelled forward and the head is thrust forceably forward or backward or to either side ....

With the head and

body both traveling at a set rate, no abnormal forces are
transmitted to the neck. But if the forward motion of the
body suddenly stops, momentum carries the head on and
produces an abnormal thrust to the neck.
"Furthermore, if the speed of the body is suddenly
accentuated in forward propulsion, as in a rear-end collision, the head is whipped backward in relation to the
body, so as to produce an abnormal thrust to the neck. Also
the head, in rebound, may then swing on the neck in the
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opposite
direction like the lash component of the whip2
lash."
Since the head and neck extend above the seat, unsupported,
they are thrust backward by the violence of the blow into hyperextension. The rest of the body is supported by the seat and continues to move forward with the car.
Forces from cars which strike at excessive speeds may do less
damage than those which strike at low speeds since the great impact
caused by high speed may dislodge the occupant as well as the seat
thus dissipating some of the force applied to the neck. We therefore
encounter many cases where the occupants complain of injury even
though we have only minor damage to the cars involved. However,
the average car traveling at 10 m.p.h. may transmit a terrific force
to a stopped vehicle. Dr. Emil Seletz in an article on whiplash injuries stated:
"[W] hen a 3,500-lb. car traveling at 10 m.p.h. strikes
the rear of another car it may transmit to this car a force
of 25 tons. The person's body (in the car that is struck)
continues to move forward, while the head, being hinged
at the neck, snaps backward. The average head weighs
about 8 lb., and the cervical vertebrae are very delicate;
the force that is pushing the head backward is even greater
than believed, since the base of the neck acts as a fulcrum
and the leverage is applied near the top of the head. Therefore, the head snaps back with the equivalent of several
tons of force- without any support, since
the muscular
'3
control of the neck is caught off guard.
After the head is thrust acutely backward the neck muscles,
which have an inherent quality of elasticity, attempt to right the
position of the head. Instead, overcompensation may develop and
the head is forced forward. Some doctors feel that it is the latter
movement that produces the greatest damage while others are of
the opinion that the greatest damage is caused when the head is
thrust back. Some doctors also believe that in a severe impact the
head is thrust backward and forward several times. This type of
injury has been described:
"Concussion to the spinal cord and the base of the brain
may develop during the acceleration extension movement
and, more often, during the deceleration oscillation of the
head. The capsular tissues and the accessory ligaments may
stretch or tear. Swelling within these structures from hemorrhage may compress the nerve roots. Lateral or rotational
forces, as when a vehicle is struck from the side, may alter
the size of the intervertebral foramens and further irritate
a cervical nerve root. Extensive tears of the ligaments and
capsular structures may allow anterior or posterior dislocations of the vertebral bodies. Such injuries
to the soft tissues
4
are, of course, not visualized by X-rays.
In recent years the term whiplash injury has been criticized as
2 Gelber, Medico-Legal Aspects of Whiplash Injuries, 78 Miss. Valley Med. J. 215, 216 (1956).
3 Seletz, Whiplash Injuries, 168 A.M.A.J. 1750, 1752 (1958).
4 r- L-n1 Mod;-JI.Le.al Asoects of Injuries to the Neck. 169 A.M.A.J. 216, 219 (1959).
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being a misnomer and being misleadingA It has been stated that
whiplash injury refers to the manner in which an injury occurs
rather than the type injury sustained. When the head snaps back
the cervical spine is bent backwards. This may cause nothing more
than a mild stretching of the ligaments with little or no disability
and little discomfort. On the other hand, the snap forward may be
of such severity that the body of the vertebra will fracture and crush
and if sufficiently severe the spinal cord may be severed, resulting
in death. In between these two extremes there may be injuries of
all degrees of severity. Since the sudden flexing (bending forward)
or extending (bending backward) of the head may cause so many
varieties of disability, using the single term "whiplash injury" to
cover all of them has been objected to. In spite of the criticism of
the term, we still see it used in medical journals, hear it used by
doctors while testifying in court and see the term in appellate court
decisions. As mentioned above, there are many injuries that can
occur when the head is jerked backward or forward and any one or
more of the following may be suffered by the patient:
1. Stretching or straining of the ligaments between the vertebrae but no actual tearing.
2. Rupture of the ligaments with resulting hemorrhaging.
3. Injury to the nerves and nerve roots.
4. Herniation of an intervertebral disc.
5. Subluxation, which is a partial dislocation of the vertebrae.
6. Compression fracture of a vertebra.
7. Concussion.
8. Psychoneurosis.
In the case of a fracture we will have a positive X-ray but in
the other cases there will be nothing abnormal on the X-ray since
the injury is entirely to the soft tissue. The symptoms in these cases
are many and varied. The patient may complain of pain in the neck
and head and stiffness in the neck muscles. In many serious cases
the patient may have lost consciousness for a period or may suffer
some confusion, dizziness, headache, inability to concentrate and
disorientation. A substantial number of patients have symptoms of
pain along the course of specific nerve roots; pain may radiate into
the head, shoulders, arms, chest, hands and jaws. In a number of
cases there are unusual complaints such as blurring of vision and
symptoms involving the patient's hearing.
In many cases of neck injury the patient does not have immediate symptoms and may tell the investigating officer that he was not
injured, which sometimes causes him embarrassment when he is
confronted with the statement in court. Often pain may not occur
for several days after the injury and in some cases the person may
not go to a doctor for weeks. Even in the cases of fracture of the
vertebrae it is not uncommon for patients to have little or no pain
for periods of from several days to several months. It is important
for the injured person's doctor to fully explain this to a jury since a
patient who doesn't complain of pain for days or weeks may be accused of malingering.
It is important that these so-called whiplash injuries be ana5 Id. at 218.
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lyzed and evaluated by both the physician and the lawyer. The
physician gets a history from the patient and takes X-rays and gives
a physical examination so as to determine how serious the injury is.
The X-ray helps little unless there is a fracture since it will be negative and most of the symptoms are subjective (experienced by the
patient himself and not amenable to physical exploration). The doctor must carefully weigh these subjective symptoms with his objective findings (those conditions of the patient which can be perceived
by the doctor) and decide whether he is confronted with a case of
mild sprain, which will subside in a short time, or whether the case
comes under a more serious category which will result in some
permanent disability. All of these injuries are sources of potential
litigation, and the physician should not only use the greatest care in
making his examination and taking the history but should keep
complete and accurate records. Even though X-rays are of little
help in the case of soft tissue injuries, there are many tests and devices now available to the physician. In the case of suspicion of
herniated intervertebral disc the electromyelogram is available. In
this procedure a radiopaque solution is injected into the spinal column. This casts a shadow on the X-ray and shows an abnormal
protrusion into the spinal canal. Discography is an X-ray examination of the cervical discs after injection of a radiopaque substance
into them. It also may be advisable to make an electromyographic
study, which is an electronic method by which objective evidences
of injury to motor nerve muscle units may be detected with a high
degree of accuracy. This is a great help in distinguishing between
functional (neurotic) and organic causes for neck pain.
In the case of a mere strain of the ligaments with no tearing,
the strain or sprain may cause local pain and temporary limitation
of motion but the results are not considered permanent. Where the
ligaments are actually ruptured there is a momentary dislocation of
the cervical joints and the injury may be considered permanent.
There may be bleeding around the spinal cord, paralysis and even
death, but the ordinary X-rays show no bone or joint injury because
the dislocated vertebra has slipped back into position. The bleeding
and swelling around the nerve roots may cause pain to be referred
down the arm into the hand and up into the neck and head. Since
we are dealing with soft tissue injury and the regular X-ray is negative, the doctor is confronted with the problem of distinguishing the
latter injury, which is serious, from the former, which is a minor
strain. It has been suggested that an X-ray be taken with the neck
in a bent or flexed position. "In the latter position the injured joint
will show a slipping of the vertebra at this point so that the upper
vertebra displaces forward on the lower vertebra. With this, there
are objective clinical findings such as muscle spasm, limitation of
motion and a protective way of holding the head." Spasm is a contraction of a muscle and since it is difficult to simulate, it is con6 Van
(1957).

Demork,

Injuries of the Neck and Arm; Their Medicolegal Aspects, 24 Ins. Counsel J. 287

SACHS-LAELOR- CORPORATION SEALS- ALPINE 5-3422

JULY-AUGUST 1959

DICTA

sidered an objective finding. Changes in reflex reactions and changes in the normal curvature (lordotic curve) of the neck are also
objective findings.
A large number of the so-called whiplash injuries of the neck do
not respond to treatment and get poor results. There is a wide divergence among doctors when called upon to give opinions in actions involving such injuries. Psychoneurotic symptoms are freqently present and this helps complicate the picture. In view of this,
Dr. Nicholas Gotten, of the University of Tennessee, decided that
there was need for a study of such whiplash injuries. 7 One hundred
cases were studied and the survey was limited to those cases in
which the problem of compensation and litigation had been ended.
Dr. Gotten and his associates concluded that the emotional factor
plays an important part in the ability of the physician to obtain a
satisfactory result from treatment. The patient's personal reaction
to his injury complicated the evaluation of his symptoms, treatment
and recovery. The nervous tension and anxiety that the patient
developed after the injury tended to create psychoneurotic symptoms which continued for months, being finally resolved to a great
extent by settlement of the litigation. Of the hundred patients with
whiplash type of injuries who were interviewed subsequent to settlement of legal claims for damage, eighty-eight per cent had recovered, fifty-four with no residual disability and thirty-four with
minor symptoms requiring treatment; twelve per cent continued to
have severe symptoms but only six per cent of these were under
medical treatment. Surgery was necessary in only two cases and
was beneficial in both. Psychosomatic symptoms were manifested
in some way in eighty-five per cent of the cases. Loss of time for as
long as three months occurred in forty-one per cent of the cases before settlement of claims but only in seven per cent subsequent to
settlement of claims. The doctor concluded, "the evidence indicates
the great difficulty in evaluating whiplash type of injuries due to
the complicating factor of monetary compensation."
Prior to Dr. Gotten's survey, Drs. Gay and Abbott had made a
study of fifty persons who had suffered whiplash injury to the
neck.,
"Each patient had symptoms and findings characteristic of
7 Gotten, Survey of One Hundred Cases of Whiplash' Injury after Settlement of Litigation, 162
A.M.A.J. 865 (1956).
8 Gay & Abbott, supra note 1.

YOUR OFFICE SAFE
may be safe enough for ordinary purposes but your important documents
should be in a SAFE DEPOSIT BOX in our new modern vault, designed
for both safety and convenience.
A whole year for as little as $5 plus tax.

COLORADO
OF DENVER -

STATE

BANK

SIXTEENTH AT BROADWAY

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

JULY-AUGUST

1959

DICTA

a sprain of the neck. In case of a simple sprain, the symptoms
consisted of pain in the lower cervical spine, limitation of motion in the neck, and spasm and tenderness of the cervical
spine musculature. Movement or jarring of the neck made the
symptoms worse, and, in an acute case, it was characteristic
for the patient to support the neck and head with his hands.
When the injury was remote, some experienced a sensation of
difficulty in supporting the head. In rare instances in which
a second whiplash injury occurred, all symptoms were immediately intensified. Tenderness and spasm were often present in adjacent musculature, including muscles of the upper
thoracic spine and shoulder girdle."
The patients showed general nervous symptoms.
In seventy per cent of the cases there was cervical radiculitis,
the persons having intense pain in the posterior cervical region, with
radiation of pain into the head, lower jaw, shoulder girdle, upper
chest and arms. This was usually accompanied by marked spasm of
the cervical muscles.
In sixty-two per cent of the cases there was evidence of a cerebral concussion. The patients suffered a momentary lapse of consciousness (from seconds to one half hour) and described a blinding
or explosive sensation in the head at the time of the crash. They
immediately had a sensation of being bewildered and dazed and
headache developed in a few minutes or hours. Nervous symptoms
were especially intense in this group.
In twenty-six per cent of the cases a protruded intervertebral
disc in the cervical region was diagnosed clinically. These patients
were treated by conservative measures but eventually two patients
required surgery.
The complication that was most distressing for patient and
physician was a persistent psychoneurotic reaction which was present in fifty-two per cent of the cases.
In their report, the doctors made this observation somewhat in
conflict with Dr. Gotten's findings. "In some patients, the aggravation of legal action was considered important, but, even after settlement, these patients were often partially disabled by recurrent nervous symptoms." The doctors concluded that the patients were more
disabled and remained handicapped for longer periods than was anticipated considering the mild character of the accident and that the
study of patients who suffered from persistent pain many months
after their accident suggests that the injury is more severe and more
complicated than was generally supposed among laity, legal authorities, and physicians.
In commenting on the above study, Dr. John H. Schadffer9 states
that it is improbable that a psychoneurotic reaction is responsible
for prolonged disability in these cases. He feels that it is an organic
cause even though it cannot be demonstrated. The doctor states:
"Even in the less serious whiplash injuries, who can say
how much intervertebral ligamentous tearing exists? Who
can say how much hemorrhage occurs at the site of the
injury and how much subsequent fibrosis and adhesions
9 Schaeffer, Whiplash Injuries of the Neck, 153 A.M.A.J. 974 (1953).
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develop around nerve roots or into or between cervical
muscles? Certainly such things may be expected to result
in some degree of prolonged or permanent impairment.
Even worse, who can say how much or how little trauma of
the cervical cord is incurred?
"Certainly the X-rays cannot give the answers to these
questions ....
Many symptoms are due to real factors that
cannot be objectively demonstrated. Not a few persons die of
causes that cannot be demonstrated by the most thorough
autopsy. Such persons do not die of psychoneuroses."
Dr. Gotten's conclusion that money is the best cure for a whiplash injury has been challenged by many doctors. One authority
states: 10
"Gotten's data are somewhat untenable. Most patients do
show some or marked improvement after two years. (Two
years represents the average time before litigation was completed in Gotten's cases). It is impossible for me to believe
that 84% of any group would be conscious or unconscious
malingerers. Gotten's data were evaluated by medical students who certainly cannot be expected to understand the
complexities of the whole already confused picture of neck
injuries. Generalizations are dangerous and inaccurate. Every case must be judged on its own merits."
10 1 Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia 462.
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Just as the doctor is faced with the problem of determining the
seriousness of these injuries, the lawyer is faced with the problem
of placing a fair money value on them. In most of these cases the
medical and hospital bill is not large and in many cases the patient
loses little time from work, suffering but small wage loss. The main
item of damage is pain and suffering and possible permanent involvement. Assuming there is liability what should the injured person receive as damages? How much will a jury award in the case
of a simple whiplash injury? If a substantial verdict is rendered
will it be sustained by an appellate court? It is impossible to answer
these questions with any degree of accuracy but it is helpful to see
what has been awarded in cases of this type.
There are, no doubt, hundreds of actions brought each year
throughout the country seeking damages for these so-called whiplash injuries, many of them reaching appellate courts. A check of
the authorities shows that the number of cases decided by appellate
courts gets larger each year. Many of the cases involve not only a
whiplash injury but also a serious injury involving other parts of
the body. The following summary covers cases decided by various
appellate courts in the past three or four years. An attempt was
made to select cases where the whiplash was the main injury although in some of the cases there were other minor injuries involved. In all of the cases the court, in its opinion, used the term
"whiplash injury." In many of the opinions the amount of medical
expense incurred, or wage loss suffered, is not given, the court considering the injury in general terms.
AWARDS OF LEss THAN $1000

Simmons v. Pierce:" Liability was admitted in a rear-end collision in which plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury requiring him to
be put in traction and suffered other minor injuries. The medical
cost was not shown but the wage loss was $240. The lower court
awarded plaintiff $500 but this was increased to $3,000 by the appellate court.
Grayson v. Pellmounter:12 Plaintiff sued for whiplash injury
and was awarded $500 by a jury. The defendant's doctor had examined plaintiff and found no injury. The appellate court refused
to hold that the verdict was inadequate.
Baker v. Hill:13 Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was
struck in the rear by defendant's car. Plaintiff suffered a whiplash
injury of the neck and spinal column. He had no objective symptoms of whiplash injury. The doctors were in disagreement on the
extent of disability. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for
$500. The appellate court stated that this was not so inadequate as
to show passion or prejudice and affirmed the judgment.
Meeks v. Yancy: 14 There was a rear-end collision and the three
passengers in the car which was struck received whiplash injuries.
11 104 So. 2d 258 (La. App. 1958).
12 308 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).

13 8 CCH Auto Cos. 2d 1248 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1955).
,4 311 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).
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The case went to the jury on the issue of damages only. The first
plaintiff, age sixty-seven, claimed a whiplash injury which aggravated an old arthritic condition. Her disability at the time of the
trial was between five and ten per cent and the doctor stated that
she would have a residual disability. The second plaintiff, forty-two,
was hospitalized nineteen days, spent ten days in traction and the
doctor stated that the whiplash aggravated a pre-existing spinal
condition that resulted in a five per cent disability in the low back
and a ten to fifteen per cent disability in the neck. The medical cost
was $629. The jury awarded $750. The third plaintiff contended
that the whiplash aggravated a prior arthritis and she was corroborated by her doctor. Her medical costs were $130 and the jury
awarded $300. The appellate court affirmed the judgments, refusing to hold that the sums awarded were so inadequate as to show
passion or prejudice.
Whyatt v. Kukura:51 There was the typical rear-end collision in
which plaintiff claimed a whiplash injury. It appeared that she had
a pre-existing arthritis of the neck and that her medical expense
was $276. A jury verdict in the sum of $750 was affirmed by the appellate court.
Seydel v. Reuber:16 The doctors stated that plaintiff was suffering from a whiplash involving the head and neck. Medical and hospital expense amounted to $1812. There was also some wage loss.
The jury awarded $800. This was increased to $2000 by the trial
court. The appellate court held the increased amount to be inadequate and a new trial was granted on the issue of damages only.
AWARDS OVER $1000 AND LESS THAN

$3500

7

Hollander v. Earwood:1 Plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury. It
appeared that her "cervical spine showed reversal of the normal
curvature and there is slight narrowing of the 5th and 6th cervical
disc spaces and hypertrophic changes in these two levels." It further appeared that pain and limitation of motion would be recurrent
for at least a year. A jury verdict for $1500 was affirmed by the
Appellate Court.
Moses v. Southern Production Company:'8 Liability was ad157 Cal. App. 2d 803, 321 P.2d 860 (1958).
16 94 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. 1959).
17 12 CCH Auto. Cos. 2d 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1957).
15

18 101 So. 2d 485 (La Ct. App. 1958).
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mitted by the defendant. The doctor found that plaintiff was suffering from a whiplash injury which required him to be hospitalized
for thirteen days. Medical expenses amounted to $651. There was
an award of $1500 which was increased to $2423 by the Appellate
Court.
Benoit v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co.:19 Plaintiff suffered an
injury to the neck and spine "in the nature of a whiplike injury."
There was no mention in the opinion of the medical expense or
whether there was any permanent disability. An award of $2000 was
affirmed.
2
" Here again we have a rear-end collision after
Hodge v. Britton:
which plaintiff claimed a whiplash injury of the neck. The opinion
gives no detail as to the extent of disability. The trial court awarded plaintiff $2000 and awarded her husband $1500 for loss of services, medical expense and car damage. This was held as not excessive.
Mitchell v. Pierce:2 Plaintiff's doctor stated that plaintiff had
suffered a brain concussion, nervous shock and a whiplash injury of
the neck. The physician appointed by the court stated that plaintiff's complaints were largely subjective. There was no lost time
from work. Special damages for medical expense and car damage
amounted to $317. The jury awarded $2,217, which was affirmed.

AWARDs OVER $3500

AND LESS THAN
22

$5000

Watts v. Delta Fire and Casualty Co.: Plaintiff suffered the
mildest form of whiplash injury, was not hospitalized and lost no
time from work. The doctor stated that recovery in these cases may
require eighteen months and in some cases, several years. A verdict
for $3500 was sustained.
Lawrence v. Great American Indemnity Co.:23 Plaintiff suffered
a whiplash injury confining her to the hospital for twelve days. She
was totally incapacitated an additional six or seven weeks and the
doctor stated that pain would last a year. A $3500 verdict was sustained.
Green v. United States:24 This was an action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act wherein plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury resulting in trauma to the ligaments along the vertebral column and possible hemorrhage. She was unable to perform her household duties
for one month and was partially impaired from returning to full
household duties up to the time of the trial. She suffered headaches
and limitation of motion in the neck. A year and a half after the accident there was a twenty per cent limitation of bending to the side
and back. The court awarded plaintiff $3562.
Harvey v. Great American Indemnity Co: 25 An award of $4,000
for whiplash injury of the neck with some permanent disability was
held proper.
19 79 So. 2d 647 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
20 12 CCH Auto. Cos. 2d 1352 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1957).
21 106 So. 2d 536 (La. Ct. App. 1958).
22 106 So. 2d 753 (La. Ct. App. 1958).
23 107 So. 2d 338 (La. Ct. App. 1958).
24 136 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
25 110 So. 2d 595 (La. Ct. App. 1959).
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Phillips v. Travelers' Indemnity Co.:2 A $4000 award for intermittently painful whiplash injury to plaintiff's spine was held
proper.
AWARDS OvER $5000 AND LESS THAN $7500
Veterans Cab Co. v. Hill:27 Plaintiff had a five to ten per cent
disability with a wage loss of $1800 and medical expense in the sum
of $1032. An award of $5680 was held not excessive.
AWARDS OvER

$7500

AND LESS THAN $10,000

28

Attaya v. Zimmerle: This was a typical rear-end collision
wherein plaintiff claimed a whiplash injury to the neck. Plaintiff's
doctors stated that there was no permanent disability. The medical
cost amounted to $105. There was a jury verdict for $7500 which
was reduced to $2500 by the appellate court.
Town & Country Securities Co. v. Place:29 Plaintiff suffered a
whiplash injury to the neck which resulted in $1100 loss of earnings
and medical expense in excess of $600. The doctor stated that there
would probably be some permanent disability. A jury verdict for
$7500 was held not excessive.
Fisch v. Manger & Braum:2 0 Plaintiff suffered a severe injury
which was diagnosed as a "whiplash injury, the head had been
snapped back by an impact." It was later determined that plaintiff
had a ruptured disc and he underwent surgery. There was a $620
wage loss and the hospital expense exceeded $2200. Defendant offered no medical testimony to contradict plaintiff's doctors. Plaintiff had a prior accident but it appeared that he had made a good
recovery. The jury returned a verdict for $3000 but this was increased to $7500 by the District Court. The appellate court held
that this was inadequate and granted a new trial on the issue of
damages only.
2
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Palmer:
1 This was a
rear-end collision wherein plaintiff thought he was not injured.
Upon examination the next morning the doctor stated he was suffering from a moderately severe whiplash injury of the neck. A
jury award in the sum of $7830 was sustained by the appellate court.

AWARDs OvER $10,000

AND

LESS THAN $20,000

2

Seymour v. House:0' Defendant admitted liability in a rear-end
collision wherein plaintiff claimed a whiplash injury to the neck.
A jury verdict in the sum of $10,000 was reversed by the appellate
court since there was not sufficient evidence on the issue of loss of
earnings to justify submission of this issue to the jury.
26 108 So. 2d 657 (La. Ct. App. 1959).
27 16 CCH Auto. Cos. 2d 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1958)°
28 83 So. 2d 676 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
29 79 Ariz. 122, 285 P.2d 165 (1955).
90 24 NJ. 66, 130 A.2d 815(1957).
31 263 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1959).
32 305 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1957).
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Milnor Fast Service Laundry and Cleaning v. Kraft:33 Plaintiff
was a sixteen-year-old girl and suffered a ten per cent permanent
disability in the neck. An award of $10,000 was held not excessive.
34
Oberhaus v. Eichwald:
Plaintiff's doctor stated that he had
sustained a whiplash injury and that there was a soft tissue involvement and scarring which was permanent. Medical expenses
totalled $170 and wage loss was $121. A jury verdict in the sum of
$15,000 plus $1072 for car damage was sustained.
AWARDS OvER $20,000 AND LESS THAN $35,000
Kroger Co. v. Rawlings:35 Plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury
to her neck with the result that the ligaments or soft structure that
held the cervical vertebrae were torn or bruised. She wore a Thomas
Collar constantly for six months and thereafter at various times. She
complained of headaches and pain in the back of the neck. The doctor thought that plaintiff would eventually recover with no permanent disability. Plaintiff had incurred no medical expense since this
was awarded to the husband in a separate verdict. A $20,000 verdict
for plaintiff was reduced to $15,000 by the trial court and was held
not excessive by the appellate court.
Riggs v. Metcalf:3 6 Plaintiff suffered whiplash injury to her
neck and generalized body bruises resulting in permanent disability
of fifty to sixty per cent of the body as a whole. An award of $20,000 was sustained.
AWARDS OF

$35,000
3

OR MORE

Dallas Transit Co., v. Collier: 7 Plaintiff's doctor stated that
plaintiff was suffering from a whiplash injury of his cervical spine
with nerve root irritation, sprain and instability of the lumbar spine
and probable ruptured disc. Plaintiff was a laborer fifty-three years
of age. He was hospitalized for a time but the opinion gives no information on the amount of medical or wage loss. The doctor stated
that the plaintiff could not hold a job that required his presence
seven or eight hours a day. A jury verdict in the sum of $35,838 was
sustained by the appellate court.
The Colorado Supreme Court case of Pueblo v. Ratliff, 8 though
not a true whiplash case, is of great interest. Ih this case plaintiff
suffered a neck injury and plaintiff's doctor stated that there was
"some arthritic changes and slight narrowing of the 5th interspace
disc." Another of plaintiff's doctors stated that plaintiff had some
permanent disability. Defendant's doctor testified that the X-rays
showed no evidence of fracture, dislocation or other injury. He diagnosed the injury as a sprain and was of the opinion that there was
no permanent disability. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $35,000. On appeal the Supreme Court held that
the extent of permanent disability was left to conjecture and that
108 So. 2d 564 (Miss. 1959).
303 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1957).
s5 251 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1958).
86315 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1958).
33
84

37 317 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
38 131 Colo. 381, 281 P.2d 1021 (1955).
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the award was excessive and the case was sent back for a new trial.
A second trial resulted in a hung jury. In the third trial the evidence showed that plaintiff had a life expectancy of 25.27 years, that
he had earnings as a watch maker of seventy-five dollars a week and
that he was one hundred per cent disabled to do watch making due
to the injury. The evidence showed that he was suffering from a
cervical disc injury that might not be alleviated by surgery, also
that if the surgery was unsuccessful it might cause partial paralysis.
The jury returned a verdict in the sum of $37,500 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The medical authorities are not in agreement on the question of
the seriousness of such injuries and the legal authorities likewise
are hard to reconcile. In many cases small verdicts were rendered
where the injury seemed to warrant more and in other cases large
verdicts were rendered where the injuries appeared to be minor.
The term "whiplash injury" covers injuries of various degrees of
severity and each case should be decided on its own facts. Justice
will best be done when doctors will carefully analyze the injury
using all of the devices and tests available to them and when lawyers will present the case to the court and jury with a specific description of the injury rather than in the general term "whiplash
injury."
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Here's a tip that can pay handsome sales dividends. Urge your
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a "call-collect" plan tailor-made to your needs, just call our
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RUPTURED CERVICAL DISC-A NEW METHOD OF
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT
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and the University of Michigan
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societies. From 1945 through 1956
he served as Assistant in Neurosurgery at -the University of Colorado School of Medicine. During
the past twenty years he has contributed many papers to medical
journals and meetings.
The increasing speed of modern transportation has resulted in a
marked increase in accidents which shock and damage the human
body. Collisions at these increased speeds result in damage to the
body structures that are most vulnerable either by their inherent
nature or by the situation in which they are placed. Most parts of
the body if protected by a crash pad, safety belt, head rest or other
proper means of deceleration may escape serious damage. But very
few means of transportation provide protection for the cervical
spine. As a result, neck injury (whiplash) is rapidly becoming a
major problem.
The neck may be damaged in other ways than by automobile
accidents. A person may slip and fall, striking his head in such a
fashion as to wrench his neck, he may receive a blow that compresses his neck or he may sustain a direct blow to the neck. Injury
may also occur to the neck structures from repeated attritions, as in
boxing or in work which entails constant jolting.
As a result of such injury, the soft tissues of the neck, the cervical spine itself, and the cervical intervertebral discs may be contused, lacerated, fractured or ruptured. The stress, often applied in
a whip-cracking or a shearing-tearing manner, may result in stretching and tearing of ligaments, muscles and other soft tissue structures, stretching, tearing or crushing of nerve structures, fracture
and dislocation of bony structures, and crushing, fracturing and dis-
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location of disc structures. Injury to the disc structures with resultant nerve damage is the problem with which we are here concerned.
Plate I shows a normal disc, looking from the top down at the
cervical structure. A comparison of this with Plate IV will show
how a ruptured disc may press on nerve roots, resulting in nerve
damage. Plate V is a side view of the neck, and shows the relation
of the discs to the seven vertebrae.
Experience with cases of neck injury has led me to conclude
that the cervical discs are damaged much more often than has been
believed in the past and that many patients with neck injury and
diagnosis of neck sprain actually have one or more ruptured cervical
discs requiring removal.
The symptoms include headache, shoulder pain, chest pain, and
pain throughout the arm and hand; numbness and tingling in the
arm and hand; weakness and wasting in the muscles of the shoulder
girdle, the arm, forearm and hand; and sensory changes in the upper
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extremities. When these symptoms are found in proper relation,
they will suggest that a cervical disc has been ruptured. X-ray
studies of the neck are then valuable in establishing a diagnosis.
The discogram (Plate II) is a relatively new X-ray procedure
which will confirm a diagnosis of damaged cervical discs. The technique consists of injecting the suspected disc or discs with a dye
which can be seen in the X-ray. Resulting pain may indicate injury, and the extent of the damage can be estimated and the disc
involved accurately determined.
A patient with an injured neck should be treated conservatively
for a period of three months. At the end of this time, if his symptoms are still disabling, I believe a discogram should be performed.
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If the discogram reveals disc injury and his symptoms are aggravated during the test, he should be operated upon.
Until recently almost all cervical disc surgery was performed
from the back. Posterior laminectomy (Plate III) is technically difficult and in many instances is hazardous. Consequently most surgeons who have done posterior cervical laminectomies continue to
search for a better method.
About ten years ago, interest was first shown in an anterior
surgical approach to the cervical disc problem, but no definite procedural plan was developed. Then in 1955 Robinson and Smith reported that an anterior approach had achieved quite favorable results.
In November of 1958, Cloward, of Honolulu, reported remarkable success with another anterior approach to the cervical disc and
vertebra (Plate III). His operation is carried out in the front of the
neck, and the important structures in the neck are moved aside to
expose the vertebral column. The ruptured intervertebral disc is

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST

1959

removed directly, and the spinal cord and nerve roots are thus freed
of pressure (Plate IV). Finally, a plug of bone is cut from the ilium
and inserted between the vertebrae in order to fuse the two (Plate
V). It is his operation that I have been using.
Cloward says, and my experience has confirmed his findings,
that it is possible by this method to remove all of the disc and the
bony parts of the vertebra that are pressing on nerve roots or the
spinal cord, much more completely than was possible with the posterior approach. Furthermore, the dangers of injury to the spinal
cord and nerve roots in the posterior operation are largely eliminated by this method.
An amazing number of persons who have suffered intermittent
disabling neck complaints for years as a result of "whiplash" or
other accidents are found by the new method of diagnosis to have a
ruptured cervical disc instead of a commonly diagnosed psychoneurosis.
By the new improved anterior surgical treatment of ruptured
cervical discs, many of these patients are being relieved.
This combination of diagnosis of ruptured cervical discs by the
use of the discogram and surgical treatment by the anterior approach, as developed by Cloward, holds for victims of current accidents a promise of avoiding prolonged suffering.
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INTRODUCTION

This article is concerned with and limited to the recovery of
compensatory damages for pain and suffering, which accompany
and relate to a bodily injury. There shall be no discussion of traumatic neurosis as it relates to this area of recovery, since that subject is well-deserving of separate treatment.
It would be superfluous to cite authority for the proposition that
one may recover damages for "pain and suffering" resulting from a
bodily injury. As is often generally stated, such a recovery encompasses past, present and future pain and suffering; however, courts
have varied greatly in their degree of analysis and sophistication to
ward the many problems inhering in this area of damage law. No
doubt such variances are due in large measure to the incisiveness or
lack of incisiveness on the part of counsel coming before their respective bars. The Colorado courts have not been overly extended
in their consideration of this area.
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION AND CATEGORIZATION

Perhaps the most striking and immediate problem is that relating to definition and semantics. Pain, grief, fright, humiliation,
anxiety, mortification, nervousness, vexation and anguish are but a
few of the common expressions used to describe forms of human
suffering. Even if it could be said that certain forms of suffering are
universally compensable and that other forms of suffering are universally not compensable, there would still exist the tremendous
dilemma of adequate classification and distinction. Surely, as the
medical specialist gains insight into the recesses of the human mind,
these broad categorizations become less and less meaningful and
functional.
The Colorado courts have traditionally given and approved the
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broadest type of instruction regarding pain and suffering. There
has been a strong tendency to make simple reference to pain and
suffering without limitation, illustration or definition. Early cases
suggested that a recovery was permitted for "bodily suffering," no
mention being made of "mental suffering.", Somewhat later cases
indicate tacit approval of instructions allowing jury consideration
of "bodily pain and mental suffering. ' 2 More recently, the cases recite instructions including notions of "physical and mental pain and
anguish." 3 This, of course, allows the jury tremendous latitude (and
lack of direction) where opposing counsel have not sought a more
definitive set of instructions.
Recognizing the inadequacy of classification, we shall, nevertheless, consider the attitude of courts toward some of the various
types of suffering.
1. Pain and the Mental Awareness of Pain. All courts agree that
a recovery may be had for the pain attending the injury proper. This
type of reaction might verbally be described, from a layman's point
of view, as aching, throbbing, and burning sensations.4 Some jurisdictions which have considered the problem of pain and suffering
during unconsciousness have determined that there can be little or
no suffering under such circumstances. 5 These holdings represent a
crude analysis, for while there might be no conscious suffering during periods of "unconsciousness," there may, nevertheless, be subsurface anguish and reaction. These few cases do not distinguish
forms or types of non-consciousness, e.g., coma or sleep. Compensation for pain, per se, can become somewhat more accurate and finite
as those who are expert in such matters educate juries on investigations and research into individual tolerances and pain thresholds.
2. Humiliation. There is some disagreement as to whether or
not suffering in the form of humiliation is a compensable area of
recovery when attendant upon physical injury. Most courts today
permit such a recovery in all types of cases involving physical injury whether or not the injury was attributable to a negligent or intended act.6 Other courts have permitted an award for humiliation
only where the act complained of was attended by circumstances of
willfulness or wantonness or have indicated that no recovery is permitted without specifically discussing the possibility of exceptions
to their generalization. 7 The problem of compensation for humiliation usually arises in disfigurement cases.
1 Wall v. Livezay, 6 Colo. 465 (1882).
2 E.g., Denver Tramway Co. v. Martin, 44 Colo. 324, 98 Pac. 836 (1908).
3 King v. Avila, 127 Colo. 538, 259 P.2d 268 (1953); Murraw v. Whiteley, 125 Colo. 392, 244 P.2d
657 (1952); Gerick v. Brock, 120 Colo. 394, 210 P.2d 214 (1949).
4 See excellent analysis in Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So.2d 541 (1951).
5 Stone v. Sinclair Refining Co., 229 Mich. 103, 200 N.W. 948 (1924); Fries v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
R.R., 159 Minn. 328, 198 N.W. 998 (1924); see Vanderlippe v. Midwest Studies, Inc., 137 Neb. 289,
289 N.W. 341 (1939) (holding, in effect, that there could be no recovery for pain while under the influence of a morphine sedative).
6 See Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So. 2d 541 (1951). In this Mississippi case involving personal injuries arising out of a claim founded in negligence the trial court instructed the jury that there
could be no recovery for mental suffering after the Physical pain of the injury had ceased. The appellate
court reversed the trial court, holding there could be a recovery for humiliation arising as a reaction to
disfigurement, thus overruling a long line of contrary Mississippi cases. And see Grenawalt v. Nyhuis,
335 Mich. 76, 55 N.W.2d 736 (1952) (plaintiff recovered for humiliation caused by a hairdresser's negligence resulting in plaintiff's inability to dye her hair from its premature white color as she had done
for some twenty years); Erie Railroad Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920); Restatement, Torts § 905(b)
and illustration 3 (1939).
7 See Halliday v. Ingram, 78 R.I. 464, 82 A.2d 875 (1957) (negligence action; award refused for
alleged facial disfigurement of seven-year-old girl); Hoffman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 255 S.W.2d
736 (Mo. 1953) (no recovery permitted in negligence case for twenty-six-year-old woman's alleged
embarrassment over the possibility of her sterility).
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Decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court have seemingly leaned
toward the view that humiliation does not constitute an element of
award, absent a willful or wanton act, where such humiliation is
precipitated by physical injury. In Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harryman8 our -court held that there was insufficient evidence upon
which to base a recovery for humiliation, even though the plaintiff's
leg was shortened three-eights inch to one inch because of injuries
sustained. That court effectively determined that no reasonable
man could suffer mental embarrassment over the mere shortening
of a leg, at least not sufficient embarrassment to warrant compensation. By way of dictum, the court strongly hinted that even if a
proper case for humiliation were made out there could be no such
recovery unless the tortious conduct of the defendant had been colored by malice or indifference. 9
It is interesting to note that the Colorado court has permitted
damages for humiliation in many situations not involving or accompanying physical harm. These are all instances where the very tortious act of the defendant portended humiliation on the part of the
plaintiff. 10 These cases are interesting because they defy the rationale of the Diamond Rubber case wherein that court suggested that
damages for humiliation are too uncertain. 1 If damages of this nature are not too uncertain in one instance, why should they be too
uncertain in another instance? The incidence of maliciousness
and/or willfulness would not make the element of damages for humiliation more certain, although, in terms of social policy, such damages might be more desirable." It is indeed unlikely that the present incumbents of the Colorado Supreme Court would support the
philosophy of the Diamond Rubber case.
3. Anxiety over Possible Consequences of the Injury. Most
courts permit recovery for that anxiety which can be reasonably related to the physical injury. 13 While courts will recognize variations
in sensitivities of different individuals, the plaintiff's anxiety must
not be totally unrealistic or abnormal.' 4 There appears to be no
Colorado case with a square holding or analysis of this point in physical injury case. 15
4. Vexation and Annoyance. Courts are not disposed to allow a
recovery for mere collateral annoyance even though attributable to
841 Colo. 415, 92 Pac. 922 (1907).
9 Id. at 427, 92 Pac. at 926. And see the further suggestion of approval of this postion in Denver
Tramway Co. v. Martin, 44 Colo. 324, 98 Pac. 836 (1908), where the court noted that "fright" is a well
recognized element of compensable suffering, but indicated a less kindly disposition tpward "humiliation"; cf Jones v. Franklin, 11 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 464 (May 25, 1959) (court approved instructions
calling for an award for fear, anxiety, indignity, and disgrace in an assault and battery case); Blecker
v. Colorado & So. R.R., 50 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481 (1911) (court attempted to distinguish the Diamond
Rubber case); Colorado Utilities Corp. v. Casady, 89 Colo. 156, 300 Pac. 601 (1931) (court's instruction
possibly indicates a contrary attitude).
10 Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932); Sager v. Sisters of
Mercy, 81 Colo. 498, 256 Pac. 8 (1927); Westessen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pac. 689
(1925); cf Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913).
11 41 Colo. at 427, 92 Pac. at 926.
2 See comment on rule of certainty in pain and suffering case in Fehely v. Senders, 170 Ore. 457,
135 P.2d 283, 290 (1943). This case also contains an excellent review of recovery for humiliation in
disfigurement cases.
13 E.g., Figlar v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 53 A.2d 645 (1947) (plaintiff allowed to recover for anxiety
based on fear of epilepsy from brain laceration); Carter v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 47
N.J. Super. 379, 136 A.2d 15 (1957) (plaintiff's recovery based on worry over health of unborn baby
sustained); accord, Fehely v. Senders, su'pra note 12; see Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1104, 1109-13 (1943); Restatement, Torts § 905, comment e (1939) (which tends to be hesitant and vague as to requisites for
an anxiety award).
14 Restatement, Torts § 905, comment i (1939).
15 But see cases cited note 9 supro.
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the defendant's acts. While the courts have again waved the flag of
uncertainty and difficulty of pecuniary measurement,' the more
reasonable basis for a refusal to allow an award in this area would
seem to be founded on concepts of public policy and reasonable limitations on the scope of liability.
5. Loss of Capacity to Work. There is almost universal acceptance of the principle that a housewife cannot recover for loss of time
or theoretical earnings on account of her inability to pursue her
household chores, as distinguished from any employment outside the
home. Of course, a husband is permitted a recovery for the loss of
his wife's services in the home. Colorado courts have admitted evidence on this point under several theories. Evidence as to loss of
capacity to work, as compared to loss of earnings, has been allowed
to demonstrate the nature of the housewife's physical condition before and after a given personal injury. 17 Such evidence has also
been admitted on the theory that such a loss of capacity causes mental suffering on the part of the housewife."' Precedents for this position are found in a long line of Georgia cases 0 and it appears that
the Colorado position derived from one such Georgia decision.
FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING

1. The Problem of Proof. While there is general acceptance that
future pain and suffering are compensable, there is no universal
agreement as to 0the degree and nature of proof required to sustain
2
such a recovery.
Most states appear committed to the rule that future pain and
suffering must appear to be a reasonable certainty. -1 A minority of
states merely require that there be a reasonable probability of future pain and suffering.2 2 Colorado
has indicated a preference for
23
the "reasonable certainty" rule..
There is further disagreement among states following the "reasonable certainty" rule with regard to the admission of opinion evidence. Some cases distinctly hold that testimony couched in terms
indicating less than such a certainty of future pain and suffering is
inadmissible and possible grounds for reversible error..2 4 Other cases
have held that testimony indicating possibility of future pain is admissible and is sufficient to create a jury issue. 21 It would appear
that a rational view would admit any related testimony on future
pain, and at the close of the evidence determine as a matter of law
whether or not the matter should be taken from the jury.2-'
16 O'Conner v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 2 So. 2d 234, 237 (La. 1941) (mental suffering
from having to forego a vacation because of injuries, too speculative and uncertain).
17 Colorado Springs & Interurban R.R. v. Nichols, 41 Colo. 272, 92 Pac. 691 (1907); Colorado Springs
& Interurban R.R. v. Marr. 26 Colo. App. 48, 141 Poc. 142 (1914).
18 Colorado Springs & Interurban R.R. v. Nichols, supra note 17, at 276.
10 E.g., Chanley v. Shirah, 96 Go. App. 91, 99 S.E.2d 365 (1957).
20 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423 (1932).
21 Id. at 439-67.
2'-Id. at 467-70; see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McAlister, 256 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
23 Cookman v. Caidwell, 64 Cola. 206, 170 Pac. 952 (1918).
24 Haase v. Ryan, 100 Ohio App. 285, 136 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1955) (doctor's testimony that plaintiff
"may" have headaches, dizzy spells and change of personality resulting in part from an intracraniar
hemorrhage held inadmissible and prejudicial error); accord, Gray v. Richardson, 313 III. App. 626, 40
N.E.2d 598 (1942).
25 McDuffie v. Root, 300 Mich. 286, 1 N.W.2d 544, 548 (1942) (doctor's testimony that plaintiff's
headaches "might" continue as a result of skull fracture held sufficient to send future pain issue to
jury although court subscribed to "reasonable certainty" rule).
26 See excellent discussion in Shawnee-Tecumseh Traction Co. v. Griggs, 50 Okla. 566, 151 Pac. 230
(19 15).
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Almost all jurisdictions observe the principle that neither expert nor lay testimony is required on the issue of future pain and
suffering, if the nature of the injury suggests only one reasonable
conclusion-that there will be extended suffering. 27 If future pain
and suffering are not apparent to the layman, then their reasonably
certain (or probable) occurrence must be adequately proved by expert opinion. 28 There need be no permanent injury to provide the
lasting
basis for a recovery for future pain; any pain and suffering
29
beyond the day of trial is compensable and sufficient.
2. Instruction on Nature and Degree of Proof. Even those courts
which require that future pain and suffering be a "reasonable certainty" have tended to be generous in tolerating loose and vague instructions on this point. Many courts have approved instructions
which lack the magic words "reasonable certainty." These appellate
courts have declined to reverse where instructions spoke in terms
of future pain and suffering that "may occur," "are likely to occur,"
27 Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1149, 1151-54 (1938).
28 Id. at 1154-58.
29 Annot., 81 A.LR. 423, 434-36 (1932); see Dunham v. Stone, 96 N.H. 138, 71 A.2d 412 (1950).
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"are reasonably likely to occur," or "probably will occur. ' 30 There
are few Colorado cases concerned directly with the propriety and
precise wording of such an instruction 3 1 although it is to be noted
that the words "reasonably certain" do not appear in the reported
32
cases which recite the instructions on pain and suffering. Most
courts which have permitted "loose" instructions have done so on
grounds that no prejudicial error has been committed, although
they have
also indicated that such instructions are less than
33
proper.
3. Per Diem Analysis. There is still great indecision and conflict in that phase of pain and suffering dealing with the permissiblity of a per diem analysis. There has been little approval of attempts by counsel to have per diem formulae included as part of
the instructions to the jury.3 4 However, some courts have permitted
counsel to argue and suggest per diem awards in their presentations
to the jury.3 5 Other courts have found that such statements intrude
on the domain of the jury.36 This latter position seems unreasonably
static and rigid; the very lack of adequate measurability would
seem to suggest a need for fair comment by counsel on possible
evaluating techniques. Certainly the jury should not be encouraged
to select compensation awards with a wave of a magic wand, and
counsel should have the opportunity to frame and focus the jury's
contemplation of pain and suffering, although this is not to imply
that a jury should ever be bound to strict formulization. The problem is one of jury direction, not jury sterilization or usurpation.
4. Reduction of Award to Present Worth. The vast majority of
states require that awards for loss of future earning capacity be reduced to their present worth. Most of these states, however, recognize that it is not necessary to reduce the award for future pain
and suffering to a present value amount.3 7 The gist of the commen30 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423, 450-60. This annotation includes cases holding for and against this type of
instruction.
31 See Union Gold Mining Co. v. Crawford, 29 Cola. 571, 69 Pac. 600 (1902).
32 Colorado Utilities Corp. v. Casady, 89 Colo. 156, 300 Pac. 601 (1931) ("may"); Denver Tramway
Co. v. Martin, 44 Colo. 324, 98 Pac. 836 (1908) ("may"). Most local courts use an instruction which
refers to pain and mental suffering and mental anguish presently and in the future "to be endured,"
e.g., Murrow v. Whiteley, 125 Colo. 392, 244 P.2d 657 (1952).
33 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423.
34 See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1331, 1347-52 (1958).
85 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1959).
36 See Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1957); Ahlstrom v. Minnesota, St. P. & S. St.
M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955).
37 See Annot., 28 A.L.R. 1177, 1178-79 (1924).
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tary on this latter point indicates that there is no logic in reducing
damages of this nature to present value because there is no loss of
actual anticipated pecuniary benefit.3 8 Further, the amount found
to compensate one for pain and suffering is based on the broadest
and most abstract type of jury thinking, and it becomes absurd to
dissect this area of recovery by use of detailed formulae3 9 which
take into consideration capitalization rates and tax structure. Thus,
the monetary worth of pain and suffering is left to the enlightened
conscience of the jury. Those few jurisdictions which take the position that pain and suffering damages must be reduced to present
value are often ill-advised in terms of faulty analysis of precedents." There are no Colorado cases in this immediate area.
CONCLUSION

One may well wonder if the average juror would seriously ponder and take into consideration a detailed set of instructions regarding compensation for pain and suffering. Certainly we can predict
that his approach would be less than scientific and mathematically
exact. Nevertheless, instructions delineating the scope and area of
recoverable pain and suffering, setting forth the degree of necessary
proof, and reciting the non-necessity of a present value approach
would appear to be of psychological import in framing the juror's
overall approach to recoveries in this phase of personal injury law.
Increased definition with regard to awards for Dain and suffer-

ing would, at the very least, guide and focus counsel in their preparation of admissible evidence as it relates to such pain and suffering. Unfortunately, the Colorado Supreme Court has had few
opportunities to develop any refinements in the area of pain and
suffering recovery. It may be that our present enlightened Court
would welcome such opportunities.
38 E.g., Louisville and N.R.R. v. Gayle, 204 Ky. 142, 263 S.W. 763 (1924).
39 E.g., Chicago and N.W.R.R. v. Candler, 283 Fed. 881, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1922).
40 See Sweeney v. Moreland Bros. Co., 227 Mich. 203, 198 N.W. 932 (1924); O'Brien v. Loeb, 229
Mich. 405, 201 N.W. 488 (1924) (holding pain and suffering must be reduced to present worth). These
cases rely on Denman v. Johnston, 85 Mich. 387, 48 N.W. 565 (1891) (where the recovery was only for
future loss of earnings, not pain and'suffering). See also Lamont v. Highsmith Hospital Inc., 206 N.C.
111, 173 S.E. 46 (1934) and Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534 (1948) taking the
Michigan position, These latter cases can be traced to supposed precedence of the holding in Chesapeake and O.R.R. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916) (the court in that case was concerned with a statute that
only permitted recovery for pecuniary loss to dependents of the deceased).
Cf. Texas and P.R.R. v.
Buckles, 232 F.2d 257, cerf. den. 351 U.S. 954 (1956) (holding no present worth reduction for permitted
pain and suffering award).
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Nothing could be more bitter than the rancid taste of failure in
cross-examination. And that failure surely results when the lawyer
asks just one question too many and he gets one answer too many.
Unless he is reasonably certain that his cross-examination of the
defendant's doctor will accomplish one of four specific objectives,
and unless he has his examination carefully planned his best crossexamination is probably none at all.
THE FOUR OBJECTIVES

The four specific goals of cross-examination of the defendant's
medical expert are these:
1. To obtain concessions that will bolster plaintiff's theory;
2. To cast doubt upon the qualifications of the witness as a true
expert;
3. To cast doubt upon the honesty or sincerity of the witness;
4. To show that there is no sound basis for the witness's opinion.
Before a prudent lawyer embarks on any of these excursions he
recognizes that he must be thoroughly prepared. Chronologically,
then, our discussion should begin not with the words "Your witness,
Mr. Peepers," but more properly with the words "Your new client
is in the reception room, Mr. Peepers. Shall I show him in?"
TRAINING AND PREPARATION

Necessarily, the lawyer who ventures into a case involving medical evidence must carry with him a special kind of equipment. He
must have sincerity and industry, of course. But he must also have
a certain fund of medical knowledge. Unfortunately, we lawyers
were not taught even the fundamentals of medicine. Commendably,
some law schools such as the University of Denver are now offering such courses to lawyers.
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The lawyer who tries only an occasional case involving injuries
to the person must spend far more time on preparation than the
lawyer who possesses a medical background or has tried many such
cases. It is to the untrained lawyer that this paper is addressed.
Here are some of the projects which he must undertake long before
'the cross-examination of the defendant's expert begins:
1. He must interview the client so exhaustively that he will be
intimately acquainted with all of the plaintiff's subjective complaints. To become acquainted with the medical history, he must
look into previous lawsuits involving his client; he must acquire old
hospital records or medical reports; perhaps he should examine into
summer camp application forms. The sources of such information
are as limitless as the imagination of the lawyer. But you can be sure
the defendant has imagination too. And unless the plaintiff's attorney knows the full story he will be provided with some interesting surprises at the trial.
2. He must accompany his client to the treating physician's office as frequently as possible. This will help immeasurably to clarify the perplexing medical problems involved. The treating doctor
can serve as the lawyer's teacher.
3. Usually, the lawyer will have his client examined by an expert. Perhaps this expert will serve as an additional witness at the
trial. The careful lawyer will always attend this examination, listening closely to make certain that the history is consistent with the
one the patient has previously given, watching the examination
closely so that he will observe the various tests that are performed,
questioning the doctor as to the purpose of each test, and taking
notes for later study. The knowledge obtained in the doctor's office
will be indispensable during the cross-examination of defendant's
expert at the trial.
4. He must read the available literature. There was a time when
a lawyer's only source of enlightment was the heavy and highly
technical medical literature intended for the medical profession. But
now there is a growing body of literature for the lawyer which cov.ers most phases of traumatic medicine in simple and understand.able language.,
5. When the plaintiff submits himself to examination by the defendant's medical expert, the plaintiff's attorney must be there. He
-should observe what books appear on the doctor's shelves. He
-should observe which tests the doctor performs and which he omits.
He should make sure that the doctor obtains an accurate history so
that the plaintiff is not later misquoted. He should observe the care
with which the doctor performs his task--or the lack of it. He should
read the doctor's certificates so that he will be apprised fully of the
-doctor's background and training. The careful lawyer will never
miss this opportunity to "size up" the man with whom he will have
to deal in court.
I See, e.g., the following periodicals: Current Medicine for Attorneys, Box E, Newton Center,
Mass.; Journal of Forensic Sciences, Callaghan & Co., Chicago; Medical Trial Technique Quarterly,
.ollaghan & Co., Chicago; Trial Lawyer's Guide, Callaghan & Co., Chicago.
And the following texts: Gray, Attorney's Textbook of Medicine (3d ed. 1958); Houts, Courtroom Medicine, (1958); Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia, The Allen Smith Co.; Piersol, The Cyclopedia of
Medicine, Surgery & Specialties (Rev. ed. 1959); Schwartz, Trial of Automobile Accident Cases
(3d ed. 1958); Trauma, Matthew Bender & Co. (1959).
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THE TRIAL

Now we are in court. The direct examination of the defendant's
doctor has been completed. We will assume that his testimony has
been damaging to the plaintiff's case. Therefore an effective crossexamination is necessary. Turn back to the four objectives listed at
the beginning of this paper and let us see what should be done.
1. Obtain concessions that will bolster plaintiff's theory.
Chronologically, this is usually the beginning of the cross-examination. The areas of agreement must be explored while the atmosphere is friendly. There should be no bullying of the witness.
Most jurors resent an overbearing, hostile attitude on the part of the
cross-examiner. Besides the answers will be far more helpful if the
doctor is treated courteously. The subject matter of the questions
must be carefully controlled so that the doctor will have no chance
to expound on his theory of the case.
When the doctor is testifying from his notes, counsel should examine the notes. Perhaps there was an obvious fracture in the
X-rays which was noted by the doctor. He should ask him to step to
the view box and show the jury the fracture line. This will corroborate what the plaintiff's doctor has already said.
In most cases it is safe to ask the doctor whether the plaintiff's
physician is a competent man, well-respected in the profession.
If the doctor has stated that the recent X-rays show that the
fracture has healed perfectly, he should be asked if he will agree
that the X-rays do not reveal whether or not there is lingering damage to the muscles and ligaments and to the soft tissue.
If the doctor has observed that the patient's complaints are
purely subjective, plaintiff's attorney should ask whether it isn't
true that frequently a positive diagnosis is based solely upon a patient's complaints and that medical science just hasn't advanced to
the point where there is a medical test which will reveal the presence or absence of every ailment.
Most good cross-examinations stop at this point always ending
on a carefully planned high note. But if the damaging edge of the
expert's testimony has not yet been dulled, then it might not be imprudent to proceed with one or more of the other three objectives.
2. Cast doubt upon the qualifications of the witness as a true
expert.
In most cases the defendant's expert is a man of long experience
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and extensive credentials. Usually he is older, has had more war experience, is on the staffs of more hospitals, has delivered more lectures, and has a lower number on his specialty board certificate
than does the plaintiff's doctor. This is no accident; it is one of the
reasons why he was chosen. To attack the qualifications of this man
is suicide and can only reflect upon the plaintiff's own case. It is far
better to admit that the doctor is qualified in his field before the
medals and ribbons are strewn about the courtroom floor.
Even when the doctor seems less impressive the best advice is
caution. I once plunged into the background of a general practitioner
in a case involving a leg injury only to discover that the "gp" had
been modest about thirteen years of specialized experience in traumatic and industrial medicine with a large west-coast shipyard. Before plunging into these waters the examiner should inflate his water wings with a thorough advance knowledge of the doctor's background and its vulnerability. I believe that the average juror in
most areas indulges a strong presumption that a man who is licensed
to practice medicine is qualified; it will take a strong case to change
his mind.
3. Cast doubt upon the honesty or sincerity of the witness.
This excursion should also be avoided unless the examiner believes that he has a good chance to prove that the witness is insincere. There are a few doctors who have become known as "insurance company defense doctors" or "plaintiffs' doctors." We reserve
these uncomplimentary appellations for those witnesses whom we
know by past experience identify themselves intentionally with one
camp or the other. The tag implies insincerity of purpose. The motive of the doctor may be money. It may be power or influence. In
the case of the defense doctor it may be a resentful or vindictive attitude toward people who seek compensation for personal injuries.
The analysis of the expert's attitude is not for this writer but for
someone in another field. Nevertheless, the problem is a real one; it
does exist. This type of witness poses a special problem and a special challenge to the cross-examiner. In such a case the only successful tactic may be to "get rough" with the doctor in order to expose his motives, his remuneration, the intimacy of his business and
social connections with the defendant or the defendant's attorney.
This cannot be done without research. The answer may be found at
the local golf or country club or even in a bar. Where impeachment
of the doctor's testimony looms as a possibility, it is prudent to take
a deposition well in advance of the trial in order to develop leads
for investigation into every aspect of the doctor's background. Testimony he has given in other cases may be useful as it may point up a
pattern of testimony or inconsistent statements under oath.
Except in these extreme cases, it is bad taste for the examiner to
attempt to reflect upon the doctor's motives. The jury will feel that
way too. I believe it is almost always a bad tactic to ask such a
question as: "How many times have you examined for attorney
Jones within the past four years?" 2
There is another reason why the plaintiff's attorney should re2 McNenar v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 598 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
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frain from attacking the doctor's credibility. We are all concerned
with what seems to be a growing rift between doctors and lawyers.
Doctors complain of all kinds of abuses at the hands of lawyers, both
real and imagined. Some of these complaints are justified. And
sometimes the doctor's testimony is not as lacking in credibility as
the lawyer imagines it to be. The same doctor may be the plaintiff's
witness in tomorrow's trial. It is best if the "get tough" policy is
reserved only for doctors who really have it coming. Fairminded
doctors will understand and agree with this approach.
4. Show that there is no sound basis for the witness's opinion.
Here again, careful preparation is the touchstone. It is in the
doctor's office at his examination of your client that you discover
whether five or fifty minutes were spent on the case; whether the
doctor performed the necessary and accepted tests; whether he obtained a complete medical history and recorded it accurately. Or
the doctor may have examined carefully and may have his facts
straight; but his opinion may be bucking the tide of what is considered to be good medicine. The lawyer has a duty to show that
the doctor's opinion is in the minority. One way to accomplish this
purpose is through the use of basic medical texts with which the
doctor is familiar.
Doctors have been advised to dodge the medical text approach.
One "authority" tells them: "Never recognize any doctor or book as
an authority. . .. -3 A doctor will sometimes say he never heard of
the particular book. But this false testimony will be exposed when
he is challenged with the news that the same book is on the doctor's
shelf behind his desk (the attorney saw it there). Or perhaps the
plaintiff's expert has already testified that this particular book is a
basic work in the field, highly reputable, is used in the leading medical schools, and is must reading for the doctor who considers himself informed on the subject at hand. Only a foolish and dishonest
doctor will attempt to use the "I never heard of it" approach with
;an attorney who has prepared his cross-examination.
CONCLUSION

The specialized language of medicine is a double-edged sword
for the plaintiff's lawyer. He must understand the "lingo" so that
he can cope with it during the cross-examination. But if he uses too
many medical terms himself the jury may feel that the examiner is
trying to appear erudite. The examiner must be well-prepared but
must assume an attitude of inquiring humility. Sincerity and integrity are far more important in today's courtroom than art and
showmanship. Television trials notwithstanding, a jury will resent a
"'tricky" lawyer with an oily approach.
Some lawyers in their fierce and understandable partisanship
for their client's case, will blind themselves to the fact that the vast
majority of doctors are honest and dedicated practitioners and come
to court with no ax to grind. Attempts to humiliate or discredit such
a doctor can only meet with disaster since it is unalterably true that
any doctor who knows his business and who states his opinions
forthrightly is going to come away looking far better than the lawyer who vainly attempts to "break him down."
3 Wesson. A Phvsician's Primer for Defendants, 8 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 254, 258 (1959).
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The causal relation of injury to disease is often a major factor
in evaluating the extent of disability. Pathologic states resulting
from injury or disease are recognized through well established
diagnostic patterns included in the symptoms, clinical findings, and
laboratory investigations. Chronic disease states claimed to be due
to an injury are usually found to have no actual causal relationship except that there was no knowledge of the existence of the
disease and that there was no disability until after the injury.
Therefore, it is often concluded that the injury must have produced the disease. Physical abnormalities, physiologic variations
and potential disease states are common to all individuals, but may
not become recognized until an injury has led to a thorough examination. The capable, highly trained medical examiner should have
little difficulty in differentiating the results of a true injury from
those of a disease, where the two states exist as a confusing factor
in determining the extent of disability. An examiner less alert to
the psychological twists of the mind arising from disability claims
may accept everything that the claimant says relative to the injury
and fail to investigate thoroughly the facts relative to any pre-existing anomaly or disease. Repeated assertions that the injury caused
the disability eventually convince those who listen that there must
be truth in such claims. Injury may be related to disease in three
different types of circumstances:
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1. Injury as an actual cause of the disease.
In order to be the cause of a disease state an injury must
primarily produce and cause to exist the pathology leading to disability. In the case of many diseases fairly rigid limits must be
set within which a disease must occur if it is to be adjudged the
result of trauma. These limits involve the following six considerations: (1) the scientific recognition of trauma as a cause of disease; (2) the physical state of the individual before injury; (3)
the lapse of time between the trauma and the onset of the disease;
(4) the absence of causes of disease other than trauma; (5) the
severity of the injury as related to the disease; (6) disease as the
cause of the accident.
There are certain diseases in which it is recognized that injury
may play a role as a true precipitating cause. There are other diseases in which it is well recognized that trauma does not, in any
way, play a role.
The medical examiner should use common sense and scientific logic as well as his knowledge of medicine in deciding the extent to which trauma has been the cause of the disabling disease.
Therefore, it is necessary to know as much as possible of the physical state of the individual preceding his injury including definite
details regarding the exact mode of onset, the site of the injury,
and the exact time of finding or recognizing the disease state. The
site of the injury and its relation to the site of the disease must be
considered. For example, an injury might precipitate local effects
of a latent disease, such as diabetes or arteriosclerosis, to the extent that there would be gangrene of the foot following a blow
to the leg or foot. Likewise, an individual with chronic arthritis
of the spine might have a severe strain or other type of back injury
in which pain would persist as a prominent symptom for a much
longer period of time than where injury alone was present. It must
be determined how much of the continued disability is due to the
injury and the extent that is due to the arthritis. Thorough investigation of preceding symptoms may show that the actual results
of injury have ceased and that the existing disability is not greater
than would be expected from the progress of the disease, irrespective
of the injury.
An injury uncomplicated by a disease gradually recovers
over a recognized normal period of time to a maximum healing
state which results in a complete restoration to normal function,
or ends in a limited state of function resulting in disability. Where
there is a time interval between the injury and the onset of a
disease, progress to full recovery may be slow or may be reversed
in-to a- worse condition and may result in disability much more
severe than the same injury in a completely normal person. When
the disease is alleged to have been caused by the trauma, the physician, should inquire with great care into the symptoms and signs
that appeared immediately afterward. He should ascertain the
character, the duration, the localization, and the extent of immediate disability. The lapse of time between the injury and the
recognition of the disease may be reasonable in some instances
and very unreasonable in others.
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If a detailed investigation reveals no other possible cause of
the disease and disability, other than the trauma, an injury may be
said to be the actual cause of the disease.
The actual severity of the injury as it relates to the disease
must also be taken in account and there must be compatibility between the severity of the injury and the disability or disease
manifested by the patient.
Some diseases develop so slowly and insidiously that they are
not noticed until an accident occurs, and even though the accident
is trivial, the resulting trauma may seem to be the only likely
cause. For example, epilepsy attributed to a head injury may be
caused by a slowly growing brain tumor. A recognized disease
state may exist in an individual to such an extent that he may become clumsy or may in some way misjudge his activity and be
injured through an accident. This is seen in certain nervous system
diseases such as lateral sclerosis, tabes dorsalis, brain tumor, or in
certain diseases associated with an abnormally low blood sugar
condition as is seen in certain tumors of the pancreas.
2. Injury as an aggravating factor of pre-existing disease.
The existence of a disease of acute or chronic nature prior to
the date of an alleged injury, must be determined chiefly by obtaining complete details in the history of the case. The effect of the
injury on the disease state is estimated by judging the physical
state as it must have been at the time of injury and comparing it
with the disease state at the time of the examination. Probably the
most common disease to cause controversy in relation to trauma
is that of degenerative arthritis of the spine. The patient usually
has no knowledge of the spurlike formations on his vertebral bodies
until revealed by an X-ray. This is usually taken after an injury
has occurred to his back, and he may never have had any symptoms
in his back previous to the injury. However, an X-ray taken after
the injury may show shadows of calcareous bony overgrowths
much too extensive to be merely that of callous resulting from the
injury. In such cases it is often necessary to render an opinion as
to whether the injury or the disease is the perpetuating factor in
the disability, and it is also necessary to differentiate the extent
of permanent disability due to the injury from that due to the diseased state itself.
3. Injury in addition to some unrelated systemic disease.
The third relationship of injury to disease occurs when the
individual becomes injured but fails to recover promptly because
he has high blood pressure, diabetes, arteriosclerosis, or some other
disease state. The injury may heal and in no way be involved in
the chronic systemic disease. At the same time the gradual inroads
of the disease may have made recognized progress to the extent
that it is now causing the disability which started with an injury.
In this case there is a point in time which must be recognized. It
occurs when the injury ceases to exist and the disability continues;
caused by the chronic disease. For example, one might have an
injury, and, while this was healing, develop a coronary thrombosis
in no way related to the injury but secondary to previous high
blood pressure and arteriosclerosis.
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Having given in the preceding paragraphs a discussion of the
various types of circumstances in which injury may be related to
disease, the remainder of this discussion will be devoted to reviewing some of the more important medical problems as seen by the
internist in their relation to injury, such as traumatic heart disease,
peptic ulcer, and the relationship of cancer and trauma.
TRAUMATIC HEART DISEASE

Traumatic heart disease includes the anatomic lesions and functional disturbances of the heart which result from external injury
or from an intense, unusual physical exertion. According to the
causative mechanism, cardiac trauma may be classified into three
main types: (1) penetrating lesions of the chest wall; (2) nonpenetrating lesions; (3) physical strain.
Penetrating lesions are commonly caused by bullets, knives,
ice picks, needles and glass fragments following auto accidents,
or caused when the heart is torn by the sharp ends of broken ribs.
Injury to a coronary artery is a common complication of cardiac
wounds and although uninjured, the coronary artery may have to
be ligated during cardiac suture. The interventricular septum may
be injured and the nervous conduction system controlling the
heart beat interrupted. The chordae tendinae or papillary muscles
may be torn with consequent valvular insufficiency and cardiac
strain. A thrombus1 may develop at the site of injury and cerebral,
pulmonary, or peripheral embolization 2 may result from such
thrombi which have formed on the wall of the heart. The symptoms
and signs associated with penetrating lesions of the heart are
caused by hemorrhage, acute cardiac tamponade, pericarditis, contusion or infarction of heart muscle, valvular rupture or an embolism. The electrocardiogram may show evidence of pericarditis,
bundle branch block, or myocardial infarction. 4 The T wave inversions may persist for many months or years, but usually they
revert to normal after three or four months. The important point
to remember is that electrocardiographic changes represent the
most constant evidence of cardiac involvement in penetrating
chest wounds; their subsidence or persistence may be a reliable
index of the functional or organic basis of symptoms which remain
for a long time after operation.
In non-penetrating injuries cardiac damage may occur from
blunt injury to the chest wall. However, one should be cautioned
against attributing to a preceding trauma a host of unrelated cardiac
disturbances which are the consequences of the natural course
of underlying and independent organic heart disease. Non-penetrating injuries occur in steering wheel accidents, chest being run
over by an auto, blow of a fist, kick to the chest, golfball or baseball at high speed, by heavy falling or swinging objects, and com1 A plug or clot in a blood vessel or in one of the cavities of the heart, formed by coagulation of
the blood. (All definitions herein are from the Am. Illus. Med. Dict. (21st ed. 1948). Editor.)
2 Embolism: The sudden blocking of an artery or vein by a clot or obstruction.
3 Cardiac tamponade: Acute compression of the heart due to effusion of the fluid into the pericardium or to the collection of blood in the pericardium from rupture of the heart or a coronary
vessel.
4 Infarct: An area of coagulation necrosis in a tissue . . . resulting from obstruction of cirulation
to the area.
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pression of the chest between two moving objects. Serious contusion and even rupture of the heart may occur without any significant visible external injury of the chest wall and without fracture
of the ribs. These bruised and contused areas of the heart muscle
may heal with the formation of a firm scar, indistinguishable from
the scar of a cardiac infarct due to coronary artery occlusion, but
certainly with a prognosis much better than when this scar is secondary to a coronary artery occlusion. Direct trauma does not
cause coronary artery disease. Coronary occlusion is caused by
degenerative vascular changes and arteriosclerosis.
There is always doubt about reported instances of damage to
the normal heart due to undue physical effort. Doubt usually surrounds the claim that the heart was previously normal. When
abnormal heart rhythms develop there is also a question of coincidence, for they not infrequently arise in the normal heart without unusual effort or other apparent cause. In the previously diseased heart, the strain of an intense physical effort apparently may
induce the abnormal rhythms, rupture of a valve, a paroxysm of
angina pectoris, and occasionally congestive heart failure. The
normal heart has enough reserve energy to meet the demand of
unusual exertion. The diseased heart loses this reserve and is therefore more easily affected than one that is normal. Recovery from
injury to the body may be greatly influenced by a pre-existing
heart disease or a systemic disorder affecting the heart. It is a
great advantage in evaluating the influence of trauma on a preexisting heart disease if a prior examination has been recorded
showing the extent of valvular defects, coronary disease, hypertension, or any variation from the normal rhythm of the heart
beat before the sudden intense physical strain. Disease of the heart
muscle and heart valves is likely to limit cardiac reserve which
results in increased susceptibility to damage by overexertion. The
myocardial insufficiency should be evident at the most within a few
hours after trauma, if the trauma is to be held responsible for the
onset of the symptoms. The normal heart is capable of compensating for physical exertion without damage to its efficiency. On
the contrary, lesser strain on an already diseased heart may produce the onset of symptoms of prolonged consequence.
The possible causal relationship of atherosclerotic coronary
occlusion to physical strain has come to assume medicolegal importance, particularly in connection with insurance and workmen's
compensation cases. The sequence of events after a severe and unusual physical strain strongly suggests that the strain in some way
initiated or accelerated the coronary artery occlusion and the consequent myocardial infarction. These cases require careful interpretation for their correct solution. Occasionally a strenous or
unusual exertion occurs in a person with severely narrowed atherosclerotic coronary arteries. The extertion may intensify the coronary insufficiency relative to the needs of the heart muscle so that
an area of the heart muscle is subjected to a sudden and severe loss
or deficiency of oxygen and as a result injury may occur to the heart
muscle. Such cardiac muscle injury may present a clinical picture
identical with that of an acute coronary thrombosis with corresponding electrocardiographic changes.
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Rupture of a heart valve or supporting muscle may follow a
severe physical strain. More often the affected valve is the seat of
some pre-existing disease. The aortic valve is most commonly affected and the greater frequency of left-sided valvular injuries may
be attributed to the higher intracardiac pressures on that side and
to the greater frequency with which these valves are the site of
some pre-existing underlying disease.
TRAUMATIC PEPTIC ULCER

Violence to the abdomen may rupture the mucosa or lacerate
the wall of the stomach. It is conceivable that within a few days
the peptic acidity of the gastric juices might affect such a wound
to create an ulcer. Where trauma is claimed to be the cause of the
peptic ulcer there must be definite proof that no ulcer existed before the onset of the trauma. Any injury that is severe enough to
cause actual rupture of the stomach wall or a tear in its inner lining would result in immediate disability or production of symptoms; or at least the symptoms would arise soon after the injury. Aggravation of an already pre-existing peptic ulcer is often involved
in a claim that the injury precipitated activity and produced symptoms previously quiescent. This presents a difficult question as
there is no way to determine when an ulcer will flare up or produce complications such as hemorrhage or perforation. In the handling of such medicolegal cases where an ulcer is alleged to have
been produced by trauma or stress the availability of previous
X-rays and medical records, and the history of the patient's symptoms will play a considerable part in properly interpreting whether
the patient actually has a new stress ulcer or had pre-existing peptic
ulcer disease.
TRAUMA AND CANCER

The question whether trauma caused a tumor or accelerated
the growth of a previously quiescent tumor at times assumes
medicolegal importance. In considering such cases it is important
to remember that the incidence of cancer is no higher in previously
injured patients than in those without injury. Moreover, there is
no evidence from animal experimentation that a mechanical injury
is capable of causing cancer to develop in a normal animal. By
inference, therefore, mechanical injury would not be capable of
causing cancer to develop in a previously normal patient. Whether
a mechanical injury can accelerate the growth of a previously
quiescent tumor is also a difficult question to answer and the
biological interrelationships between the tumor and its host
would play a large part in the correct interpretation of such instances.
SUMMARY

A discussion has been given of the various ways in which
traumatic injuries may be related to disease and subsequent
disability occurring in patients who have been subjected to
such injuries. The medical aspects of the more common medicolegal
problems of traumatic heart disease and traumatic peptic ulcer
have been given, and evidence has been presented to contradict
the belief that traumatic injuries may cause cancer to arise.

JULY-AUGUST

DICTA

1959

LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY TO THE UNBORN
By T.
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and his LL.B. degree from Harvard
Law School in 1936, He has practiced in Denver since 1937 and is a
member of the American, Colorado, and Denver Bar Associations.
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the University of Colorado School
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In New Jersey on May 2, 1935, a baby was born permanently
retarded, both mentally and physically. A suit was brought alleging the doctor had negligently misdiagnosed the mother's pregnant condition as tumor.1 X-ray treatments had been given three
times before the baby's birth, the last treatment about six weeks
before the birth.
In 1935 it was known that if a mother had deep X-ray treatment to which a fetus was exposed, the baby could be expected
to have a gravely defective central nervous system. 2 At this time
no New Jersey court had held that a baby had a right to recover
for negligently caused injuries before birth.
"Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent in every
individual," wrote Sir William Blackstone in 1765, "and it begins in contemplation 3of law as soon as the infant is able to stir
in its mother's womb."
In the ancient Assyrian Code, circa 1500 B.C., 4 the fetus is
spoken of as a human life and cognizance is also taken of the
stages of fetal development. The unborn baby was, under this
and other ancient and later laws, protected by the threat of
penalties: a fine, the lash, and in severe cases, death.
Hippocrates, who lived four centuries before the Christian
era, sought to protect unborn babies from the aborting drugs
of Aspasia by appeal to the consciences of his fellow physicians;
asking them to swear the oath saying, "I will not give to any
woman anything to produce abortion."
In 1935 American criminal and civil law treated an unborn
baby as a person in being for some purposes beneficial to the
1 Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
2 Hobbs, Fetal Tolerance to Roentgen Rays, 54 Radiology 242 (1950); Radiation Induced Mutations
in Mammals, 55 Radiology 581 (1950).
3 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *129.
43 Smith, The Origin and History of Hebrew Law 211 (1931); Belkin, Philo and the Oral Law,
Harvard Semitic Series IX, 131, 132, n. 125.
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baby. Then as today one who feloniously inflicted injuries upon
an unborn baby which was born alive but subsequently died
from the injuries was chargeable under the criminal law with
homicide as in the killing of any human being. Also, the criminal
law generally protects the unborn baby from being intentionally aborted.
The American civil law regards a baby in his mother's
womb as capable of taking a legacy or devise. The word "children" or "issue" as used in a bequest, or a life insurance policy,
or a workmen's compensation act, would include a baby in his
mother's womb. With respect to such property rights posthumous children are regarded as in being from the time of conception.
Did the solicitude of the law for the protection of the unborn babies against the criminal conduct of others and as to
inheritance and property rights prompt New Jersey's highest
court in the Stemmer case to extend the protection to such babies
against the negligence of others? No. In 1942 the long battle
through the courts ended with nine of the fifteen judges of
New Jersey's highest court holding against the right of the defective and crippled child to recover for injuries suffered while
in the womb. Mr. Chief Justice Boggs and five other justices
dissented.5
Another mistaken diagnosis of a pregnancy as a tumor
followed by X-ray therapy reached the Illinois Supreme Court
in 1939.6 This Court followed its 1900 decision in Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital,7 which in turn followed the 1884 majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes in the first American case,
Dietrich v. Northampton." This Massachusetts case involved an
injury between the fourth and fifth month of pregnancy. The
decision rested on two grounds; first, no case had ever decided
that if the unborn baby lived he could sue for injuries received
while in his mother's womb, and, secondly, since the unborn
baby is part of the mother any damage to him which is not too
remote to be recovered is recoverable by her.
In 1924 a lower Pennsylvania court had held that injuries
received through negligence of another entitled the quickened
unborn baby to sue after birth. 9 But this forward-looking approach was disapproved in 1940 in Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co.,1° by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
As early as 1921 a lower New York court attempted to grant
recovery in a similar case," but New York's highest court, following Justice Holmes' opinion, reversed. 2 Justice Cardozo dissented
without giving any reason.
As early as 1901 a legal writer had asked the law to recognize
the legal right of the unborn baby to begin life with a sound
5 Stemmer

v. Kline, 128 NJ.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
6 Smith v. Luckhandt, 299 III. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939).
7 184 III. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
8 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
9 Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
10 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
11 Drobner v. Peters, 194 App. Div. 696, 186 N.Y. Supp. 278 (1921).
12 Drebner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
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body. 13 Others urged relief for tort injuries to the unborn baby. 4
By 1941 the reasons for denying recovery were ascribed to two
factors: (1) the practical difficulty of proving causation inviting fictitious claims and (2) the legalistic assumption that a
baby in his mother's womb is owed no duty of care because "it"
is not a person. 5 The injustice of
denying recovery has been
16
emphasized by an English writer.
Before 1935 the Supreme Court of Canada in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille,7 extended to the unborn baby the protection
of the law that recognized his separate existence under the
criminal law and the laws of estates and property rights by allowing recovery against the torts of others. As early as 1923 an intermediate Louisiana court had held that a baby injured in the
ninth month of gestation that died three days after birth had
a right of action as a "child" within the contemplation of the
civil law and the meaning of the civil code, which gives a child
a right of action for personal injuries.',
The injustice of denying recovery to the child, physically
deformed or mentally deficient for life as a result of prenatal injuries caused by the wrongful act of another, continued to haunt
the courts. The first strong precedent to establish the baby's
right to recover came from the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia in 1946.19 This well-reasoned decision gave the precedent needed to ultimately reverse the prior numerical weight
of authority.
This case involved a malpractice claim springing from the
alleged fact that a viable baby was taken from its mother's womb
through professional malpractice, with resultant injury to the
child. It paved the way for later cases involving
tortious injury
20
to the baby in the womb before viability.
In 1949 the Ohio Supreme Court 2' held a viable baby to be a
"person" within the purview of a provision of the state constitution
that "every person, for an injury done him in his person . . . shall
have remedy by due course of law." This was the first decision by an
American court of highest jurisdiction to hold, in the absence of
statute, that a child who survives birth can bring an action for
prenatal injuries. In the same year the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that where independent existence is possible and life is wrongfully destroyed a cause of action arises under the wrongful death
statute. 22 Two years later the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,'2 and also the Supreme Court of Georgia
in Tucker v. Carmichael and Sons,'24 upheld the right of the injured
baby to a claim against the tortfeasor.
13 Note, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 313 (1901).
14 Morris, Injuries to Infants En Ventre So Mere, 58 Cent. L.J. 143 (1904).
15 Prosser, Torts, 174 (2d ed. 1955).
16 Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 Comb. LJ. 76, 90 (1942).
17 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
18 Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923).
19 Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
20 A viable fetus is one sufficiently developed to survive outside the womb. Whether a fetus of
six, or eight months or younger is viable depends an all the facts, including the nature of the pediatric
care available.
21 William v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
22 Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
23 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
24 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951).
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In 1951, New York's highest court in Woods v. Lancet 25 overruled its 1921 decision in the Drobner case 26 and held the baby had
a cause of action for prenatal injury which occurred during the
ninth month of his mother's pregnancy.
The shadow of Holmes was fading. The logic and the respect
for human life shown by dissenting Chief Justice Boggs in Allaire
v. St. Luke's Hospital27 was making new precedents. In Steggal v.
Morris28 the Supreme Court of Missouri specifically overruled its
earlier decision in Buel v. United Rys. Co. 29 In 1953 Boggs' reasoning was adopted by his successors on the Illinois court in the case
of Amann v. Faidy3° which overruled Allaire after more than fifty
years.
1
Additional states, Kentucky and Oregon among others,3
adopted the modern view and allowed recovery. This enlightened
view rejected the old argument that it is too difficult to prove or
disprove the causation of injury to an unborn baby, and found the
difficulty of proof neither special to this type of claim, nor relevant
to a determination of the right to sue.
In 1957 the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Poliquin v.
Macdonald,32 held that a viable baby injured in his mother's womb
25 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
26232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
27 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
28363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
29248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913).
3o415 III. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
31 Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291
P.2d 225 (1956).
8= 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
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and born alive, or dying in his mother's womb, could have an action brought in his name against the negligent person. In the following year the same court was asked to decide whether a negligent
injury to a baby in his mother's womb before viability had a cause
of action when he lived to sue." In this recent decision, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that "an infant born alive can
maintain an action to recover for prenatal injuries inflicted upon
it by the tort of another even if it'' had not reached the state of a
viable fetus at the time of injury. 34
The New York court in Kelly v. Gregory,35 a case in which the
injury took place during the third month of pregnancy, said that,
"If the child born after an injury sustained at any period of his
prenatal life can prove the effect on him or the tort ... we hold he
makes out a right to recover. ' 36 In 1956 the Supreme Court of
Georgia in Hornbuckle v. PlantationPipe Line Company,3 7 where
the injury took place in the sixth week of pregnancy, held, "where
a child is born after a tortious injury3' 8sustained at any period after
conception, he has a cause of action.
These three modern precedents illustrate how the law has
caught up with the scientific finding that the embryo from the time
of conception becomes a separate being and remains so throughout
its life.3 9 Medical experience has discovered that the mother's contribution from conception
on is to furnish nourishment and pro40
tection for her baby.
The new rule of tort law that a baby is to be considered as in
being from the time of conception in his mother's womb reflects the
respect for human life found in the recent oaths of doctors.
The pertinent sentence in the Geneva version of the Hippocratic Oath, as adopted by the World Medical Association, comprising thirty-nine national medical societies including the American Medical Association, reads: "I will maintain the utmost respect
for human life from the time of its conception." The International
Code of Medical Ethics in defining the doctor's duty speaks to his
conscience in these words: "A doctor must always bear in mind
the importance of preserving human life from the time of conception until death."
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,"
said the 1881 pragmatic philosophy of Holmes. 41 To the student
seeking knowledge of the common law, he cautioned: "In order to
know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends
to become." In 1959 the common law, rejecting Holmes, tends to
give the unborn baby in his mother's womb, from the time of conception, the benefit of his separate being and a legal claim for
tortious injury by others.
By 1965 Blackstone's 1765 statement 42 may be corrected to
33 Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958).
34 Id. at 110.
35 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
36 125 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
37 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
38 93 S.E.2d at 728.
39 Baxter, Frazer's Manual of Embryology 1 (3d ed. 1953).
40 Malay, Legal Anatomy and Surgery 668 (1930); Patten, Human Embryology 181 (1946); Cunningham, Anatomy 7 (6th ed. 1931).
41 Hotmes, The Common Low 1 (1951).
42 See note 3 supra.
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read: "Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent in. every
individual; and with the advance findings of medical science that
an embryo is a separate being from his mother, from the moment
of conception, life begins in contemplation of law as soon as the
baby is conceived in his mother's womb."
What will be the law in Colorado? Richard John Marquez, by
his father as next friend, brought a claim in Denver District Court
against a doctor alleging prenatal injury due to malpractice causing a brain injury which "caused him to be mentally retarded and
to have a spastic condition, which condition will be permanent
throughout" his life.4 3 He asked for $500,000 damages. A motion
to dismiss was filed based on the theory that no recovery could be
had for prenatal injury. The attorneys for Richard invoked Sections 3 and 6 of Article II of the Colorado Constitution declaring,
"All persons have .certain natural, essential and inalienable rights
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying . . . their
lives . . ." and "Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and
a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person . . . ." They
further claimed that these sections were at least equal to the Ohio
Constitutional provisions in William v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc.44 No decision was rendered. The case was settled.
Prenatal injury to the unborn, in the future as in the past, may
be caused by such things as auto collisions, induced premature labor,
negligent use of forceps during delivery, excess use of drugs during
delivery, and radiation from X-ray. To what extent fall-out from
atomic tests will cause subsequent developmental defects in unborn
babies and result in tort claims cannot at this time be predicted.
Certainly imagination indicates such claims as possibilities. This
whole subject should be put on the 1965 calendar, thirty years from
the Stemmer case, 200 years from Blackstone's statement, and revisited. Critical legal reasoning, aided by increased medical knowledge, is widening the rights of the unborn baby tortiously injured.
43 Marquez v. Ashmun, Civil No. A-86771, Denver District Court (Dec. 26, 1952).
44 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
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INTRODUCTION

No matter what their belief concerning this subject, both attorneys and doctors agree that it presents complicated and highly
controversial questions. It is my hope that this article will demonstrate that there are two schools of thought within both professions,
and that even though their views are divergent they are usually
based upon an honest difference of opinion.
There can be no question that the reasons advanced against
the theory that a single trauma can cause or aggravate tumor are
impressive. In the two recent world wars, there were millions of
men who were subjected to various types of trauma, but so far
there is little evidence of any increase of cancer developing from
the scars of the millions who were so injured. It has also been
pointed out that the United States is an athletic country; that among
the many athletes who participate in all types of sports there are
relatively few cases of cancer found. Stewart' calls attention to the
fact that surgeons are daily performing all types of major operations, including chiseling of bone and the insertion of such objects
as pins and screws therein, and that the surgeons perform these
operations without fear that the trauma involved will result in
cancer. Stewart does not comment upon the reasoning of the medical profession which apparently insists that when malignant tumors
are removed an area encompassing the entire tumor must be removed, rather than cutting into the tumor itself. Might this be
an indication that those surgeons who are so emphatic in their
statements that trauma cannot aggravate or metastasize 2 a tumor,
1 Stewart, Occupational and Post-Traumatic Cancer, 23 Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med. 145 (1947).
2 Metastasis: "The transfer of disease from one organ or part to another not directly connected
with it. It may be due . . . to transfer of cells, as in malignant tumors." Am. Illus. Med. Dict. (21st
ad. 1948).
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are not yet prepared to take such a risk?3
MEDICAL OPINIONS

The opinions of scholars and experts range from the dogmatic
to the uncertain. A few examples of positive statements are:
'' 4
"A single injury does not cause any form of cancer.
"I would refuse to entertain even the suspicion that
mammary carcinoma is caused by trauma."5
"A single trauma to normal tissues is incapable of producing a malignant tumor; also there is no definite experimental evidence that a single trauma either aggravates the
tumor already present, determines the time or extent of its
metastatic spread, or fixes the site at which its metastases
shall localize." 6
"Present data confirm the view, long since adopted by
pathologists, that a single trauma to normal tissue is incapable of producing a malignant tumor."7
"The pathological anatomists who have interested
themselves in this subject are in absolute agreement that a
single trauma is incapable of causing a malignant neoplasm." 8
A plaintiff's attorney attempting to prove a causal relationship between trauma and cancer would, at first blush, throw up
his hands in despair, summarily dismiss his client and vow never
again to entertain the notion of interviewing a client who complains
that trauma caused or aggravated a malignant tumor. Upon closer
reading of the authorities, however, an infinitestimal ray of light
streaks through to remove the hopelessness which has previously
engulfed him. The attorney after careful search finds those opinions wherein certain doctors frankly declare that there is "some
uncertainty" as to the relationship of trauma to cancer.
"Trauma, as far as we know, does not cause bone tumor."9
"After many years of experience in the field of bone tumors,
the author must confess to an uncertainty of opinion and to a feeling that the final answer has not as yet been provided. He does
not hold that a single injury cannot ever be a factor of etiologic
significance.' '10
Dr. Gray"l states that compensation boards and juries hesitate
to make a finding that tumors are found to be related to accidents
3 For such an indication, see the discussion of Dr. Grantley W. Taylor of Boston, Mass., before the
NAACA Convention held in Boston in 1954 wherein he stated: "I tried to anticipate, when I said
earlier, that we assume in all of our surgical conduct, in approach to cancer, that we may aggravate,
we may disseminate it by improper surgical manipulation. We do so conduct ourselves. There is some
ground for thinking that it is an entirely justifiable fear that we may disseminate the disease by these
uncouth manipulations."
4 McBride, Disability Evaluation 653 (5th ed. 1953).
5 Stewart, Occupational and Post-Traumatic Cancer, 23 Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med. 145-46 (1957).
6 Brahdy & Kahn, Trauma and Disease 507 (1937), cited in Emerson & Reed, The Relation Between
Injury and Disease 470-71 (1938).
7 Ewing, Modern Attitude Toward Traumatic Cancer, 19 Archives of Pathology 690 (1935).
8 Brohdy & Kahn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 440.
9 Ackerman, Surgical Pathology 670 (1953).
10 Coley, Trauma in Malignant Tumors of Bone, 73 Am. J. Surg. 300 (1947).
11 1 Gray, Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine 881 (3d ed. 1950).
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since the medical profession as a whole does not feel that injuries
play a part "except perhaps in very rare instances." He goes further and states, "Chronic irritation, apparently does play some part,"
and again sets out examples such as a tumor on men's lips, generally thought to be caused by pipe smoking or irritation from a
certain tooth; cancer at the mouth of the uterus in women who
have borne children, probably caused by irritation over a period
of years; tumor of the stomach, leading to the conclusion that the
tumor was frequently preceded by years of irritation due to a
gastric ulcer; and cancer of the breast in women who have nursed
children and who have a history of cracked nipples during the
period of nursing.
Willis 2 states that injuries have often been regarded as the
cause of sarcoma 13 of bones but the evidence is inconclusive. He
concludes, however, that a thorough investigation makes it clear
that the trauma either plays no part at all, or only a very infrequent one, in the causation of bone tumor.
After further research, the plaintiff's attorney is somewhat
encouraged to find statements which strongly indicate that in
some instances it is logical to conclude that trauma does cause or
aggravate tumor. "Certain types of cancer seem to be caused by
irritation such as has been observed
in those working with coal
14
tar products, dyes and radium."'
"To assert that an accident of exceedingly minor degree should
charge the entire condition to the fracturing force is not logically
true .... It is only logical to charge accident if the force is of significant magnitude." 2
"Assuming that trauma may cause sarcoma and the author
believes that such cannot categorically be denied, one is nevertheless at a loss to state how severe or minimal an injury must be....
There is some difference of opinion among surgeons as to the effect
of trauma inciting metastases, which is illustrated in opinions referrable to open biopsy."' 6
"Bone tumor following trauma is not impossible according to
recent medical authority." 17
COURT DECISIONS

In view of the above divergence in medical opinion, it is not
surprising to find that in quoting from and relying upon various
medical experts the courts have used language which I am sure is
horrifying to the cancer expert. A typical example reads as follows:
"The accident or strain either caused the cancer, or excited or
accelerated it, and thus brought on his death."
The courts find it more palatable to allow recovery upon the
12 Willis, Pathology of Tumors 194, 678 (1948).
13 Sarcoma: "A type of tumor; often highly malignant." Am. Illus. Med. Dict. (21st ed. 1948).
14 McBride, op. cit. supra note 4, at 653.
15 1 Gray, Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine 891 (3d ed. 1950).
16 Address by Paul E. McMasters, M.D., Tenth NACCA Conventicn, Los Angeles, 1956.
17 Ellenbogen, J. of Med. Soc. of N.J., June 2, 1954, p. 33 (quoting Leedy & Leclerq).
18 Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10, 11 (1951). (Both parties presented medical testimony in this case. For an excellent analysis see 10 NACCA L.J. 60.) See Bronson v. Firemen's Retirement Fund, 79 Idaho 167, 312 P.2d 1037 (1957); Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battlefield, 6
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 209 (1957).
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theory that
trauma "activated, '" "accelerated, ' '2 or "caused met2'
astasism . '
In one case a wart-like lesion was injured by a worker while
working in a shipyard. The claimant suffered amputation of the
leg and an orthopedist testified: "Trauma does play a part in activating a preexisting benign lesion ....-22
Cancer of the face occurred following a blow and the doctor
testified that the blow and failure of the wound to heal "was the
exciting cause of the cancer. '23 Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed
on appeal.
Where female workmen's compensation plaintiff had an undiagnosed injury of the left breast requiring mastectomy some
two weeks after trauma to the exact spot it was held a prima facie
case for recovery without medical testimony. "If the reasonable
probabilities flowing from the undisputed evidence disclose a progressive course of events beginning with an external accident in
which each succeeding happening, including the injury, appears
traceable to the one that preceded it, medical evidence is not essential for an injured employee to make out a prima facie case. ' 24
However, a somewhat similar New Jersey case 25 was decided
to the contrary although partially supported by medical testimony.
The court relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff was in good
health prior to receiving the blow.
A physician testified that accidental injury "could have" aggravated a cancer "but I can't testify that it did." Yet the court in
reaching its decision stated that the sequence of events added to this
testimony
tipped the scale in favor of upholding the award upon
26
appeal.
On the other side, attorneys for defendant should read carefully a series of New York Appellate opinions, in which these
courts have examined with a critical eye plaintiff's verdicts in
which cancer was allegedly caused or aggravated by trauma. 27
LEGAL CAUSE

We, as lawyers, have long since learned that "certainty" of
causal connection has never been required. Doctors, too, may have
to accept this fact. Certainly, the majority are already aware that
"Medical science has not developed to the extent where it can
19 Heppner v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 297 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1956).
20 Roth v. Board of Trustees, 49 N.J. Super. 309, 139 A.2d 761 (App. Div. 1958).
21 Lyons v. Swift & Co., 86 So. 2d 613 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
22 Charleston Shipyards, Inc. v. Lawson, 227 F.2d 110, 112 (4th Cir. 1955); cf. Hartford Acc. &
Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934) (trauma to small benign tumor);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Youmans, 49 Go. App. 678, 176 S.E. 808 (1934) (same); Harris
v. Southern Carbon Co., 162 So. 430 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (trauma to growth); Bollinger v. Wagaraw
Bldg. Supply Co., 122 N.J.L. 512, 6 A.2d 396 (1939) (trauma to mole). But cf. Gibson v. State Compensation Comm'r, 127 W.Va. 97, 31 S.E.2d 555 (1944) (trauma to mole).
23 Harris v. Hindman, 130 Ore. 15, 278 Pac. 954 (1929).
24 Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I. 274, 75 A.2d 191, 194 (1950); accord, White v. Valley Land Co.,
64 N.M. 9, 322 P.2d 707 (1957); cf. Lyons v. Swift & Co., 86 So. 2d 613 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
25 Ricciardi v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 26 N.J. 445, 140 A.2d 215 (1958).
26 Blackfoot Coal & Land Corp. v. Cooper, 121 Ind. App. 313, 95 N.E.2d 639 (1950).
27 Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp., 282 App. Div. 193, 122 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1953). off'd, 306 N.Y. 917,
119 N.E.2d 601 (1954); Dennison v. Wing, 279 App. Div. 494, 110 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1952) (court recognizes
diversity of medical opinion); Ranney v. Habern Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 426, 110 N.Y.S.2d 496

(1952).

JULY-AUGUST

1959

DICTA

diagnose
human ailments with the exactitude of the mathemati28
cian.
Professor Ben F. Small, professor of law at the University of
Indiana, in a very interesting law review article 29 states that the
doctor narrowly admits that trauma might have something to do
with cancer developing but merely as an aggravation. As to the
lawyer, "He is looking for some footing on which to affirm or to
dismiss liability for a condition of harm .... Yet while explanation
might escape him, cause does not."2 0
In workmen's compensation and occupation disease cases, the
lawyer is not limited by the word "cause." He may use "aggravation"
or "acceleration" or both. And if the evidence does not show cancerous condition in trauma-time he may theorize as to a dormant unknown condition, "lighted-up" or activated by trauma. It is Professor Small's opinion that: "It appears that if a claimant shows
trauma followed by cancer, either old or new, at the point of injury, he has better than an even chance of recovery. 3 1
A recent article sets out with great clarity the problem of defining cause.
"Medically, the real cause of cancer is not known. But
while medicine demands proof specific, beyond a reasonable doubt that minor trauma can produce cancer, the law
will take 'reasonable inferences' from all the circumstances
of a case that minor trauma could have produced a major
disability like cancer. The law had to draw such reasonable
inferences although often they are contrary to generally
accepted medical thinking. For, after all, a court of law is
not a hospital clinic or a medical laboratory and a court of
law has to decide 'yes' or 'no' when plaintiff alleges and
attempts to prove that a minor legal situation was the
cause of his cancer. A court of law in such a case cannot,
like a medical laboratory or a medical clinic, say 'We cannot tell you with any degree of certainty whether or not
the cancer was produced by the minor legal trauma.' This
lag between thb legal necessity for final 'yes' or 'no' answers
in such cases, 6onflicts with the medical necessity for a high
degree of scientific proof which may not be available to32
day.
COLORADO CASES

The writer has been able to locate only two appellate decisions
dealing with the particular subject under discussion. Transcripts
of medical evidence given in several workmen's compensation
cases were made available for inspection,33 and comments thereon
are hereinafter included.
28 Blackfoot Coal & Land Corp. v. Cooper, 121 Ind.App. 313, 95 N.E.2d 639 (1950). For an excellent
collection of cases involving trauma to vcrious parts of the body and its causal relation to cancer (pro
and con), see I Belli, Modern Trials 665-67 (1954). See also Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause, 31
Texas L. Rev. 630 (1953); Annots., 20 A.L.R. 23 (1922) and 73 A.L.R. 498 (1931).
29 Small, supra note 28.
30 Id. at 639.
31 Id. at 644.
32 1 Current Medicine for Attorneys, No. 2, p. 1 (1953).
33 The writer expresses his thanks to Attorney Carl Luplow, of Denver, for making these transcripts
available.

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST

1959

The Canon Reliance Coal Company case3 4 was decided by the
Colorado Supreme Court in 1922. The following facts were found
by the Commission:
"On or about February 5, 1920, while the decedent was
engaged in loading coal, he was struck on the cheek by a
flying lump of coal ... he died August 26, 1921. [H] is death
was caused by the malignant growth in his cheek.... From
and after February 5, 1920, and beginning with the time
decedent's face became sore and swollen, his condition became steadily worse and finally culminated in his death
on August 26, 1921. No intervening cause is shown that
would, or does, account for the sudden change in decendent's
Our finding, therefore, is decendent's death
condition ....
was the proximate result of his accident of February 5,
1920."35
The last paragraph of the court's opinion is most interesting:
"The foregoing statements of witnesses are in other
places modified and by other experts disputed. The testimony may be unreliable. The whole subject is shrouded
in more or less mystery and despite the present opinions
and theories of some of the authorities and members of the
profession the true cause of such a cancer may tomorrow
be established as entirely separate and apart from such
an injury. But in our opinion the foregoing is sufficient
'substantial and credible evidence' to support the findings and preclude us, under the rule repeatedly laid down
by this court, from disturbing those findings, on the theory
that the commission, in basing them upon36' such evidence,
acted 'without or in excess of its powers'.
In the Beatrice Creamery Company case,37 the Colorado
Supreme Court in affirming the decisions of the Industrial Commission, quoted the Commission as follows:
"None of the experts gave it as their opinion that sarcoma cannot be occasioned or aggravated by trauma. The
only clear evidence, therefore, is the testimony of claimant and decedent that the swelling arose shortly after the
accident and at the site of the injury and did not antedate
the accident. It is therefore, found as fact that decedent
died on May 30, 1928, as the result of an injury received on
of and in the course of the emMarch 28, 1927, arising out
3
ployment of decedent."
In the Pollitt case 39 the question before the referee was whether
trauma received by the claimant caused teratoma testis. Dr.
Charles B. Kingry, an outstanding pathologist of Denver, testified
for the respondent, and concluded that the trauma as described
by the claimant in this case did not cause the malignancy. Dr.
34 Canon Reliance Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Colo. 477, 211 Pac. 868 (1922).
35 Id. at 478, 211 Pac. at 869.
36 Id. at 480, 211 Pac. at 869.
37 Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Standley, 86 Colo. 290, 281 Pac. 110 (1929).
38 Id. at 292, 281 Pac. at 110.
39 Joe Pollitt v. Brown Constr. Co., No. 619722, Industrial Comm'n of Colo., Jan. 8, 1943.
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Kingry said, "I know of no authenticated
instance in which trauma
40
caused testicular teratoma.
In this particular case, Dr. Kingry based his opinion upon the
claimant's failure to qualify under at least two criteria: (1) there
was not, in the opinion of Dr. Kingry, a definite authenticated
severe injury; (2) there was no reasonable time relation between
the supposed origin and the course of this tumor.
In the case of J. Ford,4 Dr. del Regato, an international authority on cancer and currently director of the Glockner-Penrose Cancer Clinic in Colorado Springs, gave his opinion on testimony
presented in the case. The question before the Commission was
whether or not the cancer was caused or aggravated by trauma.
Dr. del Regato concurred in medical opinion given by Dr. Richard
M. Mulligan which set out the argument of assumption of causative
effect of trauma in the field of tumors. In summary, Dr. del Regato
stated:
"I do not believe that the trauma received by Mr. Ford
did cause the development of a malignant tumor in his
testicle. Assuming that the tumor was already present as
it well could have been, the trauma was not intense
enough according to the testimony to have caused any aggravation
or change in the natural course of this malignant
42
tumor."
An interesting case that came before our Industrial Commission is that of Daniel C. McNaughton,4 3 in which Dr. H. Mason
Morfit gave an opinion on the testimony presented. The case centered around a claim made by the deceased's widow that as a result of an injury received on September 16, 1948, while at work
for the State Bureau of Mines, Daniel C. McNaughton developed
a malignant tumor of the liver which subsequently led to death.
The claimant received a single blow and was not subjected to
chronic, repeated injury.
Dr. Morfit stated that although there are some types of malignant tumor in which the part of trauma is somewhat open to question, there has never been a claim made by any well-recognized
authority that primary cancer of the liver could be attributed to
any such fact. The doctor went on to state that, although primary
liver cancers are relatively rare, the consistent finding in any large
series of cases is the coexistence of cirrhosis of the liver. This has
led to the belief by many authorities that cirrhosis of the liver is
one of the prime factors in the ultimate production of a primary
malignant liver tumor. Dr. Morfit stated that the evidence indicated that this patient had changes in the liver that antedated the
trauma and that these changes are a much more likely factor in the
genesis of a malignant liver tumor than trauma.
In the James A. Nichols case 44 another case before our Industrial Commission involving cancer, Dr. Morfit again rendered an
opinion.
40 Id. Record, p. 15 (emphasis added).
41 Jay B. Ford v. Kearney Conoco Serv., No. 1046224, Industrial Comm'n of Colo., Nov. 17, 1954.
42 Opinion on testimony, filed at Colorado State Compensation Fund, File No- 74499, Jay B. Ford v.
Kearney Conoco Ser".
4a Daniel C. McNaughton v. Colorado State Bureau of Mines, No. 850037, Industrial Comm'n of Colo.
44 James A. Nichols v. C. D. Rhoton, No. 818395, Industrial Comm'n of Colo., Feb. 17, 1948.
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Dr. Morfit took exception to the testimony of claimant's doctor whose theory was as follows:
(a) The patient sustained an injury to the right knee,
(b) As a result of (a), a hematoma developed,
(c) That this hematoma failed to resolve spontaneously
but that instead its abortive healing resulted in the formation of a malignant tumor.
Dr. Morfit stated that if hematoma was caused by the blow,
it should have made its appearance immediately. Contrary to this,
the patient stated that the first swelling appeared six weeks later.
Further, there was no evidence pertaining to the state of the tissues
immediately after the injury which would substantiate any claim
of a swelling appearing before this date. He further took issue with
the claimant's doctor's statement, "[I] t is well known that any
pathologist will agree that an organized hematoma can, under certain circumstances, undergo malignant degeneration. ' 4 5
Dr. Morfit stated that he called several reputable pathologists,
one of them being Dr. Fred W. Stewart, Chief Pathologist at Memorial Hospital for Treatment of Cancer and Allied Diseases in
New York City, and failed to get any one of them to say that they
would agree with the above statement.
On April 24, 1959, the Industrial Commission entered an order
making a full award to the widow of Robert Lopez46 who died as
a result of a metastasized malignancy.
The facts as related to the writer by claimant's attorney 7 are
briefly as follows:
"The claimant, now deceased, badly burned his leg
from the ankle to the knee when about sixteen years old,
resulting in skin grafting of the injured area. Some fifteen
years later, while employed as a truck driver, he fell and
badly bruised a portion of the grafted area of the leg (the
bruise was located on the shin bone and was about the size
of a silver dollar). The bruise or tear in the grafted skin
did not heal readily and the claimant continued to use a
salve which had been prescribed by a physician, and apparently the area became slightly infected. A little better
than two months after the injury had been incurred, and the
area still being unhealed, the claimant went to see a bone
specialist who immediately had a biopsy made of the injured area and determined the existence of a hemangiosarcoma (a rapidly growing malignant tumor). The affected
leg was immediately amputated above the knee, but apparently metastasis had begun and several months later
the lower abdomen became involved and the claimant died."
The claimant's medical testimony was principally that of a
pathologist of the Weld County General Hospital who testified in
effect that although in his opinion a single blow in itself could not
constitute the sole cause of the development of the malignancy
which occurred in this case, the combination of a granulated area
45
46
47

Opinion on testimony, on file at Industrial Comm'n of Colo., No. 81839f, p. 4.
Robert Lopez v. Shupe Bros., No. 1319840, Industrial Comm'n of Colo., Jan. 7, 1958.
Charles A. Karowsky, of Greeley, Colorado.
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(skin which had been previously grafted), an injury which caused
an' opan wound in the granulated area and the infection which
undoubtedly ensued in the wounded area, causing chronic irritation, combined with the result that a hemangiosarcoma developed.
This malignancy metastasized and eventually resulted in Mr.
Lopez' death.
Respondents paid the award in full and there will be no appeal
in this particular case.
The attitude of the Colorado Supreme Court relative to Industrial Commission cases can best be summed up by quoting from
an opinion by Mr. Justice Sutton 8 when, in refusing to reverse
the Commission, the Court quoted with approval a prior Colorado
decision as follows:
"Our Court in Industrial Commission v. Royal Indemnity Co., 124 Colo. 210, 236 P.2d 293, said, inter alia:
'There is no dispute concerning the principles of law
which are involved. If the evidence, and logical inferences
therefrom, can be said to warrant aconclusion that the accident, within a reasonable probability, resulted in the disability, the claimant is entitled to compensation, since he
was successful before the commission. If, however, the evidence, as a matter of law is insufficient to remove the question of causation from the realm of conjecture and mere
possibilities, the award of the commission cannot be upheld'."'4 9
CONCLUSION

The plaintiff's attorney who is consulted in a case involving
the question of whether or not a single or repeated act of trauma
can cause or aggravate cancer, must, in all fairness to his client
and to himself, give serious consideration to the following items:
1. It is essential that the attending physician and the client
keep a detailed written record of all information concerning or
having any bearing on the case.
2. The attorney must apply these facts to the minimal requirements"° of the experts which, if satisfied, may cause even the most
reluctant doctor to testify that your case appears to be an exception to the general rule. Failure of the facts of your case to satisfy
all these requirements does not mean that your client will be denied
a recovery under the law.5 1
3. Within the financial means of your client, obtain the best
medical experts who believe in and will support the "probable
causation" theory under the particular facts of your case. Most
experts admit that there are reputable doctors who so believe.
4. In order to adequately prepare yourself to conduct cross
examination of opposing experts, well in advance of the trial make
an appointment and pay your own doctor for the time necessary
48 In Vanadium Corporation of America v. Sargent, 134 Colo. 555, 307 P.2d 454 (1957).
49 Id. at 564, 307 P.2d at 459.
50 Ewing, 19 Archives of Pathology 690 (1935); 1 Negligence and Compensation Service,
20, p. 159: (continued)
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to fully discuss the various theories of what will cause or aggravate
cancer,5 2 and consider also the theory of pre-disposition.
5. Be fair, but firm, in explaining the differences in the doctors' interpretation of the word "cause" and that which the courts
have accepted.
Even though the medical opinions for the opposition appear
impressive and almost overwhelming, ask yourself this question:
"Why, if these experts are so positive that a single trauma will not
cause or aggravate cancer under any circumstances, do they all
set up minimal criteria before they will consider the question of
cause or aggravation?"
I am reminded of the mother who scolds her son for believing
in ghosts but ends up by telling him that, should he see a white
shrouded object floating through the air, to call her immediately.
Probably-or would it be more acceptable to the readers if I said
possibly-mother still has an uneasy feeling about ghosts.
1. There must be strongly demonstrable evidence of the authenticity of the trauma alleged,
and of the adequacy of such trauma. (This envisages a trauma of force sufficient to have reached, and
disrupted, tissues where the tumor is later found. Ed.)
2. There must be evidence of the prior integrity, (i.e., that no tumor was present) of the
injured part. (Such integrity cannot be assumed on the basis of prior abscnce of symptoms nor in the
absence of prior local examinations in competent manner. Ed.)
3. The tumor alleged to be of traumatic origin must have arisen at the exact point allegedly
injured. (In a practical manner this is usually relaxed to allow for the tumor's location in very close
relation to the injured point; it does not allow for more than about an inch leeway. Contra-coup
trauma is not included within this scope. Ed.)
4. The time elapsing between the alleged injury and the appearance of the tumor must be a
reasonable one for the type of tumor found, and there must be unbroken symptoms bridging this period.
(Such period is variable; in general, a period of less than about 3 weeks or more than 3 months is not
considered as fulfilling this postulate. The time interval must be judged in accordance with the type
of tumor found and its natural growth rate if determinable. Ed.)
5. There must be a positive diagnosis that the mass felt is a tumor, and its type and nature
must be ppsitively known. (This means that a biopsy must have been performed. This postulate also
implies that the neoplasm found is one that con arise from the type of tissue normally existent where
the tumor is found; it does not include a metastasis found at the traumatic site. Ed.) And see Warren,
117 Annals of Surgery 585-95 (1943); 1 Negligence and Compensation Service, No. 20, p. 160:
1. The tumor site must be shown affirmatively to have had complete integrity (i.e., to have
been devoid of tumor) prior to the injury alleged.
2. The injury must have been of force sufficient to have disrupted the continuity of the
tissue at the site where the tumor is found and to have initiated cellular proliferation.
3. The tumor must follow the alleged injury by a reasonable length of time, this varying
with the type of tumor found.
4. The tumor must b- o$ the type that might reasonably develop as a result of regeneration
and repair of the tissue allegedly injured.
See also cases cited note 27 supro.
51 See notes 18-26 supra.
52 See 1 Gray, Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine 877-83 (3d ed. 1950), for theories of inclusion,
biologic origin, heredity, infection, race, traumatic and combination of causes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

According to a recent estimate the cost of judgments, out-ofcourt settlements, investigation expenses and legal fees paid in malpractice cases by the American medical profession and their insurers
now exceeds $45,000,000 each year.' This estimate would indicate
that malpractice claims are far more prevalent and judgments recovered are far larger in other parts of the country than in Colorado. Just how prevalent are these claims? The American Medical
Association has reported that about fourteen per cent of all its members in the United States have been subjected to such claims. 2 In

California, where the claim rate seems to be the highest, one doctor in every four has been charged with malpracticeA
No doubt the average doctor upon first hearing of a malpractice
claim against one of his colleagues is tempted to damn the claimant's attorney. But contrary to the opinions of most medical men,
attorneys very seldom if ever are the initial instigators of medical
malpractice claims. In fact a renowned and highly respected physician who claims many years of "wide experience advising doctors,
helping defense attorneys, appearing in court . . . as an expert witness, and as a defendant ....
,4 recently declared: "My observation
1 Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Saturday Evening Post, Apr. 11, 1959, p. 48. It is estimated that about 6,000 claims are filed in the United States each year. Id., Apr. 18, 1959, pp. 31, 115.
In England latest 12 month figures show that out of 3,223 malpractice cases tried in the Queen's Bench
Division, 2,671 resulted in verdicts for the plaintiff-patient. AMA News, July 13, 1959, p. 5, col. 2.
2 Wesson, Medical Malpractice Suits: A Physician's Primer for Defendants, 8 Clev.-Mor. L. Rev. 254
(1959).
8 Wesson, supra note 2 at 254.
4 Ibid.
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has been that every malpractice suit, without any exception, is instigated either directly or indirectly by a doctor." 5
Unquestionably some malpractice claims are without foundation in fact or support in law.6 Just as unquestionably some malpractice claims are well founded in both fact and law.7 It is the
ethical obligation of every attorney to discourage groundless claims
and not to espouse unjust suits. It should be the ethical obligation
of every fair minded physician to co-operate in obtaining justice
for a patient who has been wronged by a fellow physician. The
overriding duty of each profession is to the public. The problem
of both groups is to determine which claims are justified and which
are not. Since fair evaluation of claims can best be accomplished
through understanding of the law governing them, this paper
surveying, summarizing, and criticizing the sizable body of Colorado case law in the field is submitted in the hope that from increased knowledge will grow greater mutual understanding between our brother professions.

II.

THEORY AND NATURE OF THE AcTION

At common law an action for negligent treatment by a physician generally was instituted by a writ of trespass on the case.8
The older action in trespass was unavailable in most cases because
almost always the patient had consented to the touching of his person and therefore he could not plead a direct, forcible trespass. But
in cases where treatment was instituted without consent of the
patient or continued against his will after he had discharged the
physician, the doctor's touching or cutting of the patient's body
might constitute trespass in the nature of battery or both assault
and battery.9 Moreover, where the patient's consent was limited
to a particular treatment or operation and the doctor went beyond
that treatment or performed some unauthorized operation, there
might be a trespass action. Finally, there was sometimes available,
as an alternative, an action in assumpsit based on breach of the physician's express contract to effect a cure or upon an implied contract to. use due care in treatment. 0 Sometimes a single act might
subject the practitioner to an action in trespass, case (negligence),
or contract, at the option of the claimant."
Abolition of common law pleading and of forms of actions has
not eliminated the practical value of understanding these distinctions. The theory of the case is still highly significant. One must
still plead facts which would have allowed a recovery on some
5 Ibid.

(Emphasis added.)
6 See, e.g., Locke v. Van Wyke, 91 Colo. 14, 11 P.2d 563 (1932).
7 For example, Dr. Paul R. Hawley, a director of the American College of Surgeons, is reported to
have said recently that according to reliable estimates, "today one-half of the surgical operations in
the United States are performed by doctors who are untrained or inadequately trained, to undertake
surgery." N.Y. Times, May 28, 1959, § 1, p. 33. The Times reported Dr. Hawley as relating that one of
the world's most distinguished surgeons has stated that at least half his practice consists of attempts
to correct the bad results of surgery undertaken in community hospitals by doctors inadequately trained
in this field. Ibid.
8 Shipman, Common Law Pleading 96 (1923).
9 See the discussion of this problem in Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 74-78, 266 P.2d 1095,
1096 (1954); Cody v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 254-55, 222 P.2d 422, 424 (1950).
10 Shipman, Common Law Pleading 96 (1923).
11 E.g., McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 All. 124 (1930).
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theory under the prior practice. Furthermore, the theory of the
12
action -may determine what statute of limitations governs it,
whether the plaintiff must prove actual damages to get his claim
to the jury,1 3 whether punitive damages may be recovered,1 4 whether
damages are limited to those within the contemplation of the parties
when the relationship was entered,' whether the action survives
death of a party,"' whether release of a prior tortfeasor releases the
physician called to treat injuries caused by that tortfeasor," and
whether malpractice insurance covers the claim. 18 Most of these
problems have been dealt with in Colorado cases. This article will
be limited to actions on claims for breach of contract, assault and
battery, and negligence."l
A. Breach of Contract
It is fundamental that in the absence of an express contract to
the contrary a physician by undertaking treatment in a particular
case does not warrant a cure or even an improvement in the patient's
condition. 20 The law recognizes that many of "the thousand natural
shocks that flesh is heir to" 21 are incurable, and that intervening
causes quite unrelated to the physician's ministrations "may sometimes thwart the highest
skill employed in the accustomed or only
22
procedure known.
But Colorado cases often have declared that a physician when
employed impliedly contracts: (a) that he possesses a reasonable
degree of learning and skill equal to that ordinarily possessed by
others of his profession, (b) that he will utilize reasonable skill
and observe ordinary care and diligence in exercising his art and
applying his special knowledge to accomplish the purpose of his
employment, and (c) that in diagnosing the disease or injury and
selecting the mode of treatment he will employ his best judg12 For example, in Colorado, an assault and battery action is barred in one year. Colo. Rev. Stat.
But actions in the nature of assumpsit and most actions in the nature of trespass on
the case are governed by a six-year statute of limitations. Id. § 87-1-11(4)&(7). A statute whose constitutionality has never been authoritatively determined purports to bar "tort or implied contract"
actions against anyone "licensed to practice medicine, chiropractic, osteopathy, chiropody, midwifery or
dentistry" in two years. Id. § 87-1-6. For a more extensive discussion of this problem, see the text
at note 210 infra.
13 It is of course elemental that proof of damages is essential to establish a claim based on negligence, but at least nominal damages will be presumed to flow from any assault or battery.
14 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-2-2 (1953); Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
15 This is a fundamental limitation applied, albeit with increasing liberality, to damages for breach
of contract, but not applied at all to tort damages.
16 See Meffley v. Catterson, 132 Colo. 222, 287 P.2d 45 (1955), overruled, Publix Cab Co. v.
Colorado Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702 (Cola 1959). The survival statute involved in Publix Cab Co.
was amended in 1957, and the problem has probably been eliminated as to actions arising under
the later statute. Compare Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-1-9 (1953), with id. § 152-1.9 (Cum. Supp. 1957).
17 Compare Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 33 P.2d 1116 (1934), with Hennig v. Crested Butte
,:o., 92 Colo. 459, 21 P.2d 1115 (1933). This problem is discussed in detail in the text at note 173 infra.
18 The legal division of the American Medical Association is presently concerned about this most
practical problem. See series of four articles: Malpractice Insurance Changes Needed, beginning in the
AMA News, May 18, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
19 In at least one reported Colorado case a patient sued his physician on a false imprisonment
theory. Meek v. City of toveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30 (1929).
20 Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 202, 66 P.2d 808, 811 (dictum) (1937); Locke v. Van Wyke,
91 Colo. 14, 20, 11 P.2d 563, 565 (dictum) (1932).
21 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene 1.
22 Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 202, 66 P.2d 808, 811 (1937).

§ 87-1-2 (1953).
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ment. 23 Thus it is theoretically possible that his failure to perform
these implied promises will give rise to a breach of contract *action.
This possibility is recognized in the statute of limitations on medical
malpractice which is expressly made applicable to actions based
on implied contract. 24 A survey just completed by the American
Medical Association's legal division indicates that among those
who file claims against doctors, "suing for breach of contract has
become more popular. ' 25 However,
this theory of action has seldom
26
been utilized in Colorado.
Besides the possibility of implied contract, it is possible that
a particular physician may at the time of employment promise
to effect a cure or improvement and thereby create an express contract. Even if such representations were considered ethical, no wise
practitioner would indulge in them, for such an agreement would
render him liable without regard to fault if for any reason his treatment did not achieve the promised results. There may be a danger
that in attempting to quiet a patient's fears or to reassure him, a
doctor, without intending to guarantee a cure, might make remarks
which the patient could reasonably interpret as such a guarantee. In
such a case it is possible that a court might find a contractual
obligation. The dangers to the doctor from such unintended contractual entanglements are magnified by the fact that many medical
malpractice insurance policies probably do not cover liability of
a doctor for failure to perform
his contract to accomplish a cure or
27
improvement of condition.
B. Assault and Battery
Colorado case law indicates that a physician who treats or
operates upon a patient without the latter's consent may be liable
for assault and battery. 2 Other jurisdictions have held that a surgeon who has the patient's consent for a particular operation but
goes beyond that consent to perform other or additional surgery is
23 Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 43, 173 Pac. 200, 202 (1918); Bonnet v. Foote, 47 Colo. 282, 285,
107 Pac. 252, 254 (1910); McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 167, 128 Pac. 870, 872-73 (1912).
24Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-6 (1953).
25 AMA News, June 29, 1959, p. 11, col. 1.
26 One attempt was made to rely on a contract theory, but the Supreme Court held that the complaint sounded in tort. Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
27 See note 25 supra.
28 See the discussion in Cody v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 255, 222 P.2d 422, 424 (1950). This was
quoted with apparent approval in Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 75, 266 P.2d 1095, 1096 (1954).
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guilty of an assault and battery. 29 Colorado has rejected the latter
position, at least for purposes of holding the one year limitation
on assault and battery actions inapplicable to such a case.30
From the plaintiff's point of view this theory of action has certain distinct advantages. In such a case the doctor could be held
strictly accountable for an unfortunate result without proof that
he was guilty of the slightest negligence. In many cases the plaintiff by choosing this form of action would by-pass the hurdle of
obtaining expert testimony to prove negligence. Moreover the law
presumes that at least nominal damages flow from every assault
and battery, and the plaintiff could get his case to the jury without proving any actual damages. Exemplary damages would be
possible, since assault and battery are intentional torts.
At least two factors discourage this form of action. First, a recent survey indicates that some medical malpractice insurance
policies may exclude coverage of intentional torts generally or of
treatment without consent,3' and furthermore exemplary damages
are not covered by liability insurance.3 2 Second, a special one year
statute of limitations probably would apply
to some malpractice.
3
actions brought on this theory in Colorado. 3
For the physician seeking to avoid assault and battery claims,
the practical problem is what constitutes a sufficient consent to
authorize treatment or surgery. Apparently Colorado law prescribes no technical requirement of a written, signed consent, even
for serious and irreversible surgery.2 4 But a clear, specific, written
and signed consent from an informed and understanding patient,
or one authorized to consent for him, can be a most effective lawsuit preventive2 5 One who relies on a patient's oral consent may
find himself trying to convince a jury that the patient did consent,
or that the operation performed was the one requested.2 Failing
that he may be held liable even if the operation was done in the
most careful and skillful manner possible. Even worse, he may have
to pay any judgment personally since, as has been noted, his malpractice insurance may
not cover the battery involved in an opera2 7
tion without consent.
No prudent surgeon should wield the scalpel without personally examining a properly signed consent form which clearly
authorizes him to perform a particular operation on a named
patient. He should be chary of relying on the assurances of others
29 Cases collected in Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695 (1957).
30 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
31 See note 37 infra.
32 Universal Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
33 For a fuller discussion see text at note 210 infra.
34 See Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 80, 266 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1954).
35 Taylor, Fewer Malpractice Claims - Via Our American Way - Consent for Treatment, Rocky Mt.
Med. J. (May, 1955).
36 See, e.g., Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943) (whether surgeon who proceeded with
major surgery after procuring consent for only minor surgery was guilty of assault was a jury question); Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39, 76 N.W. 149 (1898) (mixup on oral instructions resulting in
surgery on the wrong leg).
37 In a recent survey, 22 medical malpractice insurers were asked if their policies would cover
this situation: "Dr. Collins operated upon Mrs. King, with her consent, for an ovarian cyst. In the
course of the operation he found that a radical hysterectomy was advisable and thereupon performed this procedure. Mrs. King brought suit against Dr. Collins charging assault and battery in
that he went beyond the consent given.
"Response: Twelve companies would defend and pay. Ten firms qualified their positions, but
would not refuse coverage." AMA News, May 18, 1959, p. 3, col.2.

DICTA

JULY-AuGuST 1959

that proper consent forms have been executed and filed.3 8 In addi-

tion to written authorization to perform the particular operation
contemplated, it is often advisable to obtain the patient's general
consent to perform other or further surgery whose need becomes apparent only after the patient is unconscious and the incisions for the intended operation have been made. 39 While it is
true that courts generally are liberal in holding that an unconscious patient's consent to surgery reasonably required to pre'
vent death or serious harm is assumed,40
there is no direct Colorado
authority recognizing this legal fiction, and
there is respectable
non-Colorado authority severely limiting it.4'1
A closely related problem is who may consent on behalf of another. While a parent may consent for a child of tender years,' and
a spouse for an incompetent or unconscious husband or wife, generally a mentally competent adult, whether man or woman-married or unmarried-is master of his own person and is the only
one capable of consenting to an operation on that person.4 3 On this
point the Colorado Smith case 44 seems to reach a highly questionable result. There the husband-patient claimed that the only operation he ever discussed with the defendant doctor was a circumcision. The defendant testified that the only conversation he had
with the plaintiff prior to the day of the operation was a consultation in which he, the defendant, recommended a circumcision. But,
said the defendant physician, "all subsequent discussion, including
arrangements for, and instructions relative to, the operation, were
made by him with plaintiff's wife, mostly by telephone."4 5 The plaintiff agreed that "his wife did most of the talking . . ."6 and ad-

mitted that when the date for the operation was set, he, the plaintiff, did not clearly request the circumcision previously recommended. 47 "Defendant . . . further testified that when plaintiff's

wife called him to make definite plans for the operation he asked
her what operation, whether circumcision or sterilization, to which

38 In Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954), the surgeon prior to performing a
vasectomy inquired of the attending physician whether the latter had procured written, signed consents for this sterilization operation from the patient and his wife. The attending physician assured
the surgeon that the consents had been obtained but he unwittingly had left them at his office. The
Supreme Court held that the surgeon, in making this inquiry, "took every precaution that was reasonably required of him, and . . . there is no element of negligence left in the case as to him and he
was entitled to a directed verdict." 129 Colo. at 82, 266 P.2d at 1100. Query: If the patient had consented to no operation, would the surgeon be protected against a claim for battery, as distinguished
from negligence, by reasonable reliance on the assurance of the attending physician that proper consent had been given? It would seem that the attending physician would be powerless to consent on
behalf of the patient to a serious battery. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
39 See e.g., Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954); Stone v. Goodman, 241 App.
Div. 290, 271 N. Y. Supp. 500 (1st Dep't 1934) (plaintiff's signed general consent to any treatment
found necessary protected surgeon who operated for hernia on left side upon finding it was more
critical than right side hernia for which operation had been requested). And see cases collected in
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695, 717-19 (1957).
Typical of the broad language in such general consent forms currently in use in Denver is the following: "I hereby give my consent to Dr.
a member of the staff of
--.....
hospital, to perform upon me any operation which in his judgment he deems necessary."
40 Prosser, Torts 84 (1955); Restatement, Torts § 62, Illustrations 5 & 6 (1934); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d
695, 699-704 (1957).
41 E.g., Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951); Restatement, Torts § 54 (1934).
42 But cf. Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) (two-year old child held incapable
of consenting to ride as guest in grandmother's car, and therefore not subject to guest statute defense).
43 Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Low 77 (3d ed. 1956).
44 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
45 Id. at 78, 266 P.2d at 1098.
46 Id. at 79, 266 P.2d at 1098 (a not unlikely story).
47 Summarizing testimony, the court declared: "He admits, however, that he did not specify a
circumcision operation, and that he just mentioned an operation." 129 Colo. at 79, 266 P.2d at 1098.
Thus the court indicated its conclusion that the plaintiff was not a discriminating shopper but was
willing to take any operation in stock.
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he referred, because of Mrs. Smith's apparent difficulty in understanding what he meant, as the 'tube-tying' operation, and that she
replied that was the operation to be done."48
The best that can be inferred from this evidence is that in performing an operation upon Mr. Smith the physician relied upon
Mrs. Smith's choice of the operation to be performed even though
she was apparently having difficulty in understanding what operation was being discussed. Inescapable is the conclusion that Mr.
Smith, who was sterilized, never at any time personally consented
to be sterilized. Yet, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court
action in directing a plaintiff's verdict on liability and held that this
evidence presented a jury issue whether the plaintiff had consented
to the vasectomy.
Generally speaking it is prudent procedure to obtain the consent of both husband and wife if either is to be sterilized. 9 But if
the Smith case be law in Colorado, a doubtful hypothesis, it is not
necessary to obtain the consent of the husband, but only of the
wife, if the husband is to be sterilized.5 0 Happily for the male animal and for unborn generations, the case is unique and probably
will never be followed on this point.
C. Negligence
The theory by far most important, because nearly all medical
malpractice cases are based upon it, is negligence. Because of its
paramount significance, a major portion of this paper will be devoted to the negligence theory.
III. NEGLIGENT

MALPRACTICE

Those who engage in the healing professions, no more nor less
than other men, may be liable in tort for damages caused others
by their negligence. It has been said that: "Negligence in actions
of this nature is no different than in other situations. It consists
of doing something, which, under the circumstances, should not
have been done, or in omitting to do that which should have been
done."'" While this generality is not untrue, it is incomplete. Medical
malpractice law, although it is but an application of general negligence principles in a specific frame of reference, presents some
special legal problems. Problems concerning the standard of care
imposed upon practitioners, the specific acts or omissions which
may be deemed negligence, and the burden of proving negligence
48 129 Colo. at 79, 266 P.2d at 1098.
49 Regan, op. cit. supra note 43. This is a statement of minimum precaution, and it assumes
that the sterilization is a lawful operation. Present Colorado law apparently provides no express
authority for performing a non-therapeutic sterilization, and some authorities have warned that even
the consent of both spouses may not protect from civil, and possibly criminal, liability, a surgeon
sterilizing either spouse in a state where the operation is unlawful. Miller and Dean, Liability of
Physicians for Sterilization Operations, 16 A.B.A.J. 158 (1930); Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery, 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 233, 276-84 (1942). Regan, Malpractice and the
Physician, 147 A.M.A.J. 54 (1951). On the state of the low in Colorado, see letter from William L.
Boatright, Attorney General, to Dr. F. H. Zimmerman, Acting Superintendent, State Hospital, Pueblo,
Colorado, Aug. 30, 1928. And see Address by George E. Hall, Staff Associate, American Medic6l Association Law Department, to Congress on Medical Education and Licensure at Chicago, ill., Feb. 7,
1955.
5o How many "barefoot and pregnant" wives would cheerfully "make all arrangements" to give
such operations to their husbands, perhaps as presents for Father's Dayl
51 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 81, 266 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1954).
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in this kind of case are of particular significance. These problems
will be discussed separately in the order indicated.
A. The Standard of Care
Generally speaking, negligence is conduct which falls below
a standard established by law to protect others from an unreasonable risk of harm. 52 A doctor, like any other man, may be liable
for injury to another proximately caused by his "failure to exercise that degree of care, prudence and forethought, which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same
or similar circumstances. '53 This standard governs the physician as
a man in his non-professional contacts with other men.
His conduct in the capacity of doctor is another matter. In
addition to the minimum standard which all men must meet, men
who hold themselves out to the public as having special skill, training and knowledge in a particular profession must meet a higher
standard imposed only on those who follow that profession.5 4 The
special standard imposed on members of the medical profession
has been oft repeated in Colorado cases.
In a 1957 case the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence
to the long established standard that, "A physician is bound to
accord his patients such reasonable care, skill and diligence as
physicians in good standing in the same neighborhood in the same
general line of practice ordinarily have and exercise in like
cases." 55
Earlier Colorado cases had not restricted the standard to the
same neighborhood, but had measured a defendant's act by whether
it would have been considered good medical practice in the same or
similar localities.5 6 The distinction might have practical importance
in a case involving conduct of a doctor practicing in an area where
all doctors have been negligent in keeping abreast of developments
in the profession.
That others also are negligent is not ordinarily a
5 7
defense.
The trend of later cases from other jurisdictions is to recognize
as too narrow the standard of the "same locality" and substitute
the phrase "the same or similar localities." 58 This broader rule may
work to the advantage of a physician charged with negligence for
using a treatment not in general use in his own community. He
may be ahead of his fellows in adopting a new development already
proven through wide use in similar localities. Such leadership
should not be considered negligence.
Nevertheless the law continues to take into account the differ52 Restatement, Torts § 282 (1934).
53 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 81, 266 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1954); Prasser, Torts 124 (1955).
54 For a very recent treatment of the special rules applying to physicians, pharmacists, architects,
ngne er,

teachers,

attorneys,

abstractors,

funeral

directors,

and

accountants,

see

A

Symposium

on

Professional Negligence, 12 Vond. L. Rev. 535-839 (1959).
55 Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 283, 310 P.2d 722, 726 (1957).
56 E.g., Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 42, 173 Pac. 200, 201 (1918). This view was incorporated in
an instruction approved in Dixon v. Norberg, 113 Colo. 352, 357, 157 P.2d 131, 133 (1945).
57 "Even an entire industry, by adopting careless methods to save time and effort or money, cannot
be permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard." Prosser, Torts 136 (1955). In Weiss v. Axler, 137
Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958), the court held that custom and usage in applying a hair wave product
could not affect the test of due care if the usage foiled to comply with the manufacturer's directions
for use of his product.
58 Prosser, Torts 134 (1955).
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ences in opportunities and facilities in dissimilar communities and
recognizes that the country doctor cannot be held to the standard
applied to him who practices in a metropolitan medical center.5 9 So
too the law recognizes that a general practitioner cannot be expected to have as much skill or knowledge as a specialist 60
In some cases the plaintiff admits that the defendant doctor
was both careful and skillful in carrying out the treatment given,
but claims that he was negligent in the first instance in choosing
the wrong treatment procedure. In such a case the key issue of
negligence depends on whether the treatment selected was one
which reasonably skilled, prudent and careful practitioners in the
same or similar localities would have approved for the plaintiff's
62
ailment.6 1 Only expert testimony can establish this standard.
The last mentioned standard applies only to negligence in the
choice of treatment for an ailment whose proper treatment is well
established among medical men at the time the defendant acts.
Where the medical authorities are not in accord on the proper treatment or where no effective procedures have been proven by legitimate experimentation, the physician is free to exercise his own
judgment. With wise restraint, the law refuses to interfere with
that judgment, lest physicians be deterred from exerting their best
efforts in doubtful cases. An 1895 Colorado case stated the rule,
which is still good law,6 3 that, "in a case involving doubt, or when
there are reasonable grounds for a difference of opinion as to the
nature of the disease and the proper mode of treatment, if a physician or surgeon possessing the requisite qualifications applies his
best skill and judgment, with ordinary care and diligence, to the
examination and treatment of a case, he is not responsible for an
honest mistake or error of judgment as to the character of the disease or the best mode of treatment."64 This is a sensible rule and
one which avoids imposing on physicians a stricter standard of
liability than that imposed on other professional men.
In interpreting the rule concerning errors of judgment, the
Colorado court has been most reluctant to second-guess the physician and most lenient in giving him the benefit of the doubt.6 5 For
example, in a 1937 case where five physicians condemned the procedure followed by the defendant, but ten others approved it, the
high court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and ordered
a non-suit without a new trial. " ' It would seem that in such a case
there is at least a question of fact for the jury, especially when
one considers how difficult it is to get even one physician to fully
express his real feelings in an action against another doctor.
59 Ibid.
60 See Dixon v. Norberg, 113 Colo. 352, 357, 157 P.2d 131, 133 (1945); Prosser, Torts 133 (1955).
61 See the discussion in text at notes 94-99 infro and authorities there cited. Even a treatment procedure amounting to criminal misconduct cannot be held to be medical malpractice without expert
testimony that it violated the usual standards of care. See McKay v. State Board, 103 Colo. 305, 311-13,
86 P.2d 232, 236 (1938).
62 Norkett v. Martin, 63 Colo. 220, 165 Pac. 256 (1917); McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 171,
128 Pac. 870, 873 (1912).
63 See, e.g.,Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 66 P.2d 808 (1937); Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo.
295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934).
64 Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 539, 39 Pac. 577, 579 (1895).
65 Cases citednote 62 supro. "While it is true that physicians 'are not responsible for the errors
of an enlightened judgment where good judgments may differ, ...
they will be charged . . . only
where such errors could not have arisen except from want of reasonable skill and diligence.' " Jackson
v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 537-38, 39 Pac. 577, 579 (1895).
66 Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 66 P.2d 808 (1937).
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Whether the present Supreme Court would be inclined to take
such a case from the jury is at best a matter of conjecture.
Honest mistake of judgment is available as a defense only if it
appears that the physician used reasonable care in exercising that
judgment. 7 One who has the utmost skill and learning may nevertheless be liable if he fails to apply his ability in gathering facts
on which to base a judgment of the treatment to follow. 6 8 Whether
reasonable care is employed in exercising judgment is usually a
question of fact for the jury.69
The rule restricting medical practitioners to the use of proven
and generally recognized methods of treatment is intended to protect the public against injury through unwarranted experimentation with new methods and untried theories. At this point it is important to note two Colorado cases which espouse a novel test of
negligence for cases where the treatment procedure is questioned.
In Brown v. Hughes70 the 1934 court, without citing any authority,
declared: "The defendants herein must first have left and abandoned all knowledge acquired in the fields of exploration and
adopted some rash or experimental methods before they approached
the danger zone of liability."' 71 In the court's words, the issue was,
"Does the evidence here evince want of skill or a reckless disregard of consequences?" 72 The error was compounded by repetition
in another case three years later.73 In the latter case the court concluded that the jury had no right to find the defendant liable for
a death following an operation condemned by five medical witnesses. Said the opinion: "The defendant did not undertake a
wholly new experiment but, according to the evidence, followed
a method that had previously been used with success by himself,
and a procedure-admittedly rare--but known to have been sometimes used. '74 Certainly the law should be reluctant to stifle new
methods and improved treatments but the test laid down in these
two cases requires that a plaintiff prove what is tantamount to gross
negligence if not willful wrongdoing. Considering that in this kind
of case the only proof acceptable must come from the defendant's
fellow practitioners, the practical impossibility of meeting such a
test is obvious. It is submitted that these two cases are without
foundation in reason, policy or law and should be repudiated at
the first opportunity.
In addition it must be borne in mind that in determining
whether a particular procedure is medically approved, the question must be answered according to the tenets of the school of
practice to which the defendant belongs. 75 Under this rule an osteopath's procedures and treatments are to be tested against the standard of methods among osteopaths. 76 It follows that what is negligence if done by a medical doctor may not be negligence when
done by a chiropractor and vice versa. This is a judicial recogni67 Foase v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 283, 310 P.2d 722, 727 (1957).
68 Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 538, 39 Pac. 577, 579 (1895).
69 See, e.g., Foose v. Hayrfiond, 135 Colo. 275, 283, 310 P.2d 722, 727 (1957).
70 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934).
71 Id. at 303, 30 P.2d at 262.
72 Ibid.
73 Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 197, 66 P.2d 808, 809 (1937).
74 Id.'at 202, 66 P.2d at 811.
75 Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 150-51, 263 Pac. 26, 27 (1928) (osteopaths).
76 Ibid. And see McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912).
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tion that medicine is yet an incomplete science and no one school
of practitioners has a monopoly on knowledge of effective treatment methods. Furthermore, one must not forget that methods
forbidden by the standards in one type of locality may be quite acceptable in another. It should be noted, however, that the trend of
later cases from other states is toward holding all who practice the
healing arts close to the high standards of the medical profession
proper. These cases reason that advances in medical knowledge,
combined with tremendous improvements in communications
media, make it easier for all practitioners regardless of locality or
school of practice 77 to have the minimum knowledge required to
protect the public.
These standards of care can best be understood by considering
instances where the Supreme Court has applied them to particular
acts or omissions claimed to constitute negligence.
B. Acts or Omissions Constituting Negligence
It is of course elemental, in this context as elsewhere, that
"negligence may consist of either wrongful action or wrongful inaction. ' '78 Stated another way, a physician's negligence may consist "in his doing something which he should not have done, or in
'
omitting to do something which he should have done."79
Negligent omission. Plaintiffs in Colorado cases have alleged
negligence through inaction in the form of failure properly to
diagnose an ailment 0 or injury,"' failure to X-ray where a possible
fracture was indicated,8 2 failure to direct immobilization of a fractured limb 3 and failure, after setting a fractured bone, to use reasonable
care to ascertain whether it has remained in proper posi4
tion.1
In one suit the claimant alleged, but could not prove, that the
attending physician had been asked to bring a specialist into the
case but had failed or refused to do so.85 A somewhat similar early
case held that a physician called to treat the plaintiff for typhoid
fever was not guilty of malpractice in failing to comply with the
latter's request that an oculist be brought into the case to treat a
serious eye condition, at least in absence of proof that the typhoid
fever had caused the eye ailment. 8
Occasionally, the threat of legal liability may interfere with
good medical practice. Such an instance might occur where a physician decides that for medical reasons it would be better if the
patient does not immediately realize the gravity of his condition.
If the serious condition improves or disappears this will be considered good therapy. But if not, the doctor may be sued by an
77 McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L Rev. 549, 569-81 (1959).
78 Pearson v. Norman, 106 Colo. 396, 399, 106 P.2d 361, 363 (1940).
79 McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 169, 128 Pac. 870, 873 (1912).
8o Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 39 Pac. 577 (1895) (improper diagnosis of penis infection
resulting in gangrene and amputation of penis).
81 Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957) (diagnosis of foot fracture as sprain);
Coakley v. Hayes, 121 Colo. 304, 215 P.2d 901 (1950) (plaintiff failed to prove alleged failure to
diagnose and treat displaced cervical vertebra); Bonnet v. Foote, 47 Colo. 282, 107 Pac. 252 (1910)
(fracture diagnosed as bruise); McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912) (fractured arm
diagnosed as dislocated shoulder).
82 Foqse v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957) (fracture diagnosed, without X-ray, as
sprain); Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 263 Pac. 26 (1928) (hip fracture diagnosed as contusion in spite
of perceptible shortening of leg and inversion of foot).
83 Foose v. Haymand, supra note 82; McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912).
84 Croghead v. McCullough, 58 Colo. 485, 146 Pac. 235 (1915).
85 Cody v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 222 P.2d 422 (1950).
ae Jones v. Vroom, 8 Colo. App. 143, 45 Pac. 234 (1896) (of doubtful precedent value today).
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irate patient claiming that the condition was not diagnosed properly or that it was negligence not to fully inform him of the seriousness of his malady.17 Similarly it may be alleged as the basis
of a claim that upon discharge the physician neglected to inform
the patient that further treatment would be required.8 Courts in
other jurisdictions have frequently stated "that the relation between
the physician and his patient is a fiduciary one and therefore the
physician has an obligation to make a full and frank disclosure to
the patient of all pertinent facts related to his illness."8 9
Negligent omission may involve occurrences having neither
relation to nor bearing upon the physician's technical skill. Thus it
is obvious negligence for a surgeon to allow an unconscious patient
to roll off an operating table quite without regard to the standard
of skill and care observed by the" surgeon while actually performing the surgery.9 0 Likewise failure to take the minimum precautions
necessary to assure that the patient gets the operation intended for
him and not that requested by another would seem to present a clear
case of negligence. 9 1
Finally, in the category of negligent malpractice by omission
would fall the cases where it is charged that the patient's condition
was unnecessarily aggravated or death resulted because of the physician's general inattention and failure to respond to urgent requests for aid.9 2 Although a doctor may have no legal duty to undertake care of a particular patient in the first instance, once he
commences treatment he "cannot discharge a case and relieve himfor it simply by staying away without
self of the responsibility
93
notice to the patient.
Negligent affirmative acts. Colorado cases have dealt with two
distinct kinds of affirmative action constituting negligent malpractice. The first type consists of adopting a procedure or prescribing
a treatment other than the procedures and treatments generally
considered acceptable and effective remedies for the disease or injury involved.9 4 If an unproven or otherwise unacceptable method
is chosen and injury results, the physician may be liable even
though, once adopted, the procedure is carried out with the utmost
care and skill. Thus a doctor who prescribed a poultice instead of
the usual minor surgery was required to pay damages in spite of
his plea that at most he was guilty of an honest mistake on a matter
of judgment.9 5 Similarly, a surgeon and dentist who co-operated in
87 See, e.g., Pearson v. Norman, 106 Colo. 396, 106 P.2d 361 (1940) (physician claimed he properly
diagnosed and treated spine fracture but admitted he did not tell patient, his wife or his son of the
condition; patient claimed physician had diagnosed and treated injury as "a bad bruise and shake-up").
See Taylor, Doctor's Duty to Speak, 24 The Linacre Quarterly 67 (1957).
88 E.g., Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 255, 222 P.2d 422, 424 (1950).
89 McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549, 586 (1959).
go Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957).
91 But cf. Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
92 See, e.g., Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 173 Pac. 200 (1918) (physician admitted child's life might
have been saved had he received proper attention when it was first asked).
93 Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 149, 263 Pc. 26, 27 (1928) (physician held jointly liable for
iegligence of another to whom case had been turned over).
The facts of this leading case are
94 E.g., Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 39 Pac. 577 (1895)
set out in note 95 infra.
95 Jackson v. Burnham, supro note 94. There the plaintiff, suffcring pain from a swollen penis,
sought the defendant physician's care. Examination disclosed that the foreskin was adhering to the
head of the penis, causing a constriction or strangulation and preventing proper circulation of blood.
The usual and accepted treatment for this unhappy condition was to slit the foreskin, thus eliminating
constriction and restoring circulation. Instead of following that procedure, however, the defendant
applied and kept on the argon a tight "flaxseed meal poultice" which further constricted the organ
causing gangrene and eventual amputation. Held: Jury verdict of $5,000 for the plaintiff affirmed.

JULY-AUGUST

1959

DICTA

administering a general anaesthetic to a patient known to have a
weak heart and then extracted his tonsils plus sixteen impacted
teeth, failed to convince a jury they were not liable for the patient's
death.96
The procedure adopted must be appropriate to the case at hand,
and thus the question of proper diagnosis may overlap the problem
of choice of treatment. A method considered safe for removing
foreign objects from the throat may not be approved for removing
them from the esophagus. 97 Measures effective for dislocated
shoulders may not be advisable for fractured arms.9 8
Whether a particular procedure or treatment is acceptable must
be proved as part of the plaintiff's case and generally the only acceptable evidence is expert medical testimony. 99
In a second and more common form of malpractice by affirmative negligence, the negligence involved is not the adoption of an
incorrect diagnosis or treatment but consists of performing an approved procedure in a careless or otherwise substandard manner.
Thus where a physician in treating a fractured collar bone employed the proper method but so carelessly set the bone that the
fragments overlapped causing a crippling deformity, it was held
that a verdict for the patient was justified. 10 This form of negligence may occur in diagnosis'0 1 or in treatment. 10 2 For example, in a
given case proper diagnostic examination might justify use of an
X-ray, but if serious burns result, a jury might conclude that the
X-ray was improperly used. 103 Colorado case law examples of affirmative negligence in treatment range from maladministration of
drugs 10 4 to tearing of the patient's esophagus
while attempting to
0
remove a bone lodged in her throat.'
This type of affirmative negligence frequently occurs where
an approved surgical operation is performed in a negligent manner. Thus where the surgeon performing an appendectomy severs
the patient's intestine, 10 6 or otherwise cuts 10 7 or injures 0 8 some
part of the anatomy not properly involved in the intended operation,
the negligence may sometimes be obvious even to a layman and no
expert testimony should be required to establish negligence.
96 Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934) (but the Supreme Court reversed, finding no
evidence the defendants' acts caused the death).
97 Dixon v. Norberg, 113 Colo. 352, 157 P.2d 131 (1945).
98 McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912).
99 See note 62 supra. A recent illustration of how difficult it is to obtain clear medical testimony
to establish the point appears in Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 282-83, 310 P.2d 722, 725-26
(1957).
100 Craghead v. McCullough, 58 Cola. 485, 146 Pac. 235 (1915); Bonnet v. Foote, 47 Colo. 282, 107
Pac. 252 (1910) (fracture diagnosed and treated as mere bruise).
101 See, e.g., Coakley v. Hayes, 121 Colo. 303, 215 P.2d 901 (1950).
102 See notes 104 and 105 infra.
103 Lamme v. Ortega, 129 Colo. 149, 267 P.2d 1115 (1954) (Supreme Court reversed jury verdict
for failure of plantiff to prove injury was caused by X-ray).
104 Hedgpeth v. Schoen, 109 Colo. 341, 125 P.2d 632 (1942) (injection of arsenic solution in
treating trenchmouth).
105 Dixon v. Norberg, 113 Colo. 352, 157 P.2d 131 (1945) ($7,000 verdict for plaintiff upheld).
106 Edwards v. Quackenbush, 112 Colo. 337, 149 P.2d 809 (1944) ($18,000 jury verdict for the
plaintiff upheld).
107 Cf. Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954) (plaintiff claimed he had asked for
circumcision but was given a sterilization operation by mistake).
108 See McBrayer v. Zordel, 127 Colo. 443, 257 P.2d 962 (1953).
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Of like kind are the cases where surgeons have left foreign
objects inside patients," 9 cases once so numerous as to evoke from
the Colorado court the comment that, "Their perusal would almost
lead to the conclusion that certain surgeons use such incisions as
waste baskets." 110 In such cases also the negligence is manifest.
Even proof by the defendant surgeon that a sponge count came
out correctly may not be conclusive to clear him."' It follows that
if the surgeon had notice immediately following the operation that
the sponge count did not check, his inaction112thereafter would seem
to constitute strong evidence of negligence.
One need not spend years in medical school or specialized
practice to discern that in cases such as these somebody has been
negligent. 113 They are not unlike the classic Mississippi case where
the court, with typical Southern reserve, declared: "We can
imagine no reason why, with ordinary care, human toes could not
be left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are found in chewing
tobacco, it seems to us that somebody has been very careless." 1 4 To
paraphrase, the layman can imagine no reason why, with ordinary
care, sponges and surgical instruments cannot be left out of human
beings, and if such foreign objects are found in a patient after an
operation, it would appear that somebody has been negligent. This
of course involves the very practical problem of the plaintiff's burden of proving negligence and the extent to which that burden may
be lightened by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

IV.

BuRDi

AND M"tNuER OF PRooF

A. Proof by Expert Testimony
In many medical malpractice cases the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the standard of care as part of his case." If he
fails to prove the standard, the case cannot go to the jury,
for the jury will not be allowed to set up a standard of its
own. 116 This rule applies where it is claimed that the defendant
-

109 E.g., Smedra v. Stanek, 187 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1951); Davis v. Bonebroke, 135 Colo. 506,
313 P.2d 982 (1957); Rosane v. Senger, note 110 infro.
110 Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 368, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (1944).
1n Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 406, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930) (dictum).
1125ee Smedra v. Stanek, 187 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1951) (trial court erred in refusing to admit
evidence that just after the operation a nurse informed surgeon that the sponge count did not come
out right, and in rejecting testimony of a statement by surgeon that he had been delayed in surgery
because count did not check).
113 See the discussion in Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 405-07, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930).
114 Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365, 366 (1918).
115 Norkett v. Martin, 63 Colo. 220, 165 Pac. 256 (1917); McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 171.
128 POc. 870, 873 (1912).

118 Ibid.
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has employed a treatment not generally recognized in the profession. Here the essence of the negligence is in deciding to do
what was done, not in the manner of doing it, and obviously a lay
witness cannot say whether doctors generally would react to particular symptoms by employing a particular procedure, operation or
medication. In such cases, therefore, the standard to be applied by
the trier of facts must be established by expert medical testimony,
and cannot be otherwise established. 117 Furthermore, if different
schools of medicine recognize different standards or methods of
treating a particular condition, the expert testimony required
should come from adherents of the school which the defendant
follows.1" 8 Defendants should be careful lest in seeking to exculpate
themselves by describing their usual methods and precautions they
incidentally provide the plaintiff with otherwise unobtainable expert testimony establishing a standard. 1 9
Once the standard of care has been established by medical testimony, the plaintiff must produce evidence that it has been violated.
If the case concerns a charge that the defendant engaged in a medically unacceptable procedure, the necessary expert evidence will
often take the form of answers to hypothetical questions. For example, in Dixon v. Norberg12 0 the plaintiff claimed that her esophagus had been injured by the defendant's unorthodox procedure in
trying to remove a pork bone which had lodged there. After the
plaintiff testified describing her condition, the defendant's treatment procedure, and the resulting injury, the plaintiff's attorney
called medical witnesses to establish that the defendant's procedure
in the case constituted negligence. These medical specialists, "in
answer to hypothetical questions, testified that, assuming the existence of a bone in the esophagus and a probing for it in the manner
related by plaintiff, such a procedure was not good practice considering the present standards in the profession for a general practitioner and would be dangerous to the patient.' 12 1 Similar procedure has been followed in other cases requiring expert evidence.
Occasionally the courts have mentioned the practical difficulties
encountered by plaintiffs seeking expert testimony. 122 It is natural
for medical men, out of empathy or sympathy, to be reluctant to
testify against a colleague embroiled in legal difficulties. But it is
difficult to understand the usual explanation to the effect that a
code of ethics forbids such testimony. For professional men whose
first duty is to the patients they serve to refuse to testify fully
and frankly in order to right a wrong against one of those patients
is bad enough. But to so refuse on the ground that to tell the truth
117 Ibid. In Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 405, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930), the Colorado court
quoted with apparent approval as follows: "It is true that there is a large class of malpractice
cases in which the question or matter under investigation is so intricate and abstruse, or so little
understood, that ordinary jurors would in all probability know nothing about the same, but must
be guided by opinions of witnesses having special knowledge. In this class of cases the plaintiff fails
to make a case for the jury in the absence of a properly qualified expert witness."
118 Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 263 Pac. 26 (1928) (osteopaths).
119 This happened in Bolles v. Kinton, supra note 118. The defendant's admission eliminated the
plaintiff's burden on this point in Pearson v. Norman, 106 Colo. 396, 106 P.2d 361 (1940).
120 113 Colo. 352, 157 P.2d 131 (1945).
121 Id. at 356, 157 P.2d at 133.
122 See, e.g., Todloik v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 44, 173 Poc. 200, 202 (1918). A nationwide survey
indicated that "only about 15 per cent of all doctors would be willing to tell a patient he had been
injured by the negligent treatment of another doctor. Only about 7 per cent would agree to appear
voluntarily as a witness for such a patient in court." Silverman, supra note 1 at 116.
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would be unethical compounds the original wrong and perverts the
meaning of ethics. No self-respecting lawyer seeks from any witness, medical or otherwise, anything but the truth.1 23 No self-respecting doctor should suppress the truth, even if it happens to be
evidence in a lawsuit against another doctor. In the long run the
"conspiracy of silence" among medical men will hurt them far more
than it will help them. This is already obvious in the form of judicial departures from the once universal rule requiring expert testimony to establish negligence in a malpractice case.
B. Proof Without Expert Testimony
All too often attorneys, frustrated by the near impossibility of
obtaining medical testimony to establish the standard of care and
the fact of negligence, advise against pursuing a well founded claim
or settle for far less than the case is worth. This may be a mistake.
There is abundant Colorado authority recognizing that in certain
types of medical malpractice cases no expert evidence is required
to establish negligence. 24 Only where the negligence charged is
that the defendant treated the injury or disease by a procedure or
operation not acceptable to his own school must the standard of
care be established solely by medical testimony. 2 '
On the other hand, where it is alleged that a procedure admittedly proper for the ailment involved has been negligently performed, and the matter under investigation is so simple that laymen as well as experts can understand it, negligence may be established without medical testimony. 26 Indeed, it may even be error
to admit expert testimony in some cases of this nature.1 2 7 Thus
where an oral surgeon continued to operate after profuse bleeding
had blocked his vision, and he accidentally severed a nerve, it was
held prejudicial error to instruct the jury that only expert evidence could be considered in determining whether the defendant
had been negligent. 128 Again, where an osteopath treating a stiff
neck employed the procedure generally approved by osteopaths,
i.e., manipulation, but applied force so great that paralysis immediately resulted, it was not necessary for another osteopath to explain to the jury that there may have been negligence.'2 9
In cases where it is possible to prove negligence without expert
testimony or by a combination of expert and lay testimony, the
quantum of evidence necessary to take the case to the jury is no
greater than in other kinds of cases. Any pertinent evidence having a fair tendency to sustain the alleged negligence will suffice
for this purpose.2 0
123 This was acknowledged recently by a noted surgeon and authority on malpractice. Wesson,
Medical Malpractice Suits: A Physician's Primer for Defendants, 8 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 254, 255 (1959).
124 E.g., Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 59 P.2d 76 (1936); Daly v. Lininger, 87 Cola. 401, 288 Pac.
633 (1930).
125 Cases cited notes 115 and 124 supra.
126 Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 407, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930). "But there is an obvious distinction between a dlim of negligence in the choice of methods of treatment and a charge of negligence
in the actual performance of the work or treatment after such choice is made . . . . As to the
second-a charge of negligent performance-where there is any evidence tending to show such negligence the case is for the jury, as in other cases of negligence, whenever upon the evidence the minds
of reasonable men might differ." Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 45-46, 59 P.2d 76, 78 (1936).
127 See Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 45, 59 P.2d 76, 78 (1936) (dictum); Daly v. Lininger, 87
Colo. 401, 405-06, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930) (dictum).
128 Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 408-09, 288 Pac. 633, 637 (1930).
129 Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 59 P.2d 76 (1936).
1.0 Id. at 44, 59 P.2d at 77, Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 407, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930).
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However, it has long been established that mere proof that the
patient died or that the treatment failed is no evidence whatever of
the physician's negligence. 3 ' This follows from the previously discussed rule that in absence of expression contrary, a physician does
not warrant a cure or favorable result. 23 Thus it has been held that
proof that an injured limb is defective after. treatment is not evidence of negligent treatment.' 33 Nor was the death of a cardiac
patient following a combined tonsilectomy and wholesale extraction
of teeth considered evidence of negligence.'"
Occasionally, even in cases where it would seem to the layman
that the injury could not have occurred in the ordinary course of
events without negligence, the Colorado court has required a high
degree of precision and detail in the plaintiff's evidence of negligence. This reached an extreme in the 1953 case of McBrayer v.
ZOrdel.1:1;5 There a four-year-old girl sued a surgeon and anesthetist for loss of four teeth knocked out during a tonsilectomy. The
plaintiff's evidence included testimony that immediately prior to
the operation the teeth had been sound and strong. This the surgeon
admitted. In addition the plaintiff's mother and father testified
that immediately after the operation the surgeon and anesthetist
placed the blame for the occurrence upon each other. At the trial
both doctors denied this and each claimed he had no idea how the
teeth were loosened. For the defendants, ten experts testified that
during such operations baby teeth are often knocked out even
though reasonable care is used.
The trial jury found for the plaintiff, but on writ of error the
Supreme Court not only reversed but ordered the complaint dismissed. This disposition of the case was based in part upon the
Supreme Court's view that there was no evidence of any negligence
to take the case to the jury. Said the court, "it was not shown by
any evidence exactly how the incident occurred, and neither of the
operating doctors seemed to know, but said that without any apparent cause or reason, it happened frequently in such operations."' ; Such a result is quite acceptable to anyone willing to
suppose that four firm and healthy teeth (not properly involved in
any operation) are quite likely to drop out of a child's mouth simultaneously and of their own accord while the child is lying immobile. ' 37 That supposition is as reasonable as expecting a fouryear-old child who was unconscious at the time of the occurrence
to describe in detail "exactly how the incident occurred . . ."I" when
two physicians who were present, conscious, and presumably attentive claimed they didn't know how it happened. In a not dissimilar leading California case where five doctors and hospital per13t Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 306, 30 P.2d 259, 263 (1934); Locke v. Van Wyke, 91 Colo.
14, 20, 11 P.2d 563, 565 (1932). "God forbid that the low should apply any rule so rigorous and
unjust as that to the relations and responsibilities arising out of this noble and humane profession ....
If . . . failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of negligence on the part of the
physician or surgeon, causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they would have to assume a financial responsibilitv for nearly all the ills that
flesh is heir to." McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 170, 128 Poc. 870, 873-74 (1912).
132 See text at note 20 supro.
133 McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912).
134 Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934).
135 127 Colo. 438, 257 P.2d 962 (1953).
136 Id. at 443, 257 P.2d at 965 (emphasis added).
137 " 'If the low supposes that' said Mr. Bumble, 'the law is a ass, a idiot.' " Dickens, Oliver
Twist.

138 127 Colo. at 443, 257 P.2d at 965.
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sonnel were present when a patient rendered unconscious for an
appendectomy somehow received a shoulder injury, and all five
were unable or unwilling to explain how the injury occurred, all
were held liable."1 9 Thus did one of the nation's leading courts express its exasperation at the "conspiracy of silence."
Happily the present Colorado court does not seem to require
detailed evidence of specific negligent acts in similar cases where
inferring from the result that someone must
a layman is justified 14in
0
have been negligent.
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Any meaningful discussion at this date of the Colorado res
ipsa loquitur doctrine must begin and end with the truly remarkable 1958 case of Weiss v. Axler. 4 ' Although not a medical malpractice case, Weiss' broad interpretation and liberal application of
the res ipsa rule provide a precedent of landmark significance for
future malpractice litigation.
In Weiss v. Axler the plaintiff sought damages for loss of her
hair following a permanent wave treatment in the defendant's
beauty salon. Her complaint contained a general allegation of negligence, and in addition averred specific negligence of the beauty
operator either in using too strong a wave solution or in allowing
the solution to remain in the hair too long. As evidence of the specific
negligent acts, the plaintiff testified that the defendant had orally
stated his opinion that the damage had resulted from either too
strong a solution or too long an exposure.
The defendant denied any negligence and denied making the
claimed admission against interest.
Over objection the trial court instructed the jury on the law
governing res ipsa loquitur. The jury found for the plaintiff. On
writ of error, the defendant contended that the case was not a
proper one for application of res ipsa loquitur, especially in view
of the fact that the plaintiff had introduced evidence of specific acts
of negligence and therefore there was no need to infer negligence
occurring in some unknown manner.
139 Ybarra v. Spongard, 93 Cal. App.2d 43, 200 P.2d 445 (1949). The California rationale for
applying res ipso loquitur in the case appears in Ybarra v. Spongard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
(1944).
140 E.g., Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957) (sponge case); Beadles v.
Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957) (unconscious patient fell off operating table). Accord,
Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958). Compare Edwards v. Quackenbush, 112 Colo. 337,
343-44, 149 P.2d 809, 812 (1944).
141 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958), 35 DICTA 307.
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The court, in a scholarly opinion by Mr. Justice Frantz, reviewed the hopelessly confusing and contradictory prior Colorado
case law on res ipsa, then seized the opportunity presented to clear
these muddy waters. Unanimously 142 the court held: (a) the case
was a proper one for application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
and (b) evidence of particular acts of -negligence does not preclude
reliance on res ipsa.143 Concerning the procedural effect of res ipsa
loquitur the court declared: (1) whether the doctrine applies to the
particular case is a question of law to be determined by the trial
judge upon the plaintiff's evidence, 144 (2) once the trial judge
determines that the doctrine applies, there arises a "compulsive
presumption of negligence"1 45 which is a presumption of law, not
fact,146 and (3) this presumption shifts the burden of proof (not
merely the burden of going forward with evidence) and is "conclusive as a matter of law"'' 47 unless the defendant satisfies the jury
48 "by
a preponderance of the evidence that he was not negligent.'
"Thus," said the court, "the sole question in a res ipsa loquitur
case is: has the defendant overcome the prima facie case of negligence against him by establishing by evidence satisfactory to the
jury that he was not negligent?"' 49 The presumption is not necessarily destroyed by a mere explanation from the defendant showing how the injury occurred or that he was not negligent. It is for
the jury to decide not only whether the defendant's explanation is
sufficiently convincing to justify exonerating him, but also whether
the defendant's witnesses are worthy of belief. 150
Although the opinion left several questions unanswered, 51 it
certainly represents great progress in a murky area of the law.
More important perhaps, it indicates that the present Supreme
Court believes that a trial should be an effective search for truth
and that where the very nature of an occurrence indicates that
someone must have been careless, the party having best access to
the true facts must bear the onus of producing them or suffer the
consequences.
Does the Weiss v. Axler rationale apply to medical malpractice
cases? A 1912 Colorado Court of Appeals dictum indicated that the
fact that a fractured bone healed in imperfect position could not
be treated as evidence of negligence, and the doctrine of res ipsa
142
143
144
145
146

Mr.
137
Id.
Id.

Justice Day did not participate in the decision.
Colo. at 561, 328 P.2d at 97.
at 558-59, 328 P.2d at 96.
at 559, 328 P.2d at 96.

Ibid.

Ibid.
148 Id. at 559-60, 328 P.2d at 96-97.
149 Id. at 559, 328 P.2d at 97 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at 559-60, 328 P.2d at 97.
151 For example, does the rule that it is for the judge, not the jury, to decide whether res ipso
applies (this determination being made upon the plaintiff's evidence) in effect deprive the defendant
of jury trial on the issue of credibility to be accorded the plaintiff's witnesses? Mr. Justice Frantz
was careful to poiit out that in determining whether the defendant meets the burden of overcoming
the res ipso presumption, the credibility of the defendant's witnesses remains a jury issue. Considering
Judge Frantz's recently demonstrated concern for preserving inviolate the right of jury trial in minor
criminal offenses, it is likely that the Weiss rule will be qualified to assure jury trial on the credibility
of all witnesses. Compare Canon City v. Merris 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
A second problem not answered because not raised in Weiss is the question whether, assuming
the plaintiff proves facts upon which the trial judge determines that res ipso applies, and further assuming that the defendant puts in no evidence whatever to explain the occurrence, must the trial
judge direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff? This result would seem to follow if the presumption
raised is a true presumption of law. However, such a rule would be a distinct minority position, if not
a unique position. Again, the jury would not be able to reject the plaintiff's testimony as untrue.
For a discussion of this second unsettled problem, see Dittman, One Year Review of Evidence, 36
DICTA 53, 55 (1959).
147
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loquitur could not be applied. 152 But this seems to be no more than
a proper application of the well settled rule that153mere proof of an
unfortunate result is not evidence of negligence.
Medical malpractice cases should be treated the same as other
kinds of negligence cases for purposes of determining whether res
ipsa loquitur applies. Professional men should be entitled to the
same legal protections afforded others, 154
and the usual perequisites
for application of res ipsa should apply.
It is doubtful whether res ipsa loquitur could ever apply to a
case where the claimed negligence is that the defendant employed
a procedure not medically approved for the ailment being treated.
Since the only recognized standard of care in such cases depends
upon contemporaneous expert opinions from other doctors practicing in localities similar to that where the alleged negligence occurred, it would seem to follow that the plaintiff's burden to lirove
the standard could not be discharged by res ipsa loquitur. Here the
case would fail to meet the usual condition limiting the doctrine to
cases where the occurrence is "of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone's negligence .... "I"
However, where the negligence charged is the careless performance of a medically approved procedure, there would seem
to be no objection to applying res ipsa loquitur if the usual conditions are met. For example, what if Weiss v. Axler had involved
not chemical injuries incurred during a hair wave treatment administered by a beauty operator, but similar injuries received during a
scalp treatment administered by a dermatologist? Should the court
have applied a different rule of law?
Some might insist that the 1952 case of St. Luke's Hospital Association v. Long' 56 stands in the way of applying res ipsa loquitur
to medical negligence. There a three year old child, in the hospital
for removal of his tonsils and adenoids, was strangled when he
slipped, while asleep, through the side rails of a hospital bed and
caught his head between them. Although the plaintiffs' evidence
did not show exactly how the unfortunate incident happened, the
defendant, by affirmative evidence, "explained and made known
the cause of the death and disclosed all its knowledge and means
of information as to the accident."'15 The court indicated that on
the plaintiff's evidence alone res ipsa loquitur would have properly
applied, but held that the defendant's full disclosure gave the plaintiffs "equal knowledge and means of information and the res ipsa
doctrine could no longer be invoked.' 15 8 It seems clear that on this
point, i.e., that the defendant's explanation may deprive the plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur case of its character as such a case, Weiss v.
Axler has overruled the Long case.155
152 McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 169, 128
153 See text at note 131 supro and cases cited in
154 The prerequisites for applying the doctrine in
121 Colo. 574, 589-91, 220 P.2d 344, 352 (1950). And
155 Prosser, Torts 201 (1955).
1556 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
157 Id. at 31, 240 P.2d at 921.

Pac. 870, 873 (1912).
that footnote.
Colorado are set out in Zimmerman v. Franzen,
see Prosser, Torts 201 (1955).

158 Ibid.

159 "The defendant's explanation does not per se destroy the presumption; the conviction of the
jury (or the court in a trial to it) that the exolnnotion exonerates the defendant dissipates the presumption." Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 560, 328 P.2d 88, 97 (1958). This would also seem to follow
from the rule of Weiss that evidence of specific negligence may sometimes co-exist in the case with
the res ipso doctrine. Id. at 561, 328 P.2d at 97.
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In other jurisdictions there is a fast growing body of authority
applying res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice cases. 160 It may
or may not be significant that one leading California malpractice
case 6 1 applying res ipsa was quoted with approval in Weiss v.
Axler 6-2 and cited with apparent approval in a 1957 Colorado malpractice case which was tried on a res ipsa theory. 163 Thereis no
reason to expect that res ipsa loquitur will not be applied in future
Colorado malpractice cases.
D. Burden of Proving Causation
One final point on the plaintiff's burden of proof deserves
thorough discussion in a separate article and therefore will receive but brief mention here. This is the claimant's obligation to
prove that the defendant's negligent act caused the injuries. Many
a plaintiff's bark has sailed serenely past the straits64 of negligence
only to be wrecked on the rocky coast of causation.'
Proof of causation has a dual aspect. As usual in negligence
cases the legal test of proximate cause must be met. Nearly always
in malpractice cases the additional hurdle of medical cause is present. True, in an occasional case nothing but an identifiable doctor's
negligence could account for the injury, as in some "sponge"
cases. In a rare case, too, the mere proximity in time between
the physician's ministrations and appearance of the patient's
injury symptoms may be sufficient. For example, where
an osteopath suddenly and with great force twisted the plaintiff's
neck, and the plaintiff instantaneously experienced nausea, terrific
pain and paralysis, the Supreme Court felt that causation had been
sufficiently shown to take the case to the jury. 161
In most malpractice cases, however, proof of causation requires
medical testimony. Thus where the question was whether a particular trauma caused an eye infection which did not develop until
several months later, medical testimony that the infection possibly
could have resulted from the trauma was held insufficient to support
a jury verdict. 66 In malpractice cases, as in other personal injury
cases, evidence that the cause-effect relationship is a possibility is
not sufficient;
opinion evidence must indicate at least a probabil16 7
ity.
Once the plaintiff by competent evidence has established that
the defendant's act probably was the efficient cause of the injuries,
it would seem that the defendant would have the burden of going
forward with contrary evidence or with evidence of some other
160 Discussions of the modern cases appear in McCoid, The Core Required of Medical Practitioners,
12 Vond. L. Rev. 549, 621-31 (1959); Note, 23 Mo. L. Rev. 203 (1958); Comment, 30 So. Calif. L. Rev.
80 (1956); Note, 9 Stanford L. Rev. 731 (1957).
161 Yborra v. Spongard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (unconscious patient received shoulder
injury during appendectomy).
162 137 Colo. at 549, 328 P.2d at 91.
163 Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 371, 311 P.2d 711, 714 (1957).
164 E.g., Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 305, 30 P.2d 259, 263 (1934) "The burden was on plaintiff
to show that the acts of the defendants complained of were the direct cause of death . . . . There
is no evidence in this case, which would support a verdict, that death would not have otherwise ensued. The burden is not met by a showing that it might have resulted from the operations
complained of, and jurors should not be left to coniecture as to the efficient and proximate cause.
The possibility of death as a result of such operations is not sufficient. There should be evidence
eliminating the intervention of other causes which might exist."
165 Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 59 P.2d 76 (1936).
166 Hanley v. Spencer, 108 Colo. 184, 115 P.2d 399 (1941).
167 Lamme v. Ortega, 129 Cola. 149, 267 P.2d 1115 (1954). And see note 164 supra.
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cause independent of his own act.'6 t But there is some Colorado
authority indicating that the plaintiff's affirmative showing that
the defendant probably caused the injury must be accompanied by
evidence "eliminating the intervention of other causes which might
exist." 65
After the burden of proving negligence, causation and damages
has been met, the plaintiff will have to meet and overcome whatever defenses the defendant has raised.
V.

DEFENSES

The usual defenses to negligence liability are available in medical malpractice cases on the same terms as in other cases. For example, the plaintiff may be guilty of contributory negligence in
failing to follow his physician's advice to remain in the hospital for
further treatment or diagnosis' 7" or failing to seek other medical
care after 1becoming
dissatisfied with the defendant physician's min71
istrations.
For the most part the law governing defenses presents few
problems peculiar to malpractice law. One possible exception is
the defense of mistake of judgment, which has already been discussed.17 2 Two others are the defenses of release and statute of
limitations.
A. Release
The nature and theory of the plaintiff's claim may be important
in determining whether the defense of release is available to the
defendant. This defense is the plea that the plaintiff has released
another and the release operates to bar the malpractice claim. 17 3
For example, in Sams v. Curfman174 the plaintiff was injured when
his car collided with a creamery company truck. The injuries he
thus received were treated by the defendant physicians. First the
plaintiff sued the creamery company and its driver, receiving a
sizable cash settlement in return for signing a release in the usual
broad terms. The physicians were not parties to the action thus
compromised and they were not. mentioned in the release.
Soon after settling the first lawsuit, the plaintiff filed a second,
entirely separate, action against the physicians. This suit asked
compensatory and exemplary damages for "gross negligence and
wrongdoing" in diagnosis and treatment of the same injuries involved in the first action.
The doctor-defendants pleaded in bar the settlement and release with the creamery company, and the trial judge granted the
defendants judgment on the pleadings. In the Supreme Court, the
168 Hedgpeth v. Schoen, 109 Colo. 341, 342-43, 125 P.2d 632 (1942) "Where an efficient, adequate
cause for injuries has been found, it must be considered as the true cause, unless another,' not
incident to it, but independent of it, is shown to have intervened."
169 See, e.g., Lamme v. Ortega, 129 Colo. 149, 155, 267 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1954); Brown v.
Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 306, 33 P.2d 259, 263 (1934).
170 This defense was raised .ut not passed on in Pearson v. Norman, 106 Colo. 396, 106 P.2d
361 (1940). See McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Cola. App. 163, 168, 128 Pac. 870, 873 (1912) (dictum), "A
patient is bound to submit to such treatment as his surgeon prescribes . . . . If he will not, his'
neglect is his own wrong or mistake for which he has no right to hold his surgeon responsible."
171 Hanley v. Spencer, 108 Colo. 184, 187, 115 P.2d 399, 400 (1941) (court indicated such conduct
is contributory negligence as marier of law).
172 See text at notes 63-69 supra.
173 Cases on this problem from other jurisdictions are collected in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075 (1955).
174 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).

JULY-AUGUST

1959

DICTA

plaintiff argued that his complaint for malpractice alleged both a
tort and a breach of contract. He contended that the contract action against the physicians should not be barred by his settlement
of a tort action against the creamery company. Moreover, he asserted, there was no causal connection between the wrong of the
creamery company driver and the later malpractice.
Defendants countered that the action against the doctors was
in form and nature a tort action, that it asked damages which
would have been recoverable in the initial action as proximately
caused by the creamery's original wrong, and that the one cause of
action for those damages had been settled and co-liable tortfeasors
released.
The high court, after a brief struggle with the issue whether
the complaint sounded in tort or contract, held that the complaint
set out a tort cause of action, and therefore it was barred by the release. By implication, at least, the opinion indicates that an action
against the physicians for breach of contract would not have been
barred by settling the claim against the prior tortfeasor.
The Sams case points out a pitfall for plaintiffs' attorneys. They
should not be tempted, in cases involving medical malpractice in
treating injuries caused by a prior tortfeasor, to settle with the
wrongdoer whose tort brought the claimant to the doctor's office,
even where the original tort caused minor damage in comparison
with the malpractice, or where the original tortfeasor's liability is
highly doubtful. Even assuming such a settlement would not bar
a later contract claim against the physician, damages for breach
of contract might be severely limited, and175of course no exemplary
damages are available in a contract action.
It might be noted that, strictly speaking, the Sams rationale
may not apply today. The court carefully specified that the complaint was governed by rules of pleading which did not allow
commingling of tort and contract theories in a single cause of action.
It is possible that under the present more liberal pleading 176 the
court would hold in similar circumstances that if the facts alleged
stated a claim on a contract theory, settlement of a tort claim
against a prior wrongdoer would not bar the contract action
against the doctors. Moreover, the whole idea that a release of one
joint, concurrent or consecutive tortfeasor releases all others has
justification in neither logic nor legal history and has been severely
criticized. 7 7 This is another area where the Supreme Court of Colorado, which of late has so dramatically demonstrated its determination not to adhere blindly to unsound or unjust precedents, 178 may
greatly improve the law if given the opportunity.
The Colorado court has already recognized certain limitations
on the harsh rule that the release of a prior tortfeasor releases a
physician who negligently treats injuries caused by that tortfeasor.
Thus where the initial injury is covered by workmen's compensation, the injured workman may, in some cases, accept his compen175 Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 127-28, 137 P.2d 1017, 1018 (1943) (dictum).
,76 Colo. R. Civ. P., Rule 8 (3) allows setting out in a complaint, "two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count . . . or in separate counts ....
"
The same rule provides that a plaintiff may state as many claims as he has regardless of consistency.
177 See, e.g., Prosser, Torts 244 (1955).
178 See, e.g., Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702 (1959); Canon City v. Menris
137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
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sation award and release his employer without necessarily sacrificing his action for medical malpractice. Whether this is possible
in a particular case turns on the theory of the action and the relation
of the party sued to the plaintiff.
For example, in Hennig v. Crested Butte Co. 179 the injured
workman, after accepting a compensation award and releasing his
employer, brought action against the employer for injuries allegedly
sustained through malpractice of a physician who had been employed by the defendant-employer to treat the workman. Apparently
the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant, the employer of both
the physician and the plaintiff, vicariously liable for the physician's
alleged malpractice. This, said the Supreme Court, could not be
done in the face of a release of the same defendant after payment
of a compensation claim filed for the same injury and all disability
arising from or connected with it.
It should be noted that the Hennig case said nothing about the
right of an already compensated workman to sue the doctor whose
negligent treatment may have greatly aggravated the injury incurred on the job. Hennig was an action against the employer. There
are many reasons for allowing a separate medical malpractice action after settlement of the original workmen's compensation claim.
First, the compensation act was intended as humanitarian, beneficial protection for injured workmen, not as a refuge for negligent
doctors. The latter are strangers to the act,so and, unlike covered
employers, have not exchanged the disadvantage of liability without fault for the advantage of liability limited in amount. The
act's purpose of benefitting workmen should not be perverted into
denying them a common law action probably included in the Bill
of Rights guarantee of a remedy for every wrong.'
Second, the amount of a workmen's compensation award has
little or no relation to the actual pecuniary loss of the claimant.
Such an arbitrary and often pitifully inadequate award should not
be substituted for an opportunity to obtain satisfaction in the form
of damages commensurate with the injury. There has already been
too much judicial confusion of "satisfaction" of claims with "release"
or tortfeasors. ' 2 Legislative deprivation of this claim for compen17992 Colo. 459, 21 P.2d 1115 (1933)
180 See the discussion of this point in Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 228, 36 P.2d 156, 158 (1934).
is1 Colo. Const. art. II, § 6. The Colorado court indicated concern on this issue in Froid v. Knowles,
95 Colo. 223, 234, 36 P.2d 156, 161 (1934).
18 See Prosser, Torts 243-46 (1955).
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satory damages
might well constitute a taking of property without
8 3
due process.1
Third, the claim against the employer is essentially separate
and different from the malpractice claim. The job-incurred injury
is generally separated in time, place and causation from the malpractice injury. The employer and the doctor usually are not joint
nor even concurrent tortfeasors. The employer's liability is not
based on fault but is relational, arising out of the contract relation
of employer and employee. The physician's liability, on the
other hand, is nearly always in tort.' 84 Often the damages may be
divisible or at least capable of apportionment. For example, an employee may incur a hernia from on-the-job strain. If, in preparing
him for a hernia operation, the surgeon negligently allowed him
to fall off the operating table and fracture an arm,""5 there would
be no problem whatever in allocating damages to the separate injuries. Yet even in this kind of case it is not clear that the workman would have a separate claim against the surgeon if the surgeon
had been employed by the workman's employer.
Fortunately it appears settled in Colorado that the injured employee has a separate claim for malpractice against a physician
whom the employee himself selects and pays to treat an, injury
covered by workmen's compensation.'8 6 Therefore a settlement of
the workmen's compensation claim in such a case does not bar a
later action against the workman's personal physician for malpractice. 8 7 It is submitted that the rule should be the same when
the physician is selected and paid by the employer or his compensation insurance carrier. Mere formalities, such as who retained
and paid the physician, do not affect the inherent separateness of
the claims, and they should not determine whether settlement of
one bars the other.
B. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations as a defense presents special problems in malpractice cases. At least two of these problems have
been dealt with by the Colorado Supreme Court and are worthy of
discussion here. They are the problems encountered by courts when
asked to decide: (a) when the statute of limitations begins running or is tolled, and (b) which of several possibly applicable statutes of limitations properly applies in a particular case.
A third problem, the question whether the special two year
Colorado malpractice statute is constitutional, has never been
raised for decision by the Supreme Court. However, the question
has more than academic interest and will be discussed briefly here.
When statute begins running-tolling. The weight of authority
holds that a statute of limitations governing malpractice begins to
183 See Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 P.2d '372, 375 (1944) (medical malpractice).
"A legal right to damage for an injury is property and one can not be deprived of his property
without due process."
184 "It will aid our study, we think, if we shall keep in mind that the liability of a tort-feasor
is predicated on fault, that of an employer under the compensation act, on relationship." Froid v.
Knowles, 95 Cola. 223, 226, 36 P.2d 156, 158 (1934).
185 Compare the facts in Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957), 34 DICTA 351.
186 Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 36 P.2d 156 (1934).
187 Ibid.
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run when the act or omission alleged as malpractice occurs. 8 The
majority seem to enforce this view even where the malpractice is
not discovered until after the statute has barred any action. 189 Other
courts, however, have held that the statute does not commence
running until the malpractice results in injury. 190 The latter view
seems more consistent with the broader rule that statutes of limitations do not start running until a claim accrues, at least when it is
considered that actual loss or damage is an indispensable element of
a negligence claim. 191 Still another minority view holds that the
statute does not run prior to the time the plaintiff discovers 92
or by
reasonable diligence should have discovered the malpractice.
The Colorado Supreme Court has never directly declared which
of the above views it prefers, and on at least one occasion has ex93
pressly declined to decide when the statute commences to run'
while seeming to hold, in effect, that the statute does not run until
discovery of the injury.
Two Colorado cases9 4 have involved the problem of tolling the
statute of limitations. The first, and most dramatic, was Rosane v.
Senger.195 There the defendants had left a gauze pad in the plaintiff's abdomen during surgery performed on her in 1930. After more
than ten years of suffering without realizing the cause, the plaintiff learned through exploratory surgery performed by another
doctor that the gauze pad left behind in the prior surgery had been
causing her discomfort. Thus it appeared from the plaintiff's own
evidence not only that injury, i.e. damage, had occurred, but also
that she had discovered the fact of injury (although not the precise
cause) more than two years before she brought suit. She instituted
action in 1941, over eleven years after the act alleged as malpractice, but only about one year after she first learned of that act.
The Supreme Court opinion does not state whether the defendant
surgeons knew they had left the pad inside the plaintiff, nor is
there a recital of any specific attempt by them to conceal their
mistake.
As seen by the court the issue was: "Does justifiable delay, due
to plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of a known injury, stop the
running of the statute when plaintiff has used every reasonable
effort to ascertain that cause and been frustrated solely by defendants' concealment? In other words
under such circumstances,
1 96
when did the cause of action accrue?'
The Supreme Court, acknowledging but repudiating the contrary majority view, held that the statute commenced running
only upon the plaintiff's discovery that the pad had been left inside
188 Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law 244-45 (1956); 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons
123 (1942); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 60 (1951). Cases collected in Annots., 7.4 A.I.R. 1317
(1931), 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943).
189 See, e.g., Becker v. Porter, 119 Kan. 626, 240 Pac. 584 (1925).. And see authorities cited in
note 188 supra.
190 E.g., Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936); Meredith, Malpractice
Liability of Doctors and Hospitals 206-07 (1956).
191 Prosser, Torts 165 (1955).
192 This is the rule in California. Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942).
193 See Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 367, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (1944).
194 Ibid. And see Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957).
195 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
196 Id. at 367, 149 P.2d at 374. (Emphasis added.) Note that'the question when.the cause of action
accrues is technically different from the question whether certain facts toll the statute, but the
court lumped the two as one issue.
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her. In reference to the prevailing rule that the statute is tolled
only by fraudulent concealment,'197 the opinion declared: "We are
not impressed with the reasoning which supports the materiality
of fraud."'198 The court reasoned that whether the concealment was
fraudulent or not made no practical difference to the plaintiff, for
without knowledge of facts upon which to base a complaint, "the
victim (would be) equally helpless regardless of the motive for
concealment.' '199 Further the court expressed concern that strict enforcement of the
majority position might raise serious constitu200
tional questions.
Clearly the Rosane case establishes that to toll the statute no
fraud in the sense of scienter or actual intent to deceive need be
shown. But throughout the opinion the court indicates that concealment is the effective ingredient. Yet nowhere is there mention
of what constituted concealment in this case. It is not even stated
that the defendants knew they had left the pad inside the plaintiff.
This poses the question whether the court really held that mere
ignorance of facts constituting the claim tolls the statute. If this
be the proper interpretation, the case created a new and not
generally recognized exception to the general rule that the plaintiff's mere ignorance of facts giving him an action does not delay the
running of the statute of limitations.2 0 ' The latter rule has been
recognized in Colorado, 20 2 but in a case rejected in Rosane as
not
2 04
in point20 3 and later modified if not overruled by legislation.
Colorado's apparent adherence to the liberal minority view that
ignorance of the facts constituting a cause of action tolls the statute
was affirmed if not extended in the 1957 case of Davis v. Bonebrake.205 There the plaintiff alleged that during a hysterectomy
done August 17, 1951, the defendant surgeons left a sponge in her
abdomen. A second operation was performed September 5, 1951,
and the plaintiff learned in October, 1953, that the latter operation
had been done for the purpose of removing the sponge left behind
in the first operation. The complaint was filed October 16, 1953,
more than two years afterV.both operations, but shortly after the
plaintiff obtained specific knowledge of the alleged malpractice.
The plaintiff contended that the defendants had been guilty of
fraudulent concealment which tolled the statute. The defendants
cited testimony of the plaintiff as showing that she knew, or with
reasonable care should have known, shortly after the first operation that something had been left inside her. Specifically, the plaintiff had testified in a deposition that shortly after the first operation she noticed on her abdomen a lump about the size of a partially opened fist. The following cross-examination occurred:
"Q. Now, you thought that it was a foreign object of
some kind, didn't you, Mrs. Bonebrake? A. Well, I didn't
think you could grow something just that fast ....
197 Cases cited in Annots., 74 A.L.R. 1317 (1931), 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943).
198 Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 369, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944).
199 Ibid. (Parenthetical matter added).
200 Id. at 370. 149 P.2d at 375.
201 See Note, 17 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 124 (1944).
202 Miller v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Colo. 364, 105 P.2d 404 (1940).
203 Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 369, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944).
204 See Industrial Comm'n v. Newton Co., 135 Colo. 594, 600, 314 P.2d 297, 301 (1957).
205 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957).
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Q. But you believe (sic) that it was not something
that was part of you, is that correct?
A. Well, I felt-I mean
2 0' 6
-there was something there.
Plaintiff further testified that she knew something was wrong
but had no idea precisely what the matter was. In addition she
claimed that she had questioned the doctors and the surgical nurse
seeking information but had been rebuffed. Eventually she had
learned from the surgical nurse that the second operation had been
performed to correct the error of the first.
On appeal of a trial court judgment for the plaintiff, the
Supreme Court held that the evidence presented a jury issue
whether the plaintiff knew about the malpractice more than two
years before she filed action. An additional ground for affirming
the trial court on this point, said the high court, was that, at best,
the plaintiff's testimony as to what occurred during the allegedly
negligent operation "cannot arise above that of the conjecture of a
non-observer of the event.12 0 7 The court indicated that such testimony is incompetent to establish "discovery" by the plaintiff which
would start the statute of limitations running.
Bonebrake indicates the lengths to which the Supreme Court
will go to avoid enforcing the two-year statute of limitations. Mr.
Justice Day, in a dissenting opinion, asserted that the majority
opinion in effect had repealed the statute. 2 0° This general attitude
of the court toward the special malpractice statute of limitations is
extremely significant in a context yet to be discussed,
the question
20 9
whether the special statute is unconstitutional.
Which statute of limitations applies. The leading Colorado case
governing applicability of limitations is the Smith case.2 10 There the
complaint alleged that the plaintiff had employed the defendant
surgeon to perform a circumcision operation, but the defendant,
"without Plaintiff's authorization did then and there commit an
unlawful battery . . . by performing upon Plaintiff's person a surgical operation known as a Vasectomy which rendered the Plaintiff
sterile .... ,,2l1
No circumcision was performed. It was not claimed
that the vasectomy was performed in any but the most careful and
expert manner; the sole complaint was that the claimant did not
get the operation he asked for.
Alert defense counsel moved to dismiss on the ground that the
action, by the plaintiff's own characterization, constituted a suit for
"an unlawful battery" and since it had not been commenced within
one year after the defendant's act, it was barred by the one year
statute of limitations governing battery cases.2 12 The trial court
denied the motion, holding the special two year malpractice statute
of limitations 213 applicable. After taking evidence, the trial judge
206 Id. at 510-11, 313 P.2d at 985.
207 Id. at 513, 313 P.2d at 986.
208 Id. at 524, 313 P.2d at 992.
209 See text at note 225 infra.
210 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
-11 129 Colo. at 74, 266 P.2d at 1096.
212 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-2 (1953), provides: "All actions for assault and battery . . . shall
be commenced within one year after the cause of action shall accrue, and not afterwards."
213 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-6 (1953): "No person shall be permitted to maintain an action, whether
such action sound in tort or implied contract, to recover damages from any person licensed to practice
medicine, chiropractic, osteopathy, chiropody, midwifery or dentistry on account of the alleged
negligence of such person in the practice of the profession for which he is licensed or on account of
his failure to posse!-s or exercise that degree of skill which he actually or imnoliedly represented
promised or agreed that he did possess and would exercise, unless such action be instituted within
two years after such cause of action accrued."
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directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, leaving
only the question of damages to the jury.
On writ of error, the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the
trial court decision that the special two year medical malpractice
statute of limitations applied. The high court, however, acknowledged that negligence in treatment and treatment without employment present claims basically different in nature. "The one is based
on the existence of a contract and authority for service, and the
other upon the lack of such contract or authority. The one is based
on lack of care or skill in the performance of services contracted
for, and the other on wrongful trespass on the person regardless
of the skill or care employed. ' 21 4 Distinguishing a prior case2 15 where
the complaint had alleged battery in continuing treatment after
the patient's consent had been revoked by discharging the physician, the Supreme Court ruled that the special two year statute
governing malpractice applies wherever the doctor's act occurs
while there is in force a contract of employment from which a
professional relation to the patient arises. The court reasoned that
the gist of the action was an alleged negligent act, not in lack of
surgical skill but in failure to observe "that degree of care which,
as practitioners,
they owed to their patient in the practice of their
21
profession.
The opinion indicated that wherever the basic relationship of
physician and patient is established, malpractice is not classifiable,
for purposes of statutes of limitations, as either battery or negligence, but is a kind of hybrid. Said the court, "While an unauthorized operation is, in contemplation of law, an assault and battery,
it also amounts to malpractice, even though negligence is not
charged."217
Thus it appears settled in Colorado that the special two-year
medical malpractice statute of limitations applies to either negligent
or intentional acts of a doctor who has been employed to perform
some treatment or operation. But this by no means solves all the
problems.
Although the special two-year malpractice statute of limitations
applies even to claims founded on treatments or operations beyond
the patient's consent, it probably does not apply to actions arising
from treatment or surgery without consent. A dictum in the 1954
Smith case declared that if the patient consents "to no operation at
all, then clearly it is a case of assault and battery, which would be
barred by the (one-year) statute of limitations."2 18
The Smith opinion carefully distinguished the facts there presented from the facts alleged in the earlier case of Cady v. Fraser.21220
In Cady the plaintiff claimed "malpractice similar to an assault"
consisting of the physician's continuing treatment after the plain214 129 Colo. at 75, 266 P.2d at 1096, quoting Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 255, 222 P.2d 422,
424 (1950).
215 Cady v. Fraser, supra note 214.
216 129 Colo. at 78, 266 P.2d at 1098.
217 Id. at 77, 266 P.2d at 1098.
218 Id. at 80, 266 P.2d at 1099 (dictum).
219 122 Colo. 252, 222 P.2d 422 (1950).
220 Id. at 254, 222 P.2d at 423.
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tiff had told him to "get off the case .... -"221 Although the precedent value of Cady is weakened by the fact that there the plaintiff's claim died for lack of proof, the significance of the case lies
in the fact that in Smith the Supreme Court took pains to distinguish the facts alleged in Cady.22 2 Thus the Smith opinion clearly
implied that facts such as those pleaded in Cady would present
a claim in the nature of assault and battery, subject to a one-year
statute of limitations. This rationale affirms the fundamental proposition that the physician-patient relation is consensua 223 and indicates that the relationship may be terminated by the patient's
withdrawing a consent previously given. Treatment after withdrawal of consent would amount to trespass. A fortiori it would
seem that a physician who renders treatment without ever obtaining consent in the first instance commits battery and, if the patient
is conscious, both assault and battery. 224 An action seeking damages for such conduct would have to be brought within one year.
Under the Smith rationale it would seem proper to infer that a
malpractice claim based on a breach of contract theory would be
governed by the two-year malpractice limitation rather than the
statute of limitations governing other contract actions.
Constitutionality of the special statute of limitations on malpractice. The Smith precedent, obviating many problems inevitably
present where the inherent unlikeness of various kinds of malpractice claims is recognized, rests on the bald assumption that the
special two year statute of limitations is constitutional. If that statute is not constitutional, a question never decided by the Colorado
Supreme Court, then, presumably, a malpractice claim would be
barred in one year or six years depending on whether it was in the
nature of battery, negligence, or breach of contract. Thus a consideration of the constitutionality of the special two year medical malpractice statute becomes imperative.
The Colorado Constitution guarantees that, "Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for
every injury to person . . . and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay. ' '225 In a 1934 case 226 the Supreme
Court indicated that this provision might be offended by legislation abrogating the common law rule that, "a physician or surgeon
227
is beholden for injury to his patient resulting from malpractice.
The court there implied that an attempt by the legislature to
substitute a workmen's compensation claim for an employee's malpractice action against his physician would be unconstitutional.
In a 1944 case involving the special medical malpractice statute,
the court served notice that, "A legal right to damage for injury
is property and one cannot be deprived of his property without
due process. ' 2 28 More recent opinions indicate that the present
Supreme Court, to the credit of its incumbents, will not meekly
221 Ibid.
222 129 Colo. at 75, 266 P.2d at 1096-97.
223 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 71, 108 (1942).
224 Cases collected in Annots., 76 A.L.R. 562 (1932), 139 A.L.R. 1370 (1943).
225 Colo. Const. art. II, § 6.
226 Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 36 P.2d 156 (1934).
227 Id. at 234, 36 P.2d at 161.
228 Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944).
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tolerate
legislative denials of or infringements upon constitutional
229
rights.
But the Colorado Constitution poses a more potent threat to
the special malpractice statute of limitations. The constitution expressly forbids the general assembly to pass "special laws . . . for
limitation of civil actions .... "230 Prior to 1925, there was no special
statute of limitations on malpractice in Colorado. Presumably members of the healing professions were then shielded only by the
same limitations statutes applied to others, including other professional men liable to malpractice claims. But by the 1920's the
American Medical Association was making its influence felt in
legislatures across the land. In 1925 the Colorado legislature passed
the present special statute.231 With magnanimous generosity, or perhaps with one eye on the constitutional prohibition of class legislation and the other on the electorate, the statute's protection was extended to not only the more orthodox practitioners of medicine and
surgery, but, in addition, to anyone licensed to practice, "chiropractic, osteopathy, chiropody, midwifery or dentistry ....
"232
This
broad coverage may somewhat bolster the statute against a contention that it is class legislation.
Notably, however, the statute does not protect a nurse or
hospital from an action for the same kind of negligence, possibly
the same act of negligence, for which an action against the named
practitioners would be barred. This points up the essential weakness of the statute. It is not in essence a legislative declaration that
a certain type of action-malpractice-is a disfavored action and
will be barred unless promptly instituted. It is not like the statute
barring actions for assault and battery, false imprisonment, or
slander and libel after one year. Those actions are barred whether
the defendant be a doctor, lawyer or Indian chief. There the basis
for legislative classification is the nature of the action, not the profession of the defendant. But the malpractice statute is solely for
the benefit of a favored class of medical practitioners, and bars all
actions whether based on "tort or implied contract.12 23 What non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory reason exists for classifying all "tort
or implied contract" malpractice actions against a doctor differently from the same kinds of actions against a nurse or a lawyer?
The arbitrariness of the classification would be immediately apparent to physicians if the legislature should provide that all negligence actions be barred in two years, except that negligence actions
against a practitioner of "medicine, chiropractic, osteopathy, chiro-

pody, midwifery or dentistry.

...

"1234

should not be barred in less

than ten years. That the Colorado Supreme Court is not thoroughly
in sympathy with the special statute is indicated by recent decisions
229 See e.g., Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 174, 323 P.2d 614, 617 (1958). "Expedience
not override the Constitution of Colorado; it should not dethrone rights guaranteed thereunder."
230 Colo. Const. art. V, § 25.
221 Colo. Rev. Stat. J 87-1-6 (1953).
222 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
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severely limiting its scope.235 Given an opportunity, the court might
seriously consider invalidating the statute altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
As should be obvious from the above discussion, the medical
malpractice area is one of great technical and practical difficulty
for the lawyer. For the doctor the increasing frequency of malpractice claims presents a growing threat to professional reputation
as well as financial solvency. Physicians should not be distracted
from concentrating their best efforts on behalf of a patient by the
ever-present storm cloud of potential legal liability. This is an area
calling for greater cooperation of the medical and legal professions
in the public interest. The public interest would be served by more
stringent enforcement of the lawyer's duty not to accept claims
not well founded in fact, law and basic justice. A professional man's
most valuable asset is his reputation for competence in his chosen
field. An attorney as a professional man should refuse to have any
part in damaging the reputation of another professional man unless
convinced that the claimant has really been injured and that his
claim has genuine and provable merit.
The Colorado Medical Society and the Colorado Bar Association are presently working to establish a joint medical-legal board
to hear and screen malpractice cases. If a claim is found to have
merit, the medical society will aid the claimant in obtaining needed
expert evidence. If a claim is found to be without merit, the claimant will be left to his usual legal remedies. It is the hope of both
cooperating groups that this screening process will be effective in
helping claimants' attorneys determine for themselves whether
claims they are pressing should be litigated. If the plan functions
properly, it should eliminate many groundless claims not only short
of actual trial, but prior to release of publicity which may cause
irreparable damage to an entirely innocent doctor. This is an effort
at interprofessional cooperation which should have the sincere support of every man of good will in either profession.
235 E.G., Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957) (Mr. Justice Day, dissenting,
argued that the majority opinion had in effect repealed the statute of limitations); Rosane v. Senger,
112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944) (ignorance of plaintiff or impossibility of bringing suit tolls the
statute even though no fraudulent concealment by defendant is shown).
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CASE COMMENTS
Abatement and Revival-Death of Party and Revival of ActionCauses of,Action Which Survive
By JoHN LAWRENCE KANE JR.

On May 18, 1954, an automobile driven by Russell K. Jensen
was struck by a Publix taxicab. The Jensen automobile then struck
William H. Anderson, a pedestrian, as he was attempting to cross
an intersection. Anderson received injuries which required immediate hospitalization, and which caused him to remain in a coma
from the date of injury until his death on December 31, 1954. The
Colorado National Bank, acting as conservator for Anderson, filed
a personal injury action against Publix Cab Company, its driver,
and Jensen on September 16, 1954. After the death of Anderson, the
bank filed an amended and supplemental complaint substituting
itself as executor in place of its former status as conservator. On
appeal, the judgment of the trial court in favor of the bank was
affirmed. Held: A claim for personal injuries based upon negligence
survives the death of the injured person. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1959).
The ancient maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona provides a sufficient insight into the attitude of the common law toward survival actions. In fact, at early common law all actions died
with the person.' Most authorities have.explained this maxim in
terms of the criminal or quasi-criminal origin of wrongs which
later were subject to the writ of trespass. 2 Winfield has observed
that if a wrong is looked upon as having a criminal essence, then
only the actor should be liable. 3 Modern survival statutes, such as
that of Colorado 4 have recognized that not all wrongs or torts have
criminal implications and that it is therefore reasonable to seek
recompense from someone other than the actor. The Colorado statute which governed the instant case provided that "all actions in
law whatsoever, save and except actions for slander and libel, or
trespass for injuries done to the person . . . shall survive to and
against executors, administrators and conservators."'
The fundamental question to be decided was whether a negligence action to recover damages for injuries to the person would
survive the death of the injured person. If the action was one of
trespass, then it could not survive. If, however, an action to recover
damages resulting from the negligence of another was not one of
trespass under the ruling statute, then the action would survive.
Colorado has held that such damages are recoverable where
1 See Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808); cf. Statute 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330)
(declares that henceforth executors shall have an action for trespasses done to their testators).
2 3 Holdsworth, History of English Low 333, 585 (3d ed. 1923).
3 Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort,29 Colum. L. Rev. 239 (1929); see 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries *302.
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-1-9 (1953).
5 Id. (emphasis added) (This statute was amended in 1955 to provide that all actions except
slander and libel survive).
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the executor sued in assumpsit,6 but on numerous occasions, the
Court has held that negligence actions are trespasses and do not
survive.7 Where the action was for malicious prosecution,8 for separate maintenance,' for malpractice, i" and for unlawful expulsion
from membership in a labor union" the Court has held that the
damages were the result of trespass to the person and therefore did
not survive. However, where the actions were related to real estate,12
to money fraudulently obtained, 3 or to choses in action,'14 the actions of trespass were held to be for injuries done to property and
were therefore not within the exceptions of the statute.
In Fish v. Liley,5 the Court held that a claim for wrongful death
survived the death of the tortfeasor even though the tort upon
which it was based was a personal one; the action itself was not
one which survived, but, instead, there was a new action for damages and a property claim which could be asserted since the survival statute did not apply to it.
It would appear from the above authority that negligence actions are trespasses and therefore the rule in Colorado would hold
that a negligence action does not survive to or against executors.
However, in the instant case'6 the Court overruled its previous decisions and held that the term "trespass for injuries done to the
person" as used in the statute is limited to the traditional trespasses
to the person, i.e., assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The
Court ruled that an action based on negligence is an action on the
case 7 and is therefore embraced in the clause "All actions in law
whatsoever.., shall survive. .. "
The Publix case is forced by history to stand alone. Subsequent
legislation has divested it of authority so that presently its position
is unique. It might be said that the Publix decision is a lame-duck
case and that therefore the need for study or consideration of it
may be seriously questioned. However, in a jurisprudential sense,
the need for such study is apparent. The lawyer will note and again
be reminded of the practical importance of knowing the common
law in order to fully understand his case. He will recognize that his
argument will be much stronger if it is rooted in the common law.
Additionally, the Publix opinion merits study because of the
thoroughness of research and the depth and precision of scholarship that have gone into it. If the Publix opinion, along with some
other recent opinions, establishes a standard for research and scholarship for the Colorado bench and bar, then its value is obvious.
6 Kelley

v. Union Pac. Ry., 16 Colo. 455, 27 Pac. 1058 (1891).
7 E.g., Greer v. Greer, 110 Colo. 92, 130 P.2d 1050 (1942).
8 Stanley. v. Petherbride, 96 Colo. 293, 42 P.2d 609 (1935).
9 Greer v. Greer, 110 Colo. 92, 130 P.2d 1050 (1942).
10 Meffley v. Catterson, 132 Colo. 222, 287 P.2d 45 (1955).
11 Clapp v. Williams, 90 Colo. 13, 5 P.2d 45 (1931).
12 Kling v. Phaver, 130 Colo. 159, 274 P.2d 97 (1954).
13 Brown v. Stookey, 134 Colo. 11, 298 P.2d 955 (1956).
14 Swartz v. Rosenkrans, 78 Colo. 167, 240 Pac. 333 (1925).
12 120 Colo. 156, 208 P.2d 930 (1949).
16 Publix Cab Co. v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1959).
17 See Prosser, Torts 27 (2d ed. 1955).
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Damages-Pain and Suffering-Per Diem
Argument to Jury
By JEamy E. MILLS
In an action for damages for bodily injuries plaintiff's counsel
in his closing argument to the jury made use of a placard showing
items of damages and suggested amounts to be awarded therefor.
The chart had printed thereon the plaintiff's name, age, life expectancy and medical expenses, including names of hospitals and
physicians who had rendered services. Then was listed a proposed
dollar valuation of the "Pain and Suffering" endured by the plaintiff with a suggested amount per day as an appropriate award to
be made by the jury. "Physical Disability and Inability to Lead
a Normal Life" was similarly charted, as was the item "Loss of
Earnings." Defendant's objection to the use of the placard in front of
the jury was overruled. On appeal, held: The trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in overruling the defendant's objection to the
use of the chart and the argument of the plaintiff's counsel based on
the chart. Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959).
It is worthy of notice that the court, although apparently approving the tactic of plaintiff's counsel, stated that the ultimate
course of judicial opinion on the point is not yet discernible, and
further, that recent holdings are not grounded on reasons of sufficient force either for or against such a tactic.
Even in the face of the above remarks it appears that Florida
is one of the leaders in the approval of such-an argument by counsel. In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Braddock' the Supreme Court of
Florida implicitly endorsed the use of a per diem argument by
affirming a jury verdict for $248,439, which coincided exactly with
the aggregate of the plaintiff's demands as set out on a chart similar to the one involved in the instant case. In Andrews v. Cardosa2
the use of a blackboard to illustrate or aid in an argument was indirectly recognized. The court held that it was in the discretion of
the trial judge to deny the use of such an item.
The general rule is that the trier of facts must determine the
amount to be allowed as compensation for pain and suffering.3 Since
pain and suffering are not precisely measurable and have no market
price the proper amount to be awarded can not be exactly determined. The award must, therefore, meet the standards of fairness
and reasonableness
and must be free from sentimental or fanciful
4
considerations.
The weight of authority favors allowing use of a mathematical
formula on a per diem basis when damages for pain and suffering
are involved. The point-has been squarely passed on and approved
in five states.5 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly
196 So. 2d 127 (Fla.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 892 (1957).
2 97 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1957).
3 15 Am. Jur. Damages § 71 (1938).
4 Id. § 72.
5 Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955); Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App.
261. 130 AI.E. 2d 491 (1955); Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637 (1944); Four-County
Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v.
Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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sanctioned the use of a mathematical formula in determining the
amount of an award for pain and suffering.6 Minnesota can probably
be added
to the list of states allowing per diem argument to the
7
jury.
New Jersey in the recent case of Botta v. Bruner8 has estab-.
lished itself as the first state to expressly forbid the use of a formula, although Pennsylvania has followed an unswerving course
of condemnation of any reference to amount of damages for pain
and suffering since 1891.1 The Supreme Court of New Jersey in
the Botta opinion not only held that a mathematical formula is an
improper suggestion to the jury but that any statement by counsel
demanding a specific award or disclosing the amount sued for (ad
damnum clause) will constitute error.
Arguments advanced in support of mathematical formulas and
per diem awards are: (1) While presenting his case, counsel has a
wide latitude of reference'0 and may draw any reasonable inferences from the evidence;" (2) Some guidance to the jury is necessary because there is no exact scale on which to measure the extent of injury; 12 (3) Such per diem arguments are not evidence
and are merely used as illustration and suggestion; 13 (4) The suggestion of a dollar-and-cent value for pain is no more than one
method of reasoning which the jury is entitled to hear in attempt6 Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
7 See Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 87 N.W.2d 633 (1958) (use of mathematical formula
proper for purely illustrative purposes); Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d
30 (1956) (verdict upheld notwithstanding objection to per diem argument with mathematical formula).
But see Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955) (court castigated
the idea of reaching the award on a per diem basis); Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81,
69 N.W.2d 673, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874 (1955) (verdict of $170,000 arrived at by mathematical
formula held excessive because it did not meet test of reasonableness).
8 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
9 Stassum v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 Ati. 111 (1936); Joyce v. Smith, 269 Pa. 439, 112 AtI. 549
(1921); Bostic v. Pittsburg Rys., 255 Pa. 387, 100 AtI. 123 (1917); Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Ry., 177 Pa.
1, 35 AtI. 191 (1896); Baker v. Pennsylvania Ry., 142 Pa. 503, 21 AtI. 979 (1891).
10 Nusbaum v. Pennsylvania R.R., 340 III. App. 131. 90 N.E.2d 921 (1950).
11 Hayes v. Coleman. 338 Mich. 371, 61 N.W.2d 634 (1953).
12 Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
13 Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W. 2d 30 (1956).
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ing to appraise the amount of compensation
to be awarded based
14
on their common sense and judgment.
Authorities opposing such an argument to the jury rely on the
following propositions: (1) There is no legal yardstick for the
measurement of pain and suffering; 1 5 (2) The per diem suggestion
by counsel takes the place of evidence in the mind of the jury, and
admonitions by the court not to consider the per diem argument
as evidence fail to erase all prejudicial effect; 6 (3) The employment of a per diem argument by plaintiff's counsel is prejudicial
to the right of the defendant's counsel for equal opportunity to offer
proof and submit arguments thereon. This is so because if the defendant's counsel suggests a lower per diem argument
he fortifies his
17
adversary's suggestion of a per diem formula.
The exact point in the instant case has not been raised in the
Colorado Supreme Court. It is difficult to see how the jury is put in
an unfavorable position if sound arguments in favor of and against
assessment of damages by a per diem formula are presented to
them. Should their verdict prove excessive, the judicial practices of
remittitur or setting aside the verdict can be employed by the court
in order to see that equity is attained. To deprive the plaintiff's
counsel of one of his techniques of advocacy seems unjuust since
the very essence of his argument is persuasion. Damages must be
awarded in cash! To allow counsel to suggest to the jury the most
logical method by which they can reduce pain and suffering to
money value seems the proper way to do equity to all parties involved.
The modern trend is toward the "Belli approach"'18 and it is
hoped that the Colorado Supreme Court will allow use by counsel
of per diem arguments involving a mathematical formula for computing damages for pain and suffering. Although the author is not
fully in accord with many of the techniques set forth by Mr. Belli,
it is thought that the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Botta v. Bruner will not serve to eliminate the theatrical tactics
at which it is evidently aimed.
14
15
16
17
18

Arnold v. Ellis, 97 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1957).
Herb v. Hallowell, 304 Pa. 128, 154 Atl. 582 (1931).
Ahlstrom v. Minneopois, St. P. & S.S.M.Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W. 2d 873 (1955).
Botta v. Bruner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
See generally Belli, Modern Trials, ch. 8 (1954).
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BAR BRIEFS
FORECLOSURES AND FEDERAL LIENS
-SOME SUGGESTIONS
By DONALD E. KELLEY
Donald E. Kelley received his LL.B. degree from the University of Neb-

raska in 1930. He practiced in Denver from 1945 to 1953 and has been
United States Attorney for the District of Colorado since 1953. He recently
accepted appointment as Denver City Attorney, to be effective August 22,
1959.
It is axiomatic that the United States cannot be made a party
to any lawsuit without the express authority of Congress. Likewise,
when Congress waives the sovereign immunity of the government
the conditions and limitations of the waiver statute must be strictly
observed and adhered to.
Occasionally, an attempt is made by the holder of a first deed
of trust to eliminate a federal lien by following the administrative
foreclosure route. Many members of the bar feel that there is no
justification for the exclusiveness of the method provided by Congress. But under the law as it now exists a federal lien cannot be
foreclosed except in accordance with the consent statute.' The language of the statute provides that, "the United States may be named
a party in any civil action or suit in any district court.... or in any
state court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, to quiet title to
or for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien upon real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage
or other lien."
Care should be exercised in following the procedural steps relating to pleading the interest of the government and the method of
the nature
service. "The complaint shall set forth with particularity
2
of the interest or lien of the United States.
Regardless of the jurisdiction in which the suit is filed, a copy
of the summons and complaint must be served on the United States
Attorney, and a copy of the summons and of the complaint must be
sent by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United States
at Washington, D.C.'
It should be remembered that the United States is allowed sixty
4
days in which "to appear and answer, plead or demur." The summons should so provide.
This consent statute also makes provisions for redemption by
the government. Different results obtain when the foreclosure sale
is to satisfy a lien which is inferior to that of the government than
when the foreclosure is to satisfy a lien with priority over that of
the government. Since the latter situation is the most common the
statutory language is quoted:
128 U.S.C.

§2410(a) (1948).

2 28 U.S.C. §2410(b) (1948).
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4).
4 28 U.S.C. §2410(b) (1948).

(Emphasis added).
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"Where a sale of real estate is made to satisfy a lien
prior to that of the United States, the United States shall
have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem."
The one year redemption right may discourage bidders at the
foreclosure sale and it may be considered a cloud on the title until
its expiration.
Thus, it may be said that there are two distasteful conditions
which have been imposed by Congress: (1) compulsory judicial
foreclosure, and (2) the one year redemption period.
In the case of federal tax liens both objections may be eliminated under certain circumstances. Congress has so provided. Although the method is not entirely new, its practicability dates from
the passage of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. The historical aspects will be left to the scholars. This is intended as a practical aid
for the present.
The elimination of the two objectionable procedural provisions
may be accomplished by eliminating the federal lien prior to suit,
thus obviating the necessity of making the United States a party.
The Internal Revenue Code provision referred to provides:
"Subject to such rules or regulations as the Secretary
or his delegate may prescribe, the Secretary or his delegate
may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to the lien if
(A) there is paid over to the Secretary or his delegate
in part satisfaction of the liability secured by the lien an
amount determined by the Secretary or his delegate, which
shall not be less than the value, as determined by the Secretary or his delegate, of the interest of the United States in
the part to be so discharged, or
(B) the Secretary or his delegate determines at any
time that the interest of the United States in the part to be
so discharged has no value.
In determining the value of the interest of the United
States in the part to be so discharged, the Secretary or his
delegate shall give consideration to the fair market value of
such part and to such liens thereon as have priority to the
lien of the United States."
The District Director of Internal Revenue is the "delegate" of
the Secretary. The discharge can be accomplished within the office
of the Director. No consultation or approval by Washington is required by law and none is involved in actual practice.
It is the understanding of the writer that there are no "rules
and regulations," as such. The Internal Revenue Service has issued
Form 160-Application for Discharge of Property from Federal Tax
Lien-which, in effect, spells out the information required by the
Director to enable him to determine the dischargeability of the fed5 28 U.S.C. §2410(c) (1948).
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 16325(b)(2).
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eral tax lien. The form may be obtained from the Special Procedures Section of the District Director's Office.
Briefly, the application must contain (1) a description of the
property, (2) the reason discharge is sought, (3) a description of
the federal tax lien, (4) a list of all recorded liens or encumbrances
believed to be prior to the federal tax lien, (5) a list of all unrecorded deeds, etc., believed to be prior to the federal tax lien,
(6) an itemization of proposed costs, commissions and expenses of
any transfer or sale of the property, (7) proof of the fair market
value of the property, including applicant's valuation and written
appraisals by two qualified disinterested appraisers, and (8) any
other information the applicant has bearing upon the determination
to be made.
Except for the requirement as to the appraisals, the information
which must be furnished will be available from the abstract, the file
of counsel or within his knowledge. The information required is the
minimum needed to form an intelligent opinion as to the value of
any inferior encumbrance. The procedure is simple, expedient and
effective. Its use is encouraged by both the Director's office and the
Department of Justice. This procedure must precede the filing of
suit, while the matter is still within the competence of the Director.
After suit the Director loses jurisdiction to the Department of Justice. The provisions of the act do not grant any authority to the
Department of Justice. A settlement at this point requires approval
of the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service and the Attorney General.
Before leaving the subject of the administrative discharge of
liens, attention should be called to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §2410
(d) (1948). Briefly, the subsection says, paraphrased: A person
having a lien on property which is superior to a government lien
"other than a tax lien," may make a written request to "the officer
charged with the administration of the laws in respect of which the"
government lien arises, to have it extinguished. If it appears, from
an investigation, that the property is insufficient to satisfy the government lien, in whole or in part, or that the claim has been satisfied or is otherwise uncollectible, such officer shall report the fact to
the Comptroller General who may issue a certificate of release.
In view of the fact that by executive order the Attorney General has complete authority to compromise all claims by and against
the government without suit, this subsection is not frequently
employed.
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A FIVE-MINUTE BRIEF ON WORLD PEACE
THROUGH LAW
By
THE COLORADO BAR AssOCIATION COMMITTEE ON WORLD PEACE
THROUGH LAW

The concept of world peace through law is not new, but organization of the Bar to promote it is new. In the past year, the American Bar Association has formed a Committee on World Peace
Through Law, under the energetic leadership of last year's ABA
President, Charles S. Rhyne. A similar committee has been formed,
through President McHendrie's efforts, in the Colorado Bar Association. The members of the Colorado Bar Committee are: David V.
Dunklee, Judge Hubert Glover, Stephen H. Hart, Winston S. Howard, William J. Knous, William R. Loeffler, Douglas H. McHendrie
(ex officio), David J. Miller, John A. Moore (Secretary), Richard H.
Shaw, Lucius E. Woods, and Wayne D. Williams (Chairman).
Already, five regional conferences of U. S. lawyers have been
held by the ABA Committee. The program of the Committee has
attracted nationwide attention in the press. Its chairman is vocal
and imaginative. It is very likely that there will be an increasing
amount of attention to, and discussion of, this essentially legal and
supremely important field in the coming months, and the bar can
render valuable service by stimulating and providing leadership for
such discussions and conferences as may be held. The Committee
believes that every lawyer should acquaint himself with this field as
a matter of public duty.
Objectives of the Committee are: (1) To focus attention upon,
and promote understanding of, the function of law as a means of
preserving peace; (2) To explore the possibility of holding conferences of lawyers on world peace through law-first, in the major
international regions of the world, and finally, on a world-wide
basis; (3) To increase the use of the present International Court of
Justice and to consider whether additional international courts, possibly on a regional basis, should be established; and (4) Over-all, to
apply, internationally, proven legal, techniques and institutions for
maintaining peace and justice which function in every ordered society-i. e., rules of law and courts to adjudicate controversies according to law.
The plans for international regional meetings, and for the World
Conference, have been outlined in a report of the ABA Committee.
The Committee said that such meetings probably would include:
"(1) Means of increasing use of the existing International Court
of Justice; (2) Establishment of regional courts of international law;
(3) Extension of the jurisdiction of international courts; (4) Extension and improvement of institutions and procedures for arbitration of disputes between governments, and of disputes growing out
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of concession contracts and international business transactions; (5)
Improved international cooperation for economic advancement of all
nations; (6) Consideration of means to strengthen the United Nations both by Charter changes and by increased use of existing UN
machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes under the rule of law;
(7) Clarifying uncertainties in existing international law and adapting existing rules of international law to changing conditions to further the growth of a body of international law; and (8) Methods to
compile, analyze and report legal decisions and other developments
in the international field."1
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, but it has been used infrequently. It has
decided only ten adversary cases in its thirteen years of existence;
yet every member of the U. N. is party to the statute forming the
Court. Examples of recent, important disputes appropriate for submission to the Court are: Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, the
question of Israel's right to use the Canal, the rights of the Western
powers in Berlin, impending nationalization of sugar plantations in
Cuba, British fishing rights off the Iceland coast, and aggression by
Red China in Tibet-to name only a few. None of these disputes
has seen the inside of a courtroom.
The permanent seat of the Court is at The Hague, Netherlands,
but it may sit elsewhere. It is a court of fifteen full-time judges,
elected in the Security Council and General Assembly for nine-year
terms, and paid by the U. N. No two judges may be nationals of the
same country. (The United States has had one judge on the present
court ever since its formation.)
At present, the Court has jurisdiction: (a) to give advisory
opinions at the request of authorized U. N. agencies, and (b) to decide controversies between nations which the parties refer to it.
Only nations can be parties in adversary cases, and the law to be
applied is international law, including *treaties and- principles of
equity when the parties so agree. By special action, nations may accept, in advance, compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over international disputes in which they become involved, but this operates
only as to other nations accepting the same obligation. Thirty-three
nations have accepted this compulsory jurisdiction, but many of
these acceptances contain special reservations.
The United States has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, with special reservations. This action was taken by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, in 1946. The
most important reservation by the United States is that the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction shall not extend to "disputes with regard to
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States as determined by the United States." Such a limitation operates reciprocally, and the United States' redress before the
Court is thus severely restricted. Any defendant nation may deprive the Court of jurisdiction when sued by the United States simply by determining that the matter is within its domestic jurisdiction.
I A.B.A.

News (June 1959).
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Chairman Rhyne has characterized this particular limitation as
"disastrous to the rule of law internationally." Repeal of the limiting words, "as determined by the United States," is one of the first
one resolution
steps favored by the ABA Committee, and at least
2
for such repeal is now pending in the U. S. Senate.
One of the main objectives of the Colorado committee is to
furnish the members of the bar with basic informationand news of
developments in this field. That is why this statement has included
a brief description of the composition and jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It is the earnest hope of the Committee
that our bar may be encouraged to give these problems further
study, and for that purpose, several articles, which should be available to most lawyers, are recommended by the Committee.3
Comments from all lawyers will be welcomed by the Committee. Please send them to the office of The Colorado Bar Association,
525 Mile High Center, 1700 Broadway, Denver 2, Colo.
2 Senate Resolution 94.
3 Rhyne, Concluding Statement, A.B.A.J. 589 (June 1959); Luce, The Way of the Low, A.B.A.J. 482
(May 1959); What Law Day Is About, Life, May 11, 1959, p. 432.
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OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE
OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
OPINION NO. 3
APRIL 11, 1959
1. A lawyer may, with propriety, write articles for publications in
which he gives general information upon the law.
2. A lawyer writing articles on legal subjects for magazines, newspapers, trade journals, and the like may sign his name to such
articles, but the words "Attorney at Law," "Lawyer," or other
similar designation should not be used therein.
3. A lawyer writing articles for publications may not accept employment from such publications to advise specific inquirers with
respect to their individual rights.
4. A lawyer writing articles for publications may not, in such articles, give specific legal advice on specific fact situations presented
by inquirers to such publications.
5. A lawyer writing articles for publications should caution and advise the readers thereof that their individual attorneys should be
consulted as to specific questions raised by the general information on the law presented in such articles.
6. A lawyer writing articles for legal periodicals may sign his name
to such articles, may have the designation "Lawyer" or "Attorney
at Law" appear in connection therewith and may furnish brief
biographical data which may be of interest to other lawyers and
helpful in appraising the writer's competence and may have his
photograph published in connection therewith.
FACTS

A trade association requests an attorney to write a monthly
column in the association's magazine concerning various legal problems which may confront the members of that association.
OPINION

Canon 40 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, as adopted by
the Colorado Supreme Court, reads as follows:
A lawyer may, with propriety, write articles for publications in which he gives information upon the law; but
he should not accept employment from such publications
to advise inquirers with respect to their individual rights.
This canon, in its exact language, was adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1928. Prior to that time such activity had been
held to be improper advertising under Canon 27 and conducive to
diminishing the lawyer's personal contact and responsibility to in-
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dividual clients. See Opinion No. 203 of the New York County Lawyers Association.
Canon 40 now permits such activity if certain safeguards are observed. Borderline cases concerning the application of Canon 40 will
involve the question of the lawyer's good faith and the publisher's
or sponsor's good faith.
The Committee is of the opinion that a lawyer writing articles
on legal subjects for magazines, newspapers, trade journals, and the
like may, with propriety, sign his name to such articles, but should
not use the words "Attorney at Law," "Lawyer," or other similar
designation in connection therewith. The reason for this seems fairly obvious. Such designation might well involve the indirect solicitation of professional employment proscribed by Canon 27.
Moreover, a lawyer writing such articles for publications may
not, in such articles, give specific legal advice on specific fact situations presented by inquirers to such publications. The giving of
such advice to persons with whom the lawyer had no personal contact or background of the kind so necessary to make legal advice reliable would violate Canon 35, which states that a lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. A lawyer's relation to his
client should be personal.
To assure this necessary personal lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer writing such articles in lay publications should caution and
advise the readers thereof to consult their individual attorneys as to
specific legal questions raised by his general discussion of the law
in said articles. The American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances has written a number of opinions
pointing out the pitfalls involved in the application of Canon 40.
See, for instance, Opinions 92, 98, 121, 162, 270 and 273.
One aspect of the problem before us not previously mentioned
in this opinion is discussed in Opinion 273 of the A.B.A. Committee.
That opinion involved the ethical propriety of the action of certain
lawyers in rendering opinions to a manufacturers' association for
inclusion in bulletins issued to its members.
The Committee discussed the implications in Canon 35, as we
have done above, and, in addition, felt that Canon 47 was in point
on this fact situation. Canon 47 is as follows:
No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his
name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal or
corporate.
The Committee did not pass directly on the question as to
whether the given practice constituted an unauthorized practice of
law. Feeling that such question was properly one for the A.B.A.
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, one of the bulletins involved was submitted to that body for opinion. Its opinion,
dated September 27, 1946, held that the issuance of that particular
bulletin did constitute an unauthorized practice of the law on the
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part of the manufacturers' association. As a result, the A.B.A. Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, in Opinion 273, held
that the lawyers who furnished the opinion contained in the bulletin
aided and made possible the unauthorized practice of law by a lay
agency, in violation of Canon 47.
Drinker on Legal Ethics (Columbia University Press, 1953) files
an interesting caveat to the propriety of a lawyer writing articles
for publications in which he gives information on the law. At p. 264
of his treatise, he states:
It is believed that Canon 40 was designed primarily to
sanction articles in law magazines or occasional articles in
other publications and that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a daily, weekly, or monthly column
in a newspaper or magazine devoted to the discussion of legal matters which would not, sooner or later, violate Canon
40 and, also, Canons 27, 35, and 47. What the readers of such
columns want is not a general discussion such as they can
find in a law book or in an article in a law magazine, but
something practical which they can apply to their own personal experience. Laymen usually are unable to formulate
questions clearly to such a column and a lawyer answering
such is apt to follow what he thinks his readers want to
hear about and to answer the personal problem which he
sees behind their questions. This is what the publishers will
ultimately see that they get.
A lawyer writing such articles must see that he does not fall into
such pitfalls so eloquently described by Mr. Drinker.
Finally, this Committee sees no impropriety in a lawyer writing an article, comment, case note, or book review for publication
in a recognized legal periodical. Of course, his name may, and
should, be signed to such articles, and the designation "Lawyer" or
"Attorney at Law" may be used. His photograph may also be published. Some legal periodicals give brief biographical data on such
a lawyer indicating his experience and expertness in the field which
forms the subject of the article. This is likewise permissible because
the publication is intended for judges, lawyers, and law students,
who are fully capable of judging the intrinsic value of the article.
Moreover, no overtone of solicitations of professional services could
be present in this situation.

OPINION NO. 4
APRIL 11, 1959
1. An announcement card designating or implying a specialty may
be mailed only to local lawyers and not to any other persons. It
should be brief and dignified and should not contain self-laudatory statements.
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2. An announcement card designating or implying a specialty, even
though mailed only to local lawyers and not to any other persons,
is improper if it is in a form which constitutes a statement or
representation of special experience or expertness.
FACTS

A law firm sends the following announcement card in the mail:
Doe and Moe
Attorneys at Law
Address
Announcing the Formation
of a Partnership
for the General Practice of Law
Specializing in Practice before the
Securities and Exchange Commission
and other Governmental Agencies
Phone Number
John Doe
Date
Joe Moe
OPINION

Canon 27 states, in part, that "It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters
or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations."
Canon 46 as amended by the American Bar Association on February 21, 1956, states in full:
A lawyer available to act as an associate of other lawyers in a particular branch of the law or legal service may
send to local lawyers only and publish in his local legal
journal a brief and dignified announcement of his availability to serve other lawyers in connection therewith. The
announcement should be in a form which does not constitute a statement or representation of special experience or
expertness.
Prior to its amendment, and at the time of its adoption by the
Colorado Supreme Court in 1953, Canon 46 read as follows:
"Where a lawyer is engaged in rendering a specialized
legal service directly and only to other lawyers, a brief, dignified notice of that fact, couched in language indicating
that it is addressed to lawyers, inserted in legal periodicals
and like publications, when it will afford convenient and
beneficial information to lawyers desiring to obtain such
service, is not improper."
The conclusions reached in this Opinion and in Opinions No. 5
and No. 6 would be the same under Canon 46 prior to amendment.
If the card were mailed to persons (including clients) other
than local lawyers, it would violate Canon 27 as the advertising of a
specialty. The Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of
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the American Bar Association has held in numerous opinions that an
announcement or card may not designate or imply a specialty (except patent law and admiralty law), since such would constitute indirect advertising in violation of Canon 27. See Opinions 36, 114,
145, 175, and 251 of the ABA Committee.
Canon 46 is an exception to Canon 27 but is to be strictly construed. See ABA Opinion 145. The card is apparently not addressed
only to other lawyers, let alone only to "local lawyers," since it
makes no reference to availability to associate with other lawyers in
cases within the designated specialty, and, furthermore, it refers to
"general practice" as well as the specialty. Nevertheless, if the card
were mailed only to local lawyers, it is difficult to see how such
could constitute advertising and, therefore, be in violation of Canon
27. The card is not self-laudatory and makes no reference to any
"special experience or expertness."
The Committee is of the opinion that the announcement card
referred to is proper if mailed only to local lawyers but, if not so restricted, it is in violation of Canon 27.

OPINION NO. 5
APRIL 11, 1959
1. An announcement card designating or implying a specialty may
be mailed only to local lawyers and not to any other persons. It
should be brief and dignified and should not contain self-laudatory statements.
2. An announcement card designating or implying a specialty, even
though mailed only to local lawyers and not to any other persons,
is improper if it is in a form which constitutes a statement or
representation of special experience or expertness.
FACTS

A lawyer sends the following announcement card in the mail:
John Doe
Former attorney for the
Colorado Public Utilities Commission
Announces
The Opening of Offices for
the General Practice of Law
Address
Telephone Number
Specializing in Motor
Carrier and Utility Law
Date
OPINION

For the same reasons stated in Opinion No. 4, the Committee is
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of the opinion that this card violates Canon 27, unless mailed only
to local lawyers and not to clients or other persons.
The card is substantially similar to the one referred to in Opinion No. 4, with the added element of designation of a former government position, that is, "former attorney for the Colorado Public
Utilities Commission." If the card were mailed to persons other
than local lawyers, this added element would be a further reason
why so doing would be unethical. See ABA Opinion 264. But, once
again, the Committee feels that, if restricted to local lawyers, the
card would not be improper. Obviously though, as was the case in
Opinion No. 4, the wording of the card indicates that it was probably mailed to other persons.
OPINION NO. 6
APRIL 11, 1959
1. A card announcing the formation of a partnership between lawyers residing in different states is proper if it designates in which
state or states the respective lawyers are licensed to practice and
if a true partnership exists between the lawyers.
FACTS

A law firm sends the following announcement card in the mail:
A, B, and C
Attorneys at Law
Washington, D. C.
Are Pleased to Announce that
John Doe
Has Joined the Firm as a Resident Partner in
, Colorado, with Richard Roe.
They will conduct their Practice as
Doe and Roe
Date
Address
Phone Number
OPINION

Canon 33 reads as follows:
Partnerships among lawyers for the practice of their
profession are very common and are not to be condemned.
In the formation of partnerships and the use of partnership
names care should be taken not to violate any law, custom,
or rule of court locally applicable. Where partnerships are
formed between lawyers who are not all admitted to practice in the courts of the state, care should be taken to avoid
any misleading name or representation which would create
a false impression as to the professional position or privileges of the member not locally admitted. In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person
should be admitted or held out as a practitioner or member
who is not a member of the legal profession duly author-
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ized to practice, and amenable to professional discipline.
In the selection and use of a firm name, no false, misleading, assumed or trade name should be used. The continued
use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom, is not unethical, but care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. When a member of the firm, on becoming
a judge, is precluded from practicing law, his name should
not be continued in the firm name.
Partnerships between lawyers and members of other
professions or non-professional persons should not be
formed or permitted where any part of the partnership's
employment consists of the practice of law.
ABA Opinion 256 indicates such a card is proper, but the card
should state which of the lawyers are licensed to practice in Washington, D. C., only, and which are licensed in Colorado only.
Also, Canon 33 requires that, where lawyers hold themselves
out as partners, a genuine partnership must exist, not merely an association as to particular cases. See ABA Opinion 277. It is assumed
that the lawyers referred to in the above card are true partners.
OPINION NO. 7
APRIL 11, 1959
1. A lawyer who owns an interest in a collection agency and participates in its management may not conduct a law practice in the
same offices as the collection agency.
2. A lawyer who owns an interest in a collection agency and handles its claims in court may not conduct a law practice in the
same offices as the collection agency.
FACTS

A lawyer has a financial interest in a corporation operating as
a collection agency. He maintains a general law practice in the same
offices as the corporation, which are located on the ground floor at
the corner of a busy intersection in a large city. On the store-front
windows appears the name "X Collection Agency," and underneath
appears "John Doe, Attorney at Law." The corporation solicits business by various types of advertising and personal contact, taking
delinquent accounts by assignment and endeavoring to collect them
on a contingent-fee basis. Mr. Doe manages the collection business
on behalf of the corporation. The corporation sends out collection
letters on the attorney's letterhead. If it becomes necessary to sue on
an account, Mr. Doe acts as attorney for the corporation, files the
action, and represents the corporation in court.
OPINION

In the opinion of the Committee, Mr. Doe is in violation of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
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Opinion 225 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association is directly in point. There the question
before the Committee was in three parts: first, where the lawyer
participated in the management of the collection agency, but an outside lawyer was employed to handle claims in court; second, where
the lawyer did not participate in the management, but did handle
the claims in court; and third, where the lawyer did neither of these
things, but did own an interest in the collection agency.
The ABA Committee was of the opinion that there was nothing
improper about a lawyer's owning an interest in a collection agency,
as in any other business, provided "the name of the lawyer is neither included in the name of the agency, placed on its stationery,
nor included in its advertisements, and nothing is done to create the
impression that the agency enjoys the benefit of the lawyer's advice
and professional responsibility." But the ABA Committee held that
in either of the first two instances, that is, where a practicing lawyer owns an interest in a collection agency and also participates in
its management or handles its claims in court, the lawyer's conduct
is unethical. The ABA Committee based its opinion on Canon 27,
which prohibits solicitation of professional employment, but intimated that Canon 35 and Canon 47 might also be involved.
Your committee agrees with the ABA Committee and holds that
the conduct of Mr. Doe violates Canon 27. The collection agency
would inevitably operate as a feeder for Mr. Doe's law practice. On
this point, Opinion 57 of the ABA Committee is instructive. It states,
in part:
It is not necessarily improper for an attorney to engage
in a business; but impropriety arises when the business is of
such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member of the Bar.
Such an inconsistency arises when the business is one that
will readily lend itself as a means for procuring professional employment for him, is such that it can be used as a
cloak for indirect solicitation on his behalf, or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law. To avoid such inconsistencies it is always desirable and usually necessary that the lawyer keep any business in which he is engaged entirely separate and apart
from his practice of the law and he must, in any event, conduct it with due observance of the standards of conduct required of him as a lawyer.
(See, also, In Re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621, 1953.)
The Committee is also of the opinion that Canon 35 is
violated.
The applicable language of this canon is as follows:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's
responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should
avoid all relations which direct the performance of his
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duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client ...
Where a lawyer offices in the same quarters as a collection
agency which he owns, manages, or has an interest in, and the functions and activities of the lawyer and the agency are so intermingled as in the above case, it is difficult to ascertain who is the lawyer's client. If the creditors who turn over the accounts for collection are his clients, clearly the corporation is an intervening agent
in direct violation of the canon. If the corporation is the client, the
canon is still violated, since the collection letters (and inevitably
other collection procedures and advice of a legal or semi-legal nature) are handled and controlled at least in part by the corporation
and its lay personnel. See ABA Opinion No. 68.
OPINION NO. 8
JUNE 26, 1959
1. Where the sole or main relationship among a group of lawyers is
merely the sharing of office space and expenses, they may not
list each other's names on their respective letterheads as "associates."
FACTS

Five lawyers occupy the same suite of offices. Each conducts
his own law practice independently of the others, except on rare occasions when one or more of them may collaborate on a case. One
of the lawyers pays the overhead expenses, for which he charges
the other lawyers on the basis of the space each occupies or on some
other appropriate basis. Each lawyer keeps his own books and records, maintains his own files, and has his own clients. On the stationery of each lawyer is the following letterhead:
A. B.
Attorney at Law
Building
Colorado
Associates:
C. D.
E. F.
G.H.
J. K.
OPINION

In the opinion of the Committee, this letterhead violates the
Canons of Ethics.
The letterhead is misleading in that it implies that the lawyers
are either partners or that they practice together as an association
with common clients, records, and files. It may be an attempt to
lend weight and prestige to the particular lawyer's name. Where
the sole or main relationship among lawyers is merely the sharing
of office space and expenses, they should not imply that there is
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some deeper relationship by the use of each others' names on their
letterheads in addition to their own. To do so constitutes a violation of Canon 27, which prohibits indirect advertising. See, also,
Canons 32 and 33 and Opinion 106 of the Committee on Professional
Ethics of the American Bar Association.

OPINION NO. 9
JUNE 26, 1959
1. A lawyer who merely rents office space to other lawyers may not
represent by his letterhead, telephone listing, or otherwise, that
the other lawyers are associated with him nor may he include
their names with his in a firm name.
FACTS

A lawyer, A, represents by his letterhead, telephone listing, and
otherwise, that he is a member of the firm A, B, and C. By the same
means he represents that D, E, and F are associated with or employed by the firm. In fact, no partnership or employer-employee
relationship exists, nor are B, C, D, E, and F associated with A in
any manner other than to rent space from him.
OPINION

In the opinion of the Committee, these representations violate
the Canons of Ethics.
This case is similar to our previous opinion No. 9, but more aggravated. ABA Opinion No. 106, cited therein, prohibits a lawyer
from representing that other lawyers are partners (by inclusion in
a firm name) when they are merely employees; and, therefore, this
cannot be done when they are merely tenants, as above. See Canons
27, 32, and 33. As stated in Opinion No. 9, such representations are
misleading in that they imply an association which, in fact, does not
exist.

OPINION NO. 10
JUNE 26, 1959
1. A lawyer may not publish a professional card in a newspaper of
general circulation.
FACTS

A member of The Colorado Bar Association inquires whether it
is a violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics as adopted by the
Colorado Supreme Court to publish a standing professional card in
a local newspaper. It is proposed that such professional cards, containing no bold-face type, would be published in alphabetical order
on an annual basis.
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OPINION
Notwithstanding the fact that such publications have, in the
past, been permitted in the smaller towns in Colorado and had attained the status of a local custom, the practice has generally been
discontinued.
Following the amendment of Canon 27 in 1937, the Committee
on Ethics of the American Bar Association promulgated Opinion 182,
which held that the amendment to the Canon prohibits the insertion
of a professional card in any publication other than an approved
law list or legal directory.
In view of the general attitudes of bar associations toward the
question of advertising, the policy of the American Bar Association,
and the modern facilities for communication among members of the
public, there is no sufficient justification for the publication of such
cards, and the Committee, therefore, is of the opinion that the publication of such professional cards in a newspaper of general circulation in a community is unethical and violates the Professional
Canons.

